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CHAPETR ONE 
 
Dealing with Diversity.  
Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is nothing more than a matter of fact that our social world is crowded by moral, political, 
ethnical, religious, sexual, and social diversities1. An intriguing problem arises when one discusses 
how political institutions and political theory try to accommodate and deal with these diversities 
that could threaten the traditional notions of civic unity, stability, freedom, equality, and 
individualism with which Western liberal democracy as well as liberal theory are commonly 
associated. These considerations are particularly urgent in the debates about the regulation of the 
internal life of traditional (either religious or secular) communities that reject any simple 
assimilation to the practices and the lifestyles of mainstream society. 
                                                 
1 That is not a completely new condition for liberalism. In fact, as K. A. Appiah writes, “the matter of diversity, far 
from being marginal to the origin of modern political philosophy, was central to it” (The Ethics of Identity, Princeton 
University Press, 2005, p. xv). If liberalism’s origins are to be traced back to the search for a peaceful coexistence after 
the XVI and XVII Centuries’ Wars of Religion, one cannot deny that liberalism had to do with diversity of religious, 
moral, and cultural beliefs since its beginning. What is new is the increased consciousness of that diversity. The reason 
for this circumstance should be searched out in the globalization, in migration, and in the claims for inclusion advanced 
by excluded minorities.  For some accounts of historical origins of liberalism according to which Wars of Religion are 
at the starting point of liberalism, see J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, 
2005, and C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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In this paper I discuss and criticize some liberal answers to the fact of diversity. The paper 
offers both a critical presentation of the contemporary liberal debate and a defence of a political 
liberalism that, assuming toleration as its basic virtue, brings to completion the ‘political turn’ 
inaugurated by John Rawls. 
In the next section I present two distinctions one can find in liberalism. Considering the way 
in which a theory is justified, I draw a distinction between comprehensive and political liberalisms. 
Then, looking at the value each theory assumes as fundamental, I distinguish between pro-
autonomy and pro-toleration liberalisms. Combining these two distinctions, I obtain four kinds of 
liberal theories: comprehensive pro-autonomy, comprehensive pro-toleration, political pro-
autonomy, and political pro-toleration. In the third section comprehensive liberalism is rejected both 
in pro-autonomy and pro-toleration versions. In the fourth section political pro-autonomy liberalism 
is analyzed and objected on the basis of its only partial acceptance of the politicization of liberal 
theory. In the last section I give a sketch of what a pro-toleration political liberalism would look 
like. 
 
2. Liberal distinctions: political and comprehensive, pro-autonomy and pro-toleration. 
In this section I will give an account of two distinctions one can draw in liberalism. The first 
concerns the way in which a theory is justified, whereas the other pertains to which principle each 
theory assumes as fundamental. 
 If one considers justification, one can have political or comprehensive liberalism. 
Liberalisms understood as comprehensive doctrines2 are defended by John Locke, Immanuel Kant, 
and John Stuart Mill. In spite of the differences between their theories all share the following 
feature: “they relate liberal commitments in political philosophy to some vision or conception of 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive doctrine “includes what is of value in life and gives life its meaning. Metaphysical doctrines 
regarding the nature of reality, and epistemological doctrines regarding the possibility and conditions of human 
knowledge are also comprehensive doctrines, as are all religions”. See S. Freeman, Rawls, Routledge, 2007, p. 332. 
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what matters in life and of the human person and its place in the world”3. These liberalisms do not 
hide the fact that their liberal commitments are grounded in comprehensive accounts of human 
flourishing, or in worked out theories about moral value, metaphysics, and religion. Comprehensive 
liberals maintain that political theory cannot eschew references to substantive moral or 
metaphysical normative considerations, and that the defence of traditional liberal concerns such as 
the respect of individual rights, neutrality, and toleration is dependent on their comprehensive 
commitments. For instance, as Charles Larmore writes, “Kant and Mill sought to justify the 
principle of neutrality by appealing to the ideals of autonomy and individuality”4, and Will 
Kymlicka, which is a contemporary comprehensive liberal, defends toleration resting on the value 
of individual autonomy5. 
Political liberalism is a more recent presence in the liberal landscape. It is the view mainly 
elaborated by the late John Rawls in a series of articles published in the ‘80s and systematized in 
Political Liberalism6. In this book Rawls tries to work out a liberal theory understood as a political 
conception. It has three essential features: it only applies to the basic structure of society, it is 
independent of disputable comprehensive doctrines, and it is elaborated from ideas implicit in the 
culture of a liberal democratic society7. But, apart from the complex details of Rawlsian position, I 
will assume that “political liberalism is not merely the name of a book by John Rawls. It is a 
distinctive approach to the problem of political power”8 whose core idea is that, given the 
persistence of disagreement about the way in which one should live, liberal order should not be 
founded on the validity of a specific comprehensive doctrine. It should be pointed out that the 
distinction between comprehensive and political liberalism is not a difference between a moral and 
                                                 
3 J. Waldron, Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive, in G. F. Gaus, and C. Kukathas, Eds., Handbook of Political 
Theory, Sage, 2004, p. 91. 
4 C. Larmore, Political Liberalism, in Political Theory, 1990, p. 342. Here neutrality should be understood as the 
rejection of paternalistic restrictions for enforcing a specific conception of the good. 
5 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 8. 
6 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit. Other political liberals include, among the others, C. Larmore, D. Moon, M. 
Nussbaum, S. Macedo, and J. Shklar.  
7 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., pp. 11-15. 
8 B. Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, in S. P. Young, Edited by, Political Liberalism. Variations on a Theme, State 
University of New York Press, 2004, p. 79. 
 6
a non-moral political theory. A normative theory needs some moral content, and political liberalism, 
being a normative theory, has its own moral content. What distinguishes it from comprehensive 
liberalism is that “it tries to establish liberalism as a minimal moral conception”9. In plural and 
diverse societies, traditional liberal ideas of autonomy and individuality are too controversial to 
work as the basis of a liberal democratic society. Think about traditional or religious communities 
who place a particular emphasis on the value of group membership. As Larmore maintains, 
autonomy and individuality “have themselves become simply another part of the problem”10. Thus 
political power should be exercised according to reasons that everyone can accept independently of 
the comprehensive doctrine she endorses in her life. Underlying political liberalism there is the 
confidence that a liberal society can be just and stable even if individuals do not share 
comprehensive commitment. 
The second distinction we are dealing with concerns the core principles of liberal theory. 
Autonomy and toleration are the values a liberal theory can assume as fundamental. In his Liberal 
Pluralism William Galston talks about “two quite different variants of liberal thought based on two 
distinct principles”11. Thus pro-autonomy (or Enlightenment) and pro-toleration (or pro-diversity, 
or Reformation) are the liberalisms one obtains if one thinks about the main liberal value. In 
general, pro-autonomy liberals tend to value autonomy in the sense of “individual self-direction in 
at least one of the many senses explored by John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and 
American writing in an Emersonian vein”12. They stress the importance of rational self-reflection, 
individual choice, and revisibility of conceptions of the good. Instead, pro-toleration liberals are 
more diversity-friend, and in general praise diversity understood as “legitimate difference among 
individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of good life, source of moral authority, 
                                                 
9 C. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 17. 
10 C. Larmore, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 345. 
11 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 20.  
12 Ibidem, p. 21. 
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reason versus faith and the like”13. Pro-toleration liberalism’s advocates defend the view according 
to which liberalism is not a theory necessarily committed to the (although not coercive) promotion 
of autonomous life styles and that human life can flourish also in not autonomous ways. Further, 
pro-toleration liberals think that the main purpose of a liberal theory is the peaceful and just 
coexistence of different individual and collective lifestyles. From their standpoint, liberalism is a 
theory whose purpose is the settlement of disagreement and differences about how individuals and 
groups should live together. 
Jacob T. Levy has persuasively argued and with plenty of historical examples that “the 
autonomy/toleration dispute is not a new one, but one as old as liberalism itself”14. The distinction 
is rephrased as one between rationalist and pluralist liberalism. Rationalist liberals (Kant, Mill, 
Voltaire) are committed to “intellectual progress, universalism, and equality before a unified law, 
opposed to arbitrary and irrational distinctions and inequalities, and determined to disrupt local 
tyrannies”. Pluralist liberals (Acton, Montesquieu, Tocqueville) are “hostile to the central state and 
friendly toward local, customary, voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and 
associations”15. Both rationalists and pluralists share a common commitment to the recognition of 
the value of political freedoms, but they have different attitudes towards the relation between 
individuals and communities: rationalist liberals are generally more suspicious about the dangers 
represented by intra-group oppression. However, belonging to one of the two liberal traditions does 
not forbid to a certain extent sharing concern coming from the other tradition. For instance, a 
rationalist liberal will admit limits to the promotion of autonomy, whereas a pluralistic liberal will 
recognize that group authority comes to an and in case of gross violation of human rights. 
Combining the two distinctions I have been discussing in this section, I obtain four kinds of 
liberal theories: comprehensive pro-autonomy (CA), comprehensive pro-toleration (CT), political 
pro-autonomy (PA), and political pro-toleration (PT). In this way, we reach a sufficiently complete 
                                                 
13 Ivi. 
14 J. T. Levy, Liberalism’s Divide, After Socialism and Before, in Social Philosophy and Policy, 2003, p. 281. 
15 Ivi, p. 279.  
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overview of possible liberalisms in general that is also helpful in understanding and accounting for 
the contemporary debate about liberalism and diversity. The framework offered in this paper offers 
a rather complete overview of the available theoretical options in the contemporary debate. In 
addition, it is sensibly more complex than the one assumed in much recent political philosophy. For 
example, discussing whether autonomy or toleration are the fundamental liberal principles, 
Kymlicka writes: “this contrast is described in different ways – e.g. a contrast between 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalism, or between ‘Enlightenment’ or ‘Reformation’ 
liberalism”16. Kymlicka conflates a distinction about justificatory procedures (‘political’ or 
‘comprehensive’) with one about liberalism’s fundamental value (‘autonomy’ or ‘toleration’). In his 
framework any comprehensive liberalism is ipso facto pro-autonomy, whereas any political 
liberalism is pro-diversity. The next sections will show that a comprehensive liberalism can assume 
as fundamental principle either autonomy or toleration. Similarly, a political liberalism can be either 
pro-autonomy or pro-toleration. 
 
3. Rejecting comprehensive liberalisms. 
 In this section I will discuss and criticize comprehensive liberalisms’ attempt to 
accommodate diversity. Will Kymlicka’s theory will be assumed as an instance of CA, whereas 
William Galston’s will be examined as a CT liberalism. 
Kymlicka works out a systematic liberal theory of multiculturalism. The liberalism he 
defends is overtly comprehensive and pro-autonomy and alleges to be adequate in addressing 
cultural diversity represented by national and ethnic minorities (or migrants). Kymlicka maintains 
that one needs an appeal to the “general value of individual autonomy”17 for protecting and 
enforcing the whole range of liberal rights and freedoms as well as the rights liberalism is requested 
to grant to minorities. Kymlicka understands autonomy as rational revisibility of ends. In his 
argument choice has value in so far as it allows us to assert what has value. In this sense, 
                                                 
16 W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002², p. 229. 
17 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, cit., p. 163.  
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Kymlicka’s notion of choice and autonomy is less substantive than the Kantian (according to which 
choice is intrinsically valuable as it reflects human rational nature) and Millian (which appeals to 
the intrinsic value of individuality) views18. 
According to Kymlicka, the recognition of rights for minority groups, far from being a 
departure from liberal tenets, descends from liberalism itself. Or better, from liberalism as he 
himself conceives of it. Kymlicka’s liberal political morality foundation can be expressed in the 
following proposition: “our essential interest is in leading a good life”19. The fulfilment of a good 
life demands that “we lead our life from inside” and that we are “free to question those beliefs, to 
examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and arguments our culture can 
provide”20. These are the two preconditions for living a good life. Thus, individuals need both civil 
and personal liberties for living in accordance with what they deem valuable, and “the cultural 
conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about good life, and to acquiring 
an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views”21.  
Cultural membership is particularly significant in Kymlicka’s theory. Culture is both the 
context in which individuals exercise their choices, and source of individual identity. Thus, state 
interest for the thriving of a culture is not misplaced as far as it addresses the conditions for 
individual flourishing. Rather, it could be demanded by those liberal egalitarian principles which 
are upheld by Kymlicka. According to Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism, a just distribution should not 
depend from “the arbitrariness of natural contingency and social fortune”22. Similarly, Ronald 
Dworkin has proposed an ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive23 theory of distributive 
justice according to which individuals should not be subjected to misfortunes that are beyond their 
control. If all this holds, given that the disadvantage people suffer for the decay of their culture is 
beyond individual direct control, it is a problem liberalism should care about. Cultural disadvantage 
                                                 
18 Ibidem, p. 212. 
19W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 10. 
20 Ibidem, p. 13. 
21 Ivi. 
22 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 82. 
23 R.Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1981, p. 311.  
 10
becomes particularly relevant when one considers minority groups’ condition: majority rules and 
shapes social space according to its values, ideals, and beliefs. Kimlicka claims that “it must be 
recognized that the members of minority cultures can face inequalities which are the product of 
their circumstances or endowment, not their choices and ambitions”24. Thus the recognition of some 
rights to them turns out to be fully consistent with liberal theory. Kymlicka explains that minority 
rights advocated by his theory are to be understood as ‘external protections’ rather than ‘internal 
restrictions’25, that is as policies aimed at limiting the impact of majority decisions on minorities 
rather than as restriction to individual conduct. So, in Kymlicka’s theory, minority rights cannot 
authorize the violation of basic civil and political liberties. 
Some problems for Kymlicka’s approach emerge if one considers that it aims to liberalize26 
minorities. Although Kymlicka, distinguishing between the identification of the most adequate 
liberal theory and the imposition of liberal principles to non-liberal minorities27, rules out that the 
process of liberalization goes through coercive measures, I argue that nonetheless his commitment 
to autonomy and related ideas creates serious tensions in accommodating diversity. Firstly, the idea 
of ‘leading life from inside’ is not universally accepted: it is “essentially Protestant, and played only 
a limited role in classical Athens and Rome, medieval Europe, Catholic Christianity and non-
western civilizations”28. Moreover, the way in which Kymlicka envisages the relation between each 
individual and her culture is not beyond dispute. In fact, as Monique Deveaux has observed, “rather 
then citing ‘meaningful individual choice’ as the most important benefit of cultural membership, 
members of cultural minority groups might stress the ways in which membership provides a sense 
of place and belonging”29.  In addition, if a culture “is valuable in so far as it contributes to the 
exercise of autonomy, rights to the protection of culture are justified only in the cases of those 
                                                 
24 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., p. 190. 
25 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, cit., p. 36.  
26 Ibidem, p. 94. 
27 Ibidem, pp. 164-165. 
28 B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Palgrave, 2006², p. 106. 
29 M. Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 132. 
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groups, or those cultures, that value autonomy”30: an autonomy based liberalism could discount the 
rights claims advanced by those groups who do not recognize autonomy’s primacy but who could 
equally be in a situation of undeserved disadvantage. Thus if we ground minorities’ accommodation 
in controversial values, we run the risk of marginalizing all those groups who do not confer any 
particular value to autonomous lifestyles and individualistic ways of flourishing.  
The liberalization could actually transform minorities “into something they are not”31. There 
is no particular trouble about cultures’ transformation: unless one conceives of cultures as isolated 
and unchangeable entities, one needs to recognize that historical circumstances and reciprocal 
relations continuously work in favour of cultures’ evolution. The problem is that transformations 
mainly concern minority groups, and that this process is carried out according to values that they do 
not endorse. 
In partial response to an objection like that, Kymlicka has argued that minorities’ integration 
(especially for what concerns migrants) is a “two-way street”32, in the sense that it involves 
transformations both in majority and minority. More recently Kymlicka has written also that “the 
liberal view of multiculturalism is inevitably, intentionally, and unapolegetically transformational of 
people’s cultural traditions”33. Dominant and subordinate groups should interact on the basis of fair 
terms. The former are asked to “renounce fantasies of racial superiority, to relinquish claims to 
exclusive ownership of the state, and to abandon attempts to fashion public institutions solely in its 
national image”34, whereas minorities should abandon practices contrary to liberal democratic 
principles. The problem again is that the dominant group is requested transformations according to 
principles it endorses (but that it disrespects for various and contingent reasons), whereas the 
minority is asked to transform according to values it does not approve of. 
                                                 
30 M. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 55.  
31 B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, cit., p. 108. 
32 W. Kymlicka, The Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p. 171. 
33 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 99. 
34 Ibidem, p. 99-100. 
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William Galston’s diversity liberalism promises to be more accommodating of diversity than 
Kymlicka’s approach. Galston’s objection to any version of autonomy liberalism on the basis of the 
idea that “autonomy is one possible mode of existence in liberal societies – one among others”35 
points toward an extended acceptance of diversity, at least in practical terms. Galston states that if 
public institutions assume autonomy’s primacy, individuals and groups who deny that autonomy is 
always required for human thriving could experience liberal public space as an alien place. Thus, if 
liberalism privileges autonomy, the rather common idea according to which this theory could be no 
more than a sectarian doctrine notwithstanding its traditional aspirations to impartiality, neutrality, 
and universality, could dangerously be true. Galston maintains that “autonomy based-arguments are 
bound to marginalize those individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the 
Enlightenment impulse”36. For in our societies there are many individuals and groups whose ideal 
of human flourishing is in no way associated with autonomous choice, critical self-reflection, and 
all those attitudes generally related with a liberal-rationalistic idea of individual. Thus, according to 
Galston, “properly understood liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization of 
choice”37. Assuming the protection of diversity as the core value of a political theory allows 
Galston’s theory to pursue “a policy of maximum feasible accommodation”38 whose constraints are 
the requisites of civic unity and individual security. Moreover, it enables political institutions to 
take diversity seriously without imposing liberal values in the internal life of those groups that live 
in contemporary liberal societies. 
 Galston’s diversity liberalism relies on three resources: expressive liberty, political 
pluralism, and value pluralism. Expressive liberty is “the normatively privileged and institutionally 
defended ability of individuals and groups to lead their lives as they see fit”39. In a liberal state 
                                                 
35 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 24. 
36 Ibidem, pp. 25-26. 
37 W. A. Galston, Liberal Purposes. Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, Cambridge University Press, 
1991, p. 329. 
38 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 20. 
39 W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 45, my emphasis. Expressive 
liberty has limits. For example, it would object to human sacrifice for religious or conscientious reasons, but it would 
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individuals should live according to values and beliefs they endorse, even if that runs contrarily to 
the principles upheld by the majority. They can join even non-liberal associations provided that they 
enjoy “meaningful”40 exit rights. Political pluralism is the view that refuses the idea of the state as 
plenipotentiary power toward the plurality of associations and groups one can find in liberal 
democratic societies: state is just one among many legitimate authorities, and it is not the one that 
should always prevail. Finally, value pluralism is “an account of the actual structure of the 
normative universe”41 according to which there are many and heterogeneous goods irreducible to a 
single value. Value pluralism, although it rejects relativistic conclusions, rules out the possibility of 
fully rank-ordering the distinct and conflicting values that we encounter in our moral life. From the 
point of view of value pluralism there is also no value or good (no summum bonum) always having 
priority when there is a conflict with other values and goods. This form of moral realism42 is 
fundamental in Galston’s theory. In fact, it is value pluralism, together with his persistent objection 
to the view that liberalism has to “decouple political theory from other domains of enquiry”43, that 
signals the comprehensivity of Galston’s liberalism. For value pluralism is a complex and 
controversial theory about the nature of moral values, and, as will be clearer in the next section, 
political liberalism does not need any commitment about such issues: what does matter from its 
standpoint is that there is a plurality of conceptions of the good (the so called ‘fact of pluralism’) 
and that people, even ‘reasonable’ people, tend to disagree about the best way of living44.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
approve of some practices of conservative groups (for instance gender separation or male circumcision) that an 
autonomy liberal would condemn as unsuited to liberal societies. 
40 Exit rights are meaningful when individuals: are aware of other lifestyles, are able to assess the life in other 
communities, are free from psychological coercion, and have the capacity for living in a different group from the one 
they want to leave. See W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 123. As one can see, the conditions required for 
meaningful exit rights are rather demanding. In some cases they could ask for a level of state intervention in tension 
with political pluralism’s idea of the functions of the state. See D. M. Weinstock, Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and 
Internal Minorities, in A. S. Laden, and D. Owen, Edited by, Multiculturalism and Political Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
41 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 30. 
42 For Galston value pluralism is a form of moral realism because it presupposes “the existence of moral realm that is in 
some sense ‘there’, apart from our emotional projections and cultural constructions”. See W. A. Galston, The Practice 
of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 12. 
43 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 8. 
44 The incompatibility between value pluralism and political liberalism has been forcefully argued by Charles Larmore 
in The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 1996, Chapter 3. 
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The political implications of value pluralism are not immediately clear. Among the theorists 
accepting value pluralism the compatibility between this account of moral world and liberalism is a 
matter of dispute. Theorists like I. Berlin, B. Williams, and G. Crowder, claim that pluralism is 
attuned with liberalism, whereas others like J. Gray believe that the acceptance of value pluralism 
and the consequent refusal of autonomy (and even negative liberty) as the trump value leads to 
conceiving of liberalism as a theory of only local authority45. Galston follows Berlin’s route in 
trying to elaborate a liberal theory that assumes value pluralism and negative liberty as fundamental 
ideas. For Galston and Berlin, negative liberty should be understood as “the capacity of individuals 
unimpeded by external coercion or constraints, to choose for themselves among competing 
conceptions of good or valuable lives”46. A minimal conception of liberty47 such as this can have a 
privileged status in value pluralism and can function as the starting point for the elaboration of a 
liberalism that, as I said, seems very sympathetic towards diversity. And yet, at a closer sight, it has 
its own difficulties. 
Firstly, for what concerns diversity liberalism I argue that is not clear if it conceives of 
diversity as “its point of departure”48 or as the value that should be protected or pursued through 
public policies. In this last case, one would have a position in conflict with the pluralist view 
according to which there is no ultimate value that public policy should always pursue. In addition, 
diversity, from a liberal perspective, is a fact of social life having as such no particular value. It is 
simply a sociological fact that our societies are diverse for what concerns morality, religion, and 
politics. Diversity as such is not a value and we can have circumstances in which homogeneity 
could be preferable to diversity. Think for instance about the degree of convergence required by the 
good functioning of some religious or political associations. As Chandran Kukathas has written, 
                                                 
45 For a recent and well informed survey of the different positions see G. Crowder, Value Pluralism and Liberalism. 
Berlin and Beyond, in G. Crowder, and H. Hardy, Edited by, The One and the Many. Reading Isaiah Berlin, Reading 
Isaiah Berlin, Prometheus Books, 2007. 
46 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 48. See also, I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 
1969, Chapter 3. 
47 According to Galston, assuming this idea of negative liberty does not commit to some controversial philosophical or 
psychological systems. What does matter is only the absence of coercion when one wants to leave a community that 
risks becoming a prison. 
48 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 26. 
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“diversity is not the value liberalism pursues but the source of the problem to which it offers a 
solution”49. Liberalism is required to give an answer to the problem of elaborating agreeable 
principles for making possible the peaceful coexistence in a society extensively pervaded by the 
conflict about how one should live. Posing from the starting point that diversity is the value that 
liberalism should protect could mean puzzling the priorities and the finalities of liberal inquiry. 
Others problems of Galston’s approach concern the way in which value pluralism is 
employed. It is a philosophical view about plurality and incommensurability of conflicting goods, 
not cultures, so it should emphasize a state of affairs in which many values compete without always 
having a valid rule of priority. Galston himself recognize this feature of value pluralism when he 
refers to it as a resource to ground a liberal theory. For he claims that “while liberal pluralists 
celebrate legitimate diversity among cultures, they suspect that diversity will exist within culture as 
well and that a culture’s smoothly homogeneous public face reflects the covert operation of 
power”50. This statement results in patent tension with Galston’s acceptance of the Wisconsin v. 
Yoder51 decision, in which the parents of three Amish families claimed that an excess of their 
children’s exposure to diversity would have been obnoxious to the preservation of their lifestyle. 
They requested and obtained two years of exemption of their children from a Wisconsin law 
prescribing school attendance until the age of sixteen. The homogeneity and the social immobility 
of Amish society could be a signal of an unjustified and oppressing power exercised from the 
strongest against the weakest members of the group. At this point, I agree with George Crowder’s 
when he notices that “Galston does not go as far as Gray in identifying the incommensurability of 
values with the incommensurability of political regimes, but he tends similarly to equate diversity 
of goods with diversity of cultures”52. If the identification of the incommensurability of values with 
the incommensurability of political regimes easily translates into a relativistic view according to 
which there is no prospect for criticizing political institutions from outside, even the more moderate 
                                                 
49 C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 29. 
50 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 64. 
51 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972). 
52 G. Crowder, Isaiah Berlin, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 163.  
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equation of diversity of goods with diversity of cultures is a dangerous move toward a relativistic 
position that is potentially illiberal  and unavailable to Galston given his often stated idea that 
“pluralism is not the same as relativism”53. In fact, the emphasis on the diversity of cultures might 
hide the presence of oppression and coerced homogeneity within the groups themselves. In all 
likelihood there will be conflicts between diversity among cultures and within cultures, and 
Galston’s theory does not give us clear advises to deal with them. 
 
4. Political liberalism and diversity: political transformations. 
Stephen Macedo’s work is a clear expression of political liberalism’s principles. In a 1995 
article he objected to comprehensive liberalisms on the basis that their ideals are “deeply partisan 
and not easily defended”, and that they “claim too much”54. Political authority should not be 
premised on the validity of divisive and controversial comprehensive doctrines such as the view that 
critical thinking is a necessary feature of a good life, or that religious truths are to be achieved in 
some specific ways. Closely following Rawls’ approach in Political Liberalism, Macedo proposes 
“to put aside such matters such as religious truth and the ultimate ideals of human perfection” and 
stress “to justify at least the most basic matters of justice on ground widely acceptable to reasonable 
people – and not only to those who share our particular view of the whole truth”55: political 
liberalism asks to ‘bracket’ our deepest convictions and to focus upon what reasonable people can 
share. 
The theory Macedo is advancing is not sceptical.  It is not led by the idea that human reason 
is unfit to know moral, religious, or other metaphysical truths. Political liberalism “ask us not to 
renounce what we believe to be true, but to acknowledge the difficulty of publicly establishing any 
                                                 
53 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 30. 
54 S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, in Ethics, Vol. 
105, 1995, p. 473. 
55 Ivi. In the Rawlsian jargon, reasonable people are those who “are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social 
cooperation” and “agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided 
that others also accept those terms”. See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. xlii. 
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single account of truth for the whole of life”56. If common political institutions reflected a 
contestable account of moral, religious, or philosophical truth, one would have an evident form of 
disrespect for those who are committed to other comprehensive doctrines. In this sense, political 
liberalism’s core motive is “the desire to respect reasonable people”57. Individuals express this 
respect when they discuss essential political subjects offering each other reasons they can share 
despite their deep differences, and exercise political power in accordance with principles on which 
individuals can converge from their different comprehensive doctrines. For disagreements about 
conceptions of the good do not impede that people can agree on some public aims such as the value 
of equal freedoms, democratic institutions, and social security.  
The politicization of liberalism can be understood as a tool for amending comprehensive 
liberalism’s philosophical shortcomings in understanding and accommodating the problem of 
diversity. In fact, as Macedo maintains in a 1998 article, political liberalism is to be preferred to its 
opponent because the former, almost as a definitional matter, “accommodates a greater 
philosophical diversity at the foundational level than comprehensive versions of liberalism”58. If 
political liberalism does not rely on the validity of one among many conflicting conceptions of the 
good, it can more fairly accommodate and acknowledge the so called ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’, 
that is the persistent disagreement among reasonable individuals about the ultimate matters of 
ethics, religion, and philosophy59. Whereas one could say that comprehensive liberalism “does not 
show very much respect for the choices citizens may make to live nonautonomously, as members of 
hierarchical societies or corporate bodies”60, political liberalism does not take a position about 
ultimate matters that are not directly relevant in the political domain. So it does not privilege those 
                                                 
56 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 
170. 
57 Ivi.  
58 S. Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion. Defending the Moderate Hegemony of 
Liberalism, in Political Theory, 1998, p. 79. 
59 As John Rawls argues, “political liberalism assumes that a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime”. See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. xvi.  
60 M. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in S. M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton University Press, 
1999, p. 110. 
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who are committed to an autonomy inspired conception of the good life, but at the same time it does 
not marginalize for instance those who conceive of their flourishing within conservative religious 
communities. And yet, political liberalism does not stand neither for an undifferentiated acceptance 
of diversity nor for an unconstrained neutrality among different conceptions of the good. 
In fact, far from any attitude of celebration for plurality and difference as such, Macedo 
thinks that “diversity needs to be kept in its place: diversity is not always a value and it should not 
be accepted uncritically”61. Even for political liberalism there are ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ forms 
of diversity, and the principles of a sound political theory are to distinguish among which should be 
accommodated and which should be rejected or constrained. 
Macedo’s liberalism is pretty demanding. According to him, liberal societies do not rest on 
diversity, but on “shared political commitments”. Keeping alive a thriving liberal society requires 
“a shared public morality”62 and specific citizens’ virtues that do not naturally produce themselves, 
but call for public intervention, primarily trough the public schools. Macedo’s political liberalism is 
a kind of civic liberalism that goes beyond Rawlsian “concern with basic constitutional principles” 
and emphasizes “the importance of the wider civic life of liberal democracy in practice, as well as 
liberalism’s educative ambitions”63. The civic society envisaged by civic liberalism is a shared 
moral space in which citizens respect one another as equal participants in the collective enterprise 
of self-government.  
As I mentioned, Macedo’s liberalism’s notion of neutrality is very restricted. He argues that 
“political liberal principles are neutral only in being justified independently of religious and other 
comprehensive claims”64. Political justification does not rule out the possibility that people 
supporting different conceptions of the good will differently be affected by the liberal order. 
Promoting those virtues needed for the realization of a flourishing liberal society will be differently 
judged by progressive and conservative people. Political liberalism “will probably have the effect of 
                                                 
61 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit. p. 3. 
62 Ibidem, p. 146. 
63 Ibidem, p. 169. 
64 Ibidem, p. 169. 
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encouraging critical thinking in general”65 and will be more hospitable to the supporters of Kantian 
and Millian liberalisms than, for instance, to orthodox religious individuals66. 
It would seem that political liberalism in general, and Macedo’s in particular, is nothing 
more than a disguised comprehensive liberalism committed to the value of autonomy67. So, why do 
I consider his theory as a PA liberalism rather than an instance of CA liberalism? The main reason 
resides in the justification Macedo offers for his theory: it is a political justification which, being 
independent of comprehensive claims and focusing on what people share beyond their ultimate 
disagreements, aims to be more philosophically receptive towards diversity. The notion of 
autonomy fostered by political liberalism is not a comprehensive one as far as it is not supposed to 
count in all the domains of life. Political liberalism entails that individuals are to be politically 
autonomous68, that is autonomous as free and equal citizens in a liberal democratic regime. The fact 
that political autonomy spills over in extra-political domains is a further matter that political 
liberalism should attend to69  but that does not remove the justificatory difference between political 
and comprehensive liberalism.  
This difference is manifest also in the way in which Macedo’s political liberalism deals with 
diversity. As I said, his theory is very demanding and distinguishes between healthy and unhealthy 
forms of diversity. Macedo rejects ‘negative liberal legalism’, the view according to which the law 
is “a framework of impartial [and purposeless] rules within which individuals and groups may 
pursue their own divergent ends”70. This outlook grasps liberal attempts to limit state power but 
does not allow seeing liberal constitutionalism’s more positive ambitions. Liberal societies’ 
flourishing is not a natural fact but depends on certain citizens’ attitudes that are not spontaneous 
insofar as they need a significant state intervention through the public education and other less 
                                                 
65 Ibidem, p. 179.  
66 See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 200. 
67 This objection to Macedo has been moved by Cristopher Wolfe in Natural Law Liberalism, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, p. 116, and Troy Dostert in Beyond Political Liberalism. Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p. 46.  
68 For the notion of political autonomy in Ralws, see S. Freeman, Rawls, cit., pp. 361-363. 
69 Political liberalism’s spill over effects are addressed in John Tomasi’s Liberalism Beyond Justice. Citizens, Society, 
and the Boundaries of Political Theory, Princeton University Press, 2001.  
70 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 14.  
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direct means. Liberal state needs to transform individuals’ and groups’ commitments so that they 
can actively support liberal order71. In this sense, healthy forms of diversity are those “supportive of 
basic principles of justice”72. Thus, for Macedo, liberal state has to constitute normative diversity 
for its own ends. Collective and individual identities need to be transformed in ways that render 
them able to support a liberal democratic society. Once they have been transformed in this 
direction, they can organize and develop according to their comprehensive principles and beliefs. 
The process through which in the 1960’s American Catholic Church was liberalized and, after a 
long period of distrust and suspicion, became an active supporter of democracy around the world is 
assumed as an illustration of the “transformative potential of civic liberalism”. Macedo remarks that 
this transformation “did not occur accidentally”73, but was the deliberate outcome of, among other 
political acts, the principle of separation between political and religious power. 
Macedo’s liberalism is unapologetically transformative up to the point that it does not even 
despise assimilation, provided that it operated in nonoppressive ways, and is directed toward 
justifiable values, that is values that can be defended without an appeal to comprehensive doctrines. 
In fact, as Macedo argues, “the point of the transformative mechanisms is political. They are 
deployed in liberal politics, and their effects are welcomed insofar as they secure a system of 
political liberty and other basic political goods”74. Liberal transformations stress the need to 
enhance our civil interests, the common interests of citizens who decide to peacefully live together 
in a free and diverse society, not to advance a religion over another religion or atheism over 
religious faith in general. In this sense, Macedo’s view is less demanding and more open to 
diversity than, for instance, John Dewey’s civic totalism with his idea that democratic public 
morality should be concerned with what is ultimately true. Political liberalism neither has a negative 
                                                 
71 Macedo points out that the interest for individuals’ and communities’ support for political order is not alien to 
liberalism. It is a rather old liberal concern. For instance, a classical liberal such as Adam Smith was aware that “local 
communities and other intermediate associations are important indirect instruments of civic education which may, 
nevertheless, need to be shaped and managed to some degree by public policies designed to encourage them to take 
forms that are supportive of liberal democracy”. See S. Macedo, Community, Diversity, and Civic Education. Toward a 
Liberal Science of Group Life, in Social Philosophy and Policy, 1996, p. 252. 
72 S, Macedo,  Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 134. 
73 Ibidem, p. 134-135. 
74 Ibidem, p. 137. 
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attitude towards religion and other particular loyalties nor does want, in a Deweyan spirit, “to 
dissolve traditional religions in order to transfer religious energies to the common political project 
of progressive reform and the advancement of science and culture”75. It only asks that religious and 
other groups transform in a civic direction to support liberal order. 
Up to now, the reconstruction of Macedo’s thought has been eloquent in showing that the 
politicization of liberalism represents an interesting theoretical move for accommodating diversity. 
Political liberalism scores high for what concerns the accommodation of “philosophical diversity at 
the foundational level”. Eschewing any appeal to ultimate truths and focusing on the political 
domain (although it is not seen as isolated from other extra-political concerns), political liberalism 
can claim the allegiance of many who do not feel comfortable in a society ruled by a comprehensive 
liberalism. For example, if we think about religion, political liberalism, with its focus on the need to 
avoid questions connected with the ultimate truth of a set of religious beliefs, tends to be less 
sectarian than “deeply secular” and “truth seeking” comprehensive liberalism even for scholars 
concerned with the compatibility of Islam with liberal democratic values76. In addition, Macedo’s 
approach, with its emphasis on the civic dimension of political liberalism, enables us to grasp the 
fundamental dimension of individual and collective identities’ transformations involved in the 
accommodation process. Nonetheless, in the remaining part of the present section, I contend that 
Macedo’s understanding of the transformative dimension of liberalism is incomplete. 
In a passage addressing the problem of which groups are worthy of being accommodated, 
Macedo writes that “the important point is that we must decide which communities are to be 
accommodated, and that there is nothing wrong with deciding on the basis of the best reasons that 
are available, and with due confidence in the worth of preserving liberal institutions”77. Remarking 
that we have the duty to decide whom and according to which principles is to be included in our 
                                                 
75 Ibidem, pp. 139-140. 
76 H. H. Haidar, Liberalism and Islam. Practical Reconciliation between the Liberal State and Shiite Muslims, Palgrave, 
2008, p. 104. Haidar considers Rawls and J. S. Mill as examples of (respectively) political and comprehensive 
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77 S. Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion, cit., p. 73 (emphasis in the text). 
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liberal society does not allow to see some relevant issues involved in a fair integration of 
individuals and groups understood as free and equal participants in a liberal framework. 
Firstly, given the complexity and the diversification of every liberal society it is difficult to 
identify the we in which the ultimate authority resides. Unless one assumes a monolithic image of 
liberal society, there will be more then one we competing for having the last word.  
Secondly, it is difficult to imagine an accommodation that does not involve changes in the 
majority that receives new, and presumably different, groups such as migrants. Macedo’s approach 
is well equipped to see only one side of the coin, that is the transformations demanded to minorities, 
whereas it is easily predictable that, at least descriptively, the inclusion of new minorities in a 
liberal state will alter its character. For instance, David Miller has argued that migrants’ 
contribution to the reshaping of the culture of the nation to which they move is “a process that 
happens in any case”78. The relevant normative considerations arise when one considers which the 
more adequate way of accounting for this process is. Such an account has to recognize the value of 
migrants’ contribution in a non-residual way: once they have lawfully been admitted, their status as 
less than equal citizen is unjustifiable in a liberal perspective. Imagine that a liberal society in which 
Catholicism is the most common religion receives a significant number of Muslim migrants79. Even 
though the society temporarily rejects full political integration for newcomers, it will be affected by 
many changes. Let us assume that Muslim children go to public schools with Catholic children. It is 
easy to foresee that, even without multicultural provisions aimed at accommodating newcomers, 
classrooms will become at least de facto multicultural. Later, if the Muslim presence is recognized 
and accommodated, the changes will be more extended: there will be new study programs, 
particular provisions for holidays, etc. In a subsequent stage, if migrants are fully included in the 
democratic process and obtain citizenship, one can imagine that “the acceptance of difference in the 
public sphere easily leads to a number of changes […] so as to accommodate the newly included 
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groups”80. The public space of the receiving society will lodge new individuals with their 
previously excluded different religions, beliefs, moralities, histories. The earlier Catholic and 
homogeneous society is going to not exist anymore. It will have been replaced by a new society in 
which both old residents and newcomers went trough a process of reciprocal transformations. Once 
a liberal society decides, for loyalty to its own principles of freedom and equality, to accommodate 
new groups, even the we that in Macedo’s model must rule on matters of inclusion becomes subject 
to changes. In other words, “We cannot integrate them so long as we remain we”81. Thus, a theory 
such as Macedo’s, undervaluing majority’s transformations, does not grasp a fundamental 
dimension involved in the accommodation of diversity. 
To conclude, in this same section I observed that for Macedo “the point of the 
transformative mechanisms is political”82. Communities are accepted in the liberal state provided 
that they politically transform. Differently stated, individual should become autonomous and, 
although the notion of autonomy involved is a political one, it could be troubling if one considers 
that an exclusive focus on autonomy-enhancing transformations involves an undervaluation of the 
status of the minorities and a misconception of their role when they are fully admitted in a liberal 
public sphere. 
 
5. Toward a political theory of toleration. 
 In the previous sections I have been discussing three liberal approaches to the problem of 
diversity. Comprehensive liberalism was rejected both in Kymlicka’s pro-autonomy and Galston’s 
pro-toleration version. Kymlicka’ liberal multiculturalism appears to be unable to accommodate 
diversity. The emphasis on the value of autonomy excessively constraints the accommodation of 
diversity: the liberalization of minorities, considering that they could reject the primacy of 
autonomy without being dangerous for the maintenance of a liberal order, does not take seriously 
                                                 
80 A. E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 200. 
81 B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, cit., p. 204. 
82 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 137. 
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their difference. Galston’s theory, discarding the view that autonomy is the liberal sommum bonum, 
appears to go one step further. The recognition that in a liberal society there are many legitimate 
authorities and that liberalism demands respect for “expressive liberty” would seem adequate tools 
for dealing with diversity, at least in practical terms. And yet, value pluralism is not a safe ground: 
it is a view according to which there are many goods, but Galston seems to translate it in the view 
that there are many cultures. A similar shift could, contrarily to Galston’s premises, condone 
illiberal outcomes. 
 The political turn represents a remarkable theoretical opening to the problem of diversity. 
Liberalism becomes independent of comprehensive accounts of good, truth, religion. Political 
liberalism, relying on what individuals can share despite their comprehensive loyalties, is more 
philosophically generous than comprehensive liberalism insofar as he accepts more diversity at 
foundational level. In the fourth section I discussed Macedo’s theory as an example of what I 
labelled ‘political pro-autonomy liberalism’. Macedo’s view is rather demanding. He subordinates 
the acceptance of diversity to the political transformation of the minorities looking for 
accommodation. The notion of political transformation has been found highly problematic: it 
prevents us from seeing that the integration of minorities involves reciprocal transformations both 
in majority and in minorities. 
I argue that the most adequate liberal theory for dealing with diversity has to be political and 
pro-toleration. The political turn must be brought to completion: political liberalism has to leave 
behind its commitment to autonomy, even to a political notion of autonomy. Demanding that 
individuals become politically autonomous could be too demanding and, as I observed examining 
Macedo’s theory, could hide important dimensions one has to consider about the integration of the 
minorities. Political liberalism is accomplished and does not betray its philosophical premises when 
it is coupled with a commitment to toleration. Only in this way one can have a theory that combines 
political liberalism’s philosophical openness towards diversity with the practical receptivity of pro-
toleration views.  
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The liberal outlook one obtains does not “describes a set of standards and principles by 
which a community or society should live”. A society will not be considered liberal inasmuch as it 
respects “the values which make it liberal”83, because these same values are matter of disagreement, 
but when the conditions for a peaceful coexistence of different individuals and groups have been 
realized. 
  The liberal theory I am sketching is suspicious of those approaches based on recognition or 
dialogue as the best tools for addressing diversity. The empirical starting point is the realization that 
“minorities disagree with one another and, in some cases are riven by internal conflicts which reveal 
an absence of agreement even within some of the smallest communities”84. Presuming that the 
accommodation of diversity is always connected to political recognition of minorities’ difference 
could involve a misrepresentation of minorities. Apart from numerically isolated religious groups 
like the Amish, minorities are not natural, homogeneous, and unchangeable structures. They are 
subject to continual reshaping and internal dissent. Political recognition is not the right answers 
insofar as it could be associated with the idea that minorities are always civic spirited and express 
themselves through rights claims. Dialogical approaches are as well objectionable because they are 
extremely demanding for those groups and individuals whose rationality does not dialogically 
articulate. The argumentative resolution of conflicts could consolidate the dominion of those group 
who are more dialogically oriented, that is the majority.     
Liberalism has to be ready to recognize that individuals can live successful lives even in 
non-liberal groups. Central power should not rule the internal life of private associations and 
communities, provided that they do not violate human rights and leave individuals free to flourish 
according to their own conceptions of the good. Anyway, state intervention has to be minimally 
invasive and not led by controversial ideas about the fulfilment of a good life. 
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  From this brief account one can infer that in a pro-toleration political liberalism the role of 
the state is sensibly constrained. Does the significant reduction of state intervention inevitably 
commit to the anarchical view that the state is “the most powerful instrument of oppression and 
domination we have know”85 and to Kukathas’ understanding of liberal society as an 
“archipelago”86, with the related undervaluation of the value of state unity?  
For reasons of brevity, I cannot extensively engage with Kukathas’ extremely challenging 
views, but I think that he overstates the weight of historical recordings in normative theory: from 
the fact that the state has (supposedly) been an extraordinary oppressive force does not immediately 
descends that it cannot be reformed. It could be possible and desirable that, if the state is led by the 
right liberal principles, its oppressiveness disappears as much as possible.  
 The “archipelago view of society”87 has been criticized in a recent article by Daniel 
Weinstock. He argues that this view of society (defended among the others by Kukathas, Raz, Gray, 
and Spinner-Halev88) relies on two objectionable premises: the ‘independence assumption’ and the 
‘completeness assumption’. The first claims that “people’s cultural identities are formed 
independently of the broader social and political structures of which they are a part”, whereas the 
second asserts that “membership in a group account completely for members identity”89. The 
‘independence assumption’ mistakenly assumes that groups are generally insular and isolated, 
whereas it is a matter of fact that groups and their cultures (with the exception of few conservative 
religious groups) interact and dialectically evolve. The ‘completeness assumption’ is equally 
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 27
flawed: it does not recognize that “typically, individuals belong to a plurality of groups”90 (such as 
churches, political parties, professional or recreational associations) none of which can completely 
account for the character of a person.  
To say the truth, Kukathas does maintain none of these arguments. In fact, he argues that 
“groups are themselves not in any way natural or fixed entities but mutable social formations which 
change shape, size, and character as society and circumstances vary”91. But, while Kukathas uses 
the mutability and the interactions of groups as an argument against their political recognition and 
in favour of the establishment of liberalism as the ‘politics of indifference’92 towards personal 
attachments, Weinstock draws from the same premises the conclusion that “they must also be 
thought of as having obligations towards the state and the broader society”93. The idea is that people 
live in common spaces in which they have relations with people from other groups, and that these 
relations create obligations towards other citizens and the state. As Weinstock argues, “to revert to 
the archipelago image, since citizens of modern societies actually spend quite a bit of time in the 
waters separating groups from one another, they all have a responsibility to make sure that they are 
suitable to the needs of all”94. Thus, it is difficult, even for the individuals who live in relatively 
autonomous groups, to be completely free from reciprocal obligations. 
To conclude, I think that the existence of these obligations could be consistent with the 
liberalism I am trying to defend. After all, Kukathas himself admits the existence of a state whose 
“role is to serve as an umpire”95 who has to settle disagreement among groups or individual for the 
sake of a peaceful common coexistence. Thus, the crucial issue is not the existence or the 
disappearing of the state (at the end of the day it exists) but the reasons that regulate its conduct. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
Liberalism and Minority Rights: Liberalizating Minorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduzione 
Il diffondersi sia in filosofia politica che nel dibattito pubblico di termini quali 
‘multiculturalismo’, ‘politica della differenza’, ‘politica dell’identità’ e ‘politica del 
riconoscimento’ indica la crisi del modello di cittadinanza basato sul possesso di diritti comuni e 
universali96. Questo modello, che è stato prevalente nei Paesi liberal-democratici occidentali a 
partire dal secondo dopoguerra, accordava il riconoscimento dello status di cittadino a tutti gli 
individui di uno Stato mediante la concessione di diritti politici e sociali. Tuttavia, il possesso dei 
diritti di cittadinanza non ha impedito che alcuni gruppi (per esempio i neri, i gay e le lesbiche, le 
donne, le minoranze religiose, gli immigrati, i popoli indigeni) si sentissero marginalizzati, oppressi 
o esclusi. Come ha scritto Will Kymlicka, è diventato via via sempre più chiaro che «molti gruppi si 
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sentono marginalizzati e stigmatizzati nonostante il possesso dei comuni diritti di cittadinanza. 
Molti membri di questi gruppi si sentono marginalizzati, non (o non solo) a causa del proprio status 
socio-economico, ma anche a causa della propria identità socio-culturale – la lora ‘differenza’»97. 
La nozione di cittadinanza differenziata in base all’identità socio-culturale degli individui è 
sembrato un mezzo necessario per arginare il fenomeno dell’esclusione delle minoranze e per far sì 
che la profonda diversità e il pluralismo culturale che caratterizzano le moderne società occidentali 
venissero accettati, riconosciuti e accomodati, piuttosto che oscurati mediante un’idea di 
cittadinanza uniforme che assume come accettabile universalmente un modello di individuo 
(solitamente maschio, bianco, eterosessuale) che in realtà non è affatto universale. Le richieste di 
accettazione, riconoscimento e accomodamento sono state spesso portate avanti da soggetti 
considerati non come individui isolati, ma come membri di gruppi esclusi o oppressi. Perciò, il 
processo di elaborazione di un’idea di cittadinanza maggiormente sensibile alla diversità 
rappresentata dalle minoranze ha portato alla comparsa di nozioni controverse come ‘diritti 
collettivi’ o ‘diritti di gruppo’. 
Il liberalismo, essendo per tradizione una teoria politica individualista, è sembrato incapace 
di articolare una efficace difesa dei diritti delle minoranze. Infatti, almeno fino alla fine degli anni 
’80 del secolo scorso, il discorso sui diritti delle minoranze è stato percepito come una reazione 
generale all’astrattezza individualistica e all’atomismo del liberalismo contemporaneo98. L’enfasi 
liberale sull’autonomia individuale e sull’indivdualismo morale è stata assunta dagli autori 
comunitaristi99 come la prova che il liberalismo è una teoria inadeguata a rendere conto della natura 
sociale dell’individuo e, di conseguenza, dei diritti delle minoranze. 
                                                 
97 KYMLICKA, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002², 
p. 329  
98 KYMLICKA, Will, The Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. 18. 
99 Come esempio di comunitaristi si considerino almeno SANDEL, Michael, Il liberalismo e i limiti della giustizia, 
Milano, Feltrinelli, 1994; MacINTYRE, Alasdair, After Virtue, London, Duckworth, 1981. Per il dibattito tra 
liberalismo e comunitarismo si veda FERRARA, Alessandro (a cura di), Liberalismo e comunitarismo, Roma, Editori 
Riuniti, 1992.  
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Fin dal suo primo libro100, il filosofo politico canadese Will Kymlicka ha cercato di 
dimostrare non solo che il liberalismo può elaborare una coerente teoria dei diritti delle 
minoranze101, ma che sono le premesse stesse della teoria liberale a esigerlo. In questo articolo 
presenteremo la concezione liberale di Kymlicka e il modo in cui egli difende una teoria liberale dei 
diritti delle minoranze. Infine criticheremo la centralità della nozione di autonomia nella teoria di 
Kymlicka e la sua ristrettezza nel cogliere la reale portata della diversità culturale rappresentata 
dagli immigrati. 
 
2. Liberalismo e appartenenza culturale.  
 Kymlicka concepisce il liberalismo come una teoria politica normativa, vale a dire come «un 
insieme di argomenti morali sulla giustificazione dell’agire politico e delle istituzioni»102. Il 
liberalismo si distingue per il riconoscimento di libertà fondamentali agli individui, e per consentire 
a ciascuno di scegliere e rielaborare liberamente la propria concezione del bene. 
 Kymlicka assume come punto di partenza per l’esposizione della moralità politica del 
liberalismo la seguente proposizione: «il nostro interesse essenziale consiste nel condurre una vita 
buona, nell’avere quelle cose che una vita buona contiene»103. Questa asserzione non va intesa nel 
senso relativistico o scettico per cui ogni vita, quali che siano i valori sottoscritti o le esperienze 
vissute, ha valore. Kymlicka infatti sostiene che  «condurre una vita buona è diverso da condurre 
una vita che al momento noi crediamo essere buona»104. Gli esseri umani sono fallibili, e possono 
elaborare credenze errate sul valore di ciò che stanno perseguendo. Il processo deliberativo per 
                                                 
100 KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. 
101 Bisogna precisare che le riflessioni di Kymlicka sono limitate alle sole minoranze culturali. Il significato di ‘cultura’ 
nella particolare accezione di Kymlicka sarà chiarito in seguito. 
102 KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., p. 9. 
103 Ivi, p. 10. Lo statuto filosofico di questa e delle altre due proposizioni che, come vedremo, costituiscono la moralità 
politica del liberalismo, non è chiaro. Come ha scritto Bhikhu Parekh, Kymlicka «talvolta sostiene che [le tre 
proposizioni] rappresentano fondamentali credenze liberali; altre volte le considera come verità generali sulla vita 
umana e sostiene o implica che, basandosi su di esse, il liberalismo è più vero o razionalmente difendibile di altre 
dottrine politiche». Nel primo caso, le proposizioni avrebbero cogenza solo per gli individui liberali di una società. Nel 
secondo caso invece, bisognerebbe dimostrare che le proposizioni sono convincenti ma, come vedremo, è possibile 
sollevare dubbi sulla loro accettabilità. PAREKH, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory, Basingstoke-Londra, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006², p. 105. 
104 KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., p. 10. 
 31
identificare quale vita sia buona e quali fini debbano essere perseguiti non avviene nel vuoto, ma in 
un contesto di interdipendenza. Dunque, le obiezioni secondo le quali il liberalismo si baserebbe 
sull’idea di un soggetto avulso dalle relazioni sociali, i cui interessi e preferenze sono dati 
indipendentemente dal condizionamento sociale, è malposta.  Sia John Stuart Mill che John Rawls, 
che insieme a Ronald Dworkin, sono gli autori liberali che esercitano maggiore influenza sul lavoro 
teorico di Kymlicka, non hanno assunto a fondamento del loro liberalismo un’idea di un soggetto 
morale atomisticamente concepito, ma hanno insistito sia sul fatto che i fini individuali si formano 
all’interno della società sia che il carattere è plasmato e modificato in diversi modi dall’interazione 
sociale105. 
 L’esposizione della moralità politica del liberalismo di Kymlicka si completa con altre due 
proposizioni che rappresentano le pre-condizioni della realizzazione della vita buona: «una è che 
dobbiamo condurre la nostra vita dall’interno, in accordo con le nostre credenze su ciò che 
conferisce valore alla vita; l’altra è che dobbiamo essere liberi di mettere in dubbio queste credenze, 
di esaminarle alla luce di qualunque informazione, esempi e argomenti che la nostra cultura possa 
fornirci»106. Perchè qualcosa abbia valore per l’individuo, questi deve sottoscriverla: una credenza 
religiosa, per esempio, non conferisce valore alla vita umana se viene imposta coercitivamente e 
non è il frutto di una deliberazione libera. Da qui derivano, secondo Kymlicka, le libertà civili e 
personali tradizionalmente associate al liberalismo, nonchè l’avversione per il paternalismo 
ingiustificato e l’interesse liberale per la tutela della privacy. Inoltre, in conseguenza della fallibilità 
umana, ciascuno deve poter vivere in un contesto che gli permetta di conoscere differenti 
concezioni del bene e di disporre di quelle informazioni necessarie a esaminare il proprio piano di 
vita e a rivederlo qualora ce ne fosse bisogno. Da queste ulteriori considerazioni si può riconoscere 
                                                 
105 Per avvalorare le proprie tesi Kymlicka cita RAWLS, John, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave. In Idem (a cura di 
Samuel Freeman), Collected Papers, Cambridge, MA-Londra, Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 240, e MILL, John 
Stuart, a cura di F. Leavis, Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, Londra, Chatto and Windus, 1962, p. 71. Cfr. KYMLICKA, 
Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., pp. 14-16. 
106 KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., p. 13. 
 32
la centralità dell’interesse statale per l’educazione dei cittadini e l’importanza di altre libertà 
individuali care al liberalismo come quella di espressione, di associazione, di stampa. 
 Un liberalismo come quello di Kymlicka, che abbiamo visto essere tutt’altro che 
astrattamente individualistico, riconosce un valore fondamentale alla cultura e all’appartenenza 
culturale. Infatti, pur sostenendo che in una società liberale la decisione su come vivere spetti in 
ultima istanza all’individuo, Kymlicka riconosce che «questa decisione comporta sempre una 
selezione di ciò che noi crediamo abbia più valore tra diverse opzioni disponibili, una selezione da 
un contesto di scelta che ci fornisce differenti modi di vita»107. La scelta avviene tra le opzioni che 
la cultura ci mette a disposizione. Dunque, per Kymlicka la cultura si configura innanzitutto come il 
contesto all’interno del quale gli individui scelgono per dare un significato alla propria vita108. Per 
questa ragione il valore che il liberalismo può attribuire a una cultura non è un valore in sè, ma un 
valore derivante dal fatto di essere il contesto all’interno del quale le scelte individuali si compiono 
e acquistano significato. 
 Inoltre, la cultura è fondamentale per gli individui anche in un secondo senso: essa 
conferisce loro identità. I membri di una cultura tendono a identificarsi con essa, fino al punto che 
perfino il rispetto di sè di ciascuno è influenzato dal modo in cui la propria cultura è percepita dagli 
altri. In altri termini, «se una cultura non è generalmente rispettata, allora anche ne soffriranno 
anche la dignità e l’autostima dei suoi membri»109. Kymlicka sostiene che il valore 
dell’appartenenza culturale non riguarda solo le società tradizionali, ma anche quelle liberali, in cui 
le libertà e i diritti individuali sono tutelati e non esiste una concezione del bene condivisa da tutti i 
cittadini. In questo senso, l’approccio liberale all’appartenenza culturale si distingue da quello 
comunitarista, il quale invece presuppone che la comunità culturale nei confronti della quale 
l’individuo avverte un legame costitutivo sia una comunità che condivide una specifica concezione 
del bene. 
                                                 
107 Ivi, p. 164. 
108 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 145-148. 
109 Ivi, p. 157. 
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Arrivati a questo punto è opportuno precisare che quando Kymlicka parla di cultura si 
riferisce a culture sociali (‘societal cultures’) in quanto vuole sottolineare che esse implicano «la 
condivisione non solo di ricordi e valori, ma anche di istituzioni e pratiche»110. Più precisamente, 
secondo Kymlicka una cultura sociale «è una cultura territorialmente concentrata, basata su un 
linguaggio condiviso che è usato in molte istituzioni sociali, sia nella vita pubblica che privata 
(scuole, mezzi di comunicazione, diritto, economia, governo)». Essa «implica un linguaggio e delle 
istituzioni comuni, piuttosto che credenze religiose comuni, abitudini familiari, stili di vita 
personali»111. Dunque, una cultura sociale può essere, e in genere è, pluralista. La creazione delle 
culture sociali è un fenomeno eminentemente connesso al processo di modernizzazione. Kymlicka 
sostiene infatti che «la modernizzazione consiste nella diffusione, nell’ambito di una società intera, 
di una cultura comune, compresa una lingua standardizzata, che si esprime in istituzioni 
economiche, politiche e formative comuni»112. L’esistenza di culure sociali così come Kymlicka le 
intende è stato funzionale al bisogno dell’economia moderna di avere una forza lavoro adatta alle 
sue esigenze di sviluppo, e ha reso possibile la diffusione dell’elevato livello di solidarietà 
necessario al sostegno dei meccanismi del welfare state. Inoltre, l’esistenza di un sistema educativo 
pubblico ha consentito l’affermarsi quell’eguaglianza di opportunità che costituisce uno dei 
fondamenti del sistema democratico.  
 
3. Pluralismo culturale e diritti delle minoranze.  
Ne La cittadinanza multiculturale Kymlicka distingue tra due tipi di diversità culturale ai 
quali corrispondono due tipi di Stati. Nel primo caso la diversità culturale «trae origine 
dall’assorbimento in uno stato più ampio di culture territorialmente concentrate che in precedenza si 
governavano da sole»113, sia che si tratti di popoli indigeni che di gruppi che si percepiscono come 
                                                 
110 Ivi, p. 135. 
111 KYMLICKA, Will, The Politics in the Vernacular, cit., p. 25. 
112 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 135. 
113 Ivi, p. 21.  
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vere e proprie nazioni all’interno di uno Stato più grande114 dopo aver subito una colonizzazione o 
una conquista. Le culture che vengono incorporate vengono definite ‘minoranze nazionali’, e lo 
Stato al cui interno sono presenti minoranze nazionali viene definito ‘multinazionale’. In uno Stato 
multinazionale, dunque, sono presenti due o più culture sociali distinte, e la culture minoritarie non 
aspirano all’assimilazione, ma a forme di autonomia o di auto-governo che consentano loro di 
preservare la propria specificità culturale. Gli USA e il Canada sono considerati chiari esempi di 
Stati multinazionali. Negli USA le minoranze nazionali sono rappresentate dai Portoricani, dalle 
tribù Indiane, dagli aborigeni Hawaiani e da tutti quei gruppi che sono stati involontariamente 
annessi agli USA in seguito a colonizzazione o conquista. Le minoranze nazionali canadesi sono 
invece rappresentate dagli aborigeni e dagli abitanti del Quebec. 
L’immigrazione costituisce la seconda forma di diversità culturale. I gruppi di immigrati 
vengono definiti ‘gruppi etnici’, e uno Stato in cui sono presenti nutrite comunità di immigrati è 
definito ‘polietnico’. Gli immigrati non posseggono una cultura sociale distinta da quella 
maggioritaria: infatti, Kymlicka ritiene che gli immigrati, essendosi trasferiti volontariamente in un 
altro Stato, siano disposti ad integrarsi nella nuova cultura sociale senza la pretesa (ma, come si 
vedrà in seguito, anche senza le possibilità) di ricostituire la propria cultura sociale nel Paese che li 
ospita. Uno Stato può essere sia multinazionale che polietnico, come dimostrano gli USA e il 
Canada, dove esistono sia minoranze nazionali che comunità di immigrati. 
 Kymlicka osserva (e giudica positivamente) che negli ultimi anni c’è stata una generale 
accettazione del multiculturalismo, e dunque di politiche in favore delle minoranze culturali, in tutte 
le democrazie occidentali. Nel suo ultimo libro Kymlicka identifica tre principi sottesi alla 
diffusione del muliculturalismo: in primo luogo, si osserva l’abbandono dell’idea che lo Stato sia 
proprietà esclusiva del gruppo culturale dominante in favore dell’idea che «lo Stato deve essere 
                                                 
114 Questi gruppi sono definiti come «substate ‘national groups’» in KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Odysseys. 
Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 68. 
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considerato appartenente a tutti i cittadini in eguale misura»115; in secondo luogo, si è andata 
gradualmente affermando l’idea che le minoranze non devono essere coercitivamente assimilate o 
escluse, ma che possono partecipare da eguali nella sfera pubblica affermando la propria identità 
etnica; infine si è ottenuto il riconoscimento dei torti commessi dalle maggioranze nei confronti 
delle minoranze, e si è accettata la legittimità di politiche compensative. 
 Ne La cittadinanza multiculturale116 si trova la distinzione tra diritti di auto-governo, diritti 
polietnici e diritti di rappresentanza speciale. Si tratta di un modo di categorizzare le misure adottate 
dagli Stati polietnici o multinazionali per accomodare la diversità culturale. In particolare, i diritti di 
auto-governo riguardano l’autonomia politica o la giurisdizione territoriale concessa alle minoranze 
nazionali; i diritti polietnici invece sono quei diritti concessi agli immigrati e alle minoranze 
religiose per esprimere la loro particolarità culturale (per esempio, finanziamenti di attività culturali 
minoritarie, esenzioni nei confronti di leggi che svantaggiano particolarmente alcuni gruppi, ecc); 
infine i diritti di rappresentanza speciale sono quei diritti richiesti per sopperire a un deficit di 
rappresentatività delle istituzioni nei confronti delle aspettative e degli interessi delle minoranze.  
Questi tipi di diritti costituiscono «forme di cittadinanza differenziata secondo 
l’appartenenza di gruppo»117 perchè vengono attribuiti non all’individuo in quanto tale, ma 
all’individuo in quanto facente parte di un gruppo culturale. Spesso in questi casi si è parlato di 
                                                 
115 KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Odysseys, cit, p. 65. Si veda anche KYMLICKA, Will, The Global Diffusion of 
Multiculturalism: Trends, Causes, Consequences. In TIERNEY, Stephen (a cura di), Accommodating Cultural 
Diversity, Aldershot – Burlington, Ashgate, 2007, pp. 18-19. 
116 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 50. Nell’ultimo libro di Kymlicka si trova un elenco 
dettagliato delle politiche che gli Stati multiculturali hanno adottato nel tentativo di accomodare le minoranze culturali. 
Kymlicka distingue tra le politiche adottate in favore dei popoli indigeni, delle minoranze nazionali e degli immigrati. 
Le politiche riguardanti i popoli indigeni consistono nel riconoscimento di alcuni diritti (al possesso di terreni, 
all’autogoverno, culturali) e dello status di popoli indigeni, nel rispetto del diritto consuetudinario e dei trattati stipulati 
in passato, nel ricorso a misure di affirmative action, nella garanzia di rappresentanza o consultazione negli oragani 
statali centrali, nel sostegno a organismi internazionali per la tutela dei diritti umani dei popoli indigeni. Per quanto 
riguarda le minoranze nazionali, le politiche multiculturali sono rappresentate dalla concessione dell’autonomia 
territoriale all’interno di un ordinamento federale o quasi federale, nell’affermazione del ‘multinazionalismo’, nel 
riconoscimento di diritti linguistici, della rappresentanza politica nel governo centrale e del diritto di partecipare in 
piena autonomia nelle organizzazioni internazionali, nel finanziamento pubblico dell’istruzione nella lingua delle 
minoranze. Infine, le politiche in favore delle minoranze etniche costituite dagli immigrati consistono nell’affermazione 
del multiculturalismo a livello centrale o locale, nell’esenzione dal rispetto di alcune norme di validità generale, 
nell’adozione di programmi educativi che rispettano la diversità culturale, nel finanziamento di attività culturali, nel 
riconoscimento della possibilità di avere doppia cittadinanza, nel ricorso all’affirmative action per gli immigrati 
appartenenti a gruppi particolarmente svantaggiati. Cfr, KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Odysseys , cit, pp. 66-77. 
117 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 81. 
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diritti collettivi, suggerendo «una falsa dicotomia»118 con i diritti individuali, come se tutti i diritti 
relativi alla cittadinanza differenziata fossero esercitati collettivamente. Invece, come Kymlicka fa 
notare, esistono diritti conferiti ai gruppi che sono esercitati dagli individui, come per esempio il 
diritto all’uso della lingua del gruppo culturale minoritario. Ad ogni modo, ciò che conta per 
Kymlicka non è se ad esercitare i diritti siano gli individui o le collettività, ma le ragioni per cui «i 
membri di determinati gruppi hanno diritti relativi al territorio, alla lingua, alla rappresentanza e 
così via, che i membri di altri gruppi invece non hanno»119. Nel prossimo paragrafo si vedrà che le 
ragioni del conferimento di questi diritti sono, secondo Kymlicka, coerenti con i principi del 
liberalismo. Anzi, è una corretta comprensione e applicazione di tali principi che conduce al 
riconoscimento della legittimità di queste misure, che non sono estranee alla tradizione liberale120, 
ma sono state sottostimate dai liberali contemporanei come John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin. Questi 
ultimi infatti hanno posto il pluralismo delle società contemporanee al centro della loro riflessione, 
ma hanno misconosciuto la reale natura della diversità culturale perchè hanno considerato il 
suddetto pluralismo come un fenomeno interno a un’unica cultura sociale.  
 
4. Diritti delle minoranze e liberalismo. 
 In Multicultural Citizenship Kymlicka sostiene che «i principi basilari del libralismo sono 
quelli della libertà individuale», e che dunque i diritti delle minoranze possono essere accettati da 
un punto di vista liberale solo quando «sono conformi al rispetto della libertà e dell’autonomia degli 
individui»121. I diritti delle minoranze si presentano come misure per tutelare una cultura122 e 
quindi, se si vuole sostenere che questi diritti sono coerenti con i principi del liberalismo, bisognerà 
                                                 
118 Ivi, p. 82. 
119 Ivi, p. 85. 
120 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., Cap. IV, e KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and 
Culture, cit., Cap. X  
121 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 133. 
122 Quando Kymlicka parla di difesa di una cultura, egli non intende la protezione del carattere di una cultura, cioè le 
norme, i valori e le istituzioni di una comunità in un determinato momento, ma della struttura culturale. In questo senso, 
«la comunità culturale continua a esistere anche quando i suoi membri sono liberi di modificare il carattere della 
cultura, qualora essi non ritengano più di valore i suoi stili di vita tradizionali». KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, 
Community, and Culture, cit., pp. 166-167. 
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mostrare come la difesa della propria cultura possa essere una fonte legittima di pretese da parte 
degli individui.  
Kymlicka utilizza due argomenti a sostegno della tesi della compatibilità tra diritti delle 
minoranze e liberalismo: il primo fa riferimento alla cultura come contesto all’interno del quale 
l’autonomia individuale si esercita e acquisisce significato, il secondo  invece si basa sulle premesse 
egualitarie della teoria liberale. 
Del primo argomento si è detto qualcosa già nel secondo paragrafo123. Gli individui 
compiono le proprie scelte a partire dalle opzioni messe a disposizione dal contesto culturale in cui 
vivono. Da un punto di vista liberale, gli individui scelgono e diventano autonomi all’interno della 
cultura a cui appartengono. Quindi, se i diritti delle minoranze vengono intesi come misure atte ad 
assicurare che ciascuno abbia le condizioni necessarie alla fioritura della propria vita autonoma, 
secondo Kymlicka non si vede perchè il liberalismo debba negare il riconoscimento di queste 
politiche in favore delle minoranze culturali. Ad esempio, la concessione di diritti all’auto-governo 
per le minoranze nazionali deve essere vista come un modo per assicurare che ciascun individuo 
possa continuare a vivere nella cultura sociale nella quale è stato educato e nella quale trova la 
possibilità di scegliere ciò che ha valore.  
A questo punto, una possibile obiezione potrebbe essere sollevata da coloro che fanno notare 
il pericolo derivante dalla concessione di diritti del genere di quelli che qui stiamo discutendo alle 
minoranze illiberali. In questo caso, i diritti delle minoranze favorirebbero l’oppressione degli 
individui all’interno del gruppo illiberale. Kymlicka risponde formulando una distinzione tra due 
tipi di pretese che una minoranza culturale può avanzare: restrizioni interne (internal restrictions) e 
tutele esterne (external protections). Le prime consistono in quelle misure che un gruppo può 
avanzare per ridurre, attraverso la restrizione delle libertà fondamentali individuali, l’impatto del 
dissenso interno. Questo tipo di limitazioni delle libertà sono incompatibili con il liberalismo. 
                                                 
123 Per ulteriori considerazioni, e per come Kymlicka rintracci questo argomento nelle riflessioni di Ronald Dworkin si 
veda KYMLICKA, Will, Dworkin on Freedom and Culture. In BURLEY, Justine (a cura di), Dworkin and His Critics, 
Malden, Blackwell, 2004. 
 38
Invece, le tutele esterne sono quelle misure che un gruppo etnico o nazionale potrebbe richiedere 
per «proteggere la sua esistenza e identità mediante l’attenuazione degli effetti delle decisioni della 
società dominante»124. I diritti delle minoranze sono accettabili quando si presentano sotto forma di 
tutele esterne: in questo caso, non sono presenti violazioni dei diritti individuali, e la richiesta di 
particolari forme di tutela giuridica risponde al bisogno di difendere i gruppi culturali minoritari 
dall’impatto di quelle decisioni della maggioranza che potrebbero influire negativamente sulla 
conservazione delle culture minoritarie. 
L’accettabilità delle tutele esterne risulta più chiara alla luce del secondo argomento di 
Kymlicka a favore della compatibilità tra diritti delle minoranze e liberalismo, quello basato sul 
carattere egualitario della teoria liberale. Sia John Rawls che Ronald Dworkin hanno difeso teorie 
della giustizia distributiva secondo le quali bisogna compensare o rimuovere gli svantaggi derivanti 
da caratteristiche moralmente arbitrarie125 che influiscono pervasivamente sulla vita degli individui. 
In particolare, Ronald Dworkin ha elaborato una teoria della giustizia secondo la quale la 
distribuzione delle risorse deve essere «sensibile alle ambizioni» ma non «sensibile alle doti»126. 
Secondo i principi di questa teoria, la condizione di ciascuno dovrebbe essere il risultato delle 
proprie scelte responsabili piuttosto che di quelle circostanze sociali o naturali di cui non è 
responsabile.  
Kymlicka ririene che i diritti delle minoranze culturali possano legittimamente trovare posto 
all’interno di una teoria come questa. Egli sostiene che «i membri delle culture minoritarie possono 
subire disuguaglianze che sono il risultato delle loro circostanze o dotazioni, non delle loro scelte e 
                                                 
124 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 66. In realtà, la distinzione tra restrizioni interne e tutele 
esterne non è sempre netta. Come ha scritto Weinstock, «molti provvedimenti che i gruppi promulgheranno per 
difendersi hanno sia una dimensione esterna che una interna». Per esempio, la decisione di un gruppo culturale 
minoritario di preservare la propria lingua utilizzandola nell’istruzione dei giovani può essere interpretata sia come una 
tutela esterna (come una difesa della lingua minoritaria dall’impatto di quella maggioritaria) che come una restrizione 
interna (le scelte educative sono ridotte). Cfr. WEINSTOCK, Daniel M., Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Internal 
Minorities. In LADEN, Anthony S., e OWEN, David (a cura di), Multiculturalism and Political Theory, Cambridge, 
UK - New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 247.  
125 RAWLS, John, Una teoria della giustizia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1997, pp. 97-103. 
126 DWORKIN, Ronald, Virtù sovrana, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2002, pp. 88-89. 
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ambizioni»127, e che i diritti delle minoranze possono essere visti come gli strumenti adeguati per 
contrastare tali disuguaglianze. La cultura è un bene fondamentale per ciascuno perchè, come 
abbiamo visto, essa rappresenta il contesto all’interno del quale le scelta indviduali si esercitano e 
acquisiscono significato. Quindi, lo svantaggio che un individuo subisce quando la sua cultura è in 
pericolo è particolarmente importante e soprattutto non dipende dalle proprie decisioni: il fatto di 
essere parte di una cultura particolarmente svantaggiata è una questione che ha a che fare con la 
sorte piuttosto che con una decisione. In questo senso allora, il riconoscimento di un diritto può 
«compensare questo svantaggio, in quanto attenua la vulnerabilità delle culture minoritarie rispetto 
alle decisioni ella maggiornaza» e assicurare «che i membri della minoranza abbiano, rispetto ai 
membri della maggioranza, le stesse opportunità di vivere e lavorare nella loro cultura»128.  
Nel caso delle minoranze nazionali l’uguaglianza liberale consente la concessione di diritti 
all’auto-governo grazie ai quali una minoranza può matenere in vita la propria cultura: «in questo 
modo si garantisce che il bene dell’appartenenza culturale venga egualmente salvaguardato per i 
membri di tutti i gruppi nazionali»129.   
Il discorso da fare a proposito delle minoranze etniche, vale a dire gli immigrati, è diverso. 
Gli immigrati, come si è detto, non costituiscono delle culture sociali distinte all’interno della 
cultura maggioritaria. Essi, inoltre, sono privi delle condizioni necessarie a mantenere una cultura 
sociale distinta all’interno dello Stato nel quale si trasferiscono. Affinchè nel mondo moderno una 
cultura sociale possa mantenersi e prosperare è necessario che, in un determinato territorio, un 
gruppo culturale possa quotidianamente usare la propria lingua, controllare il sistema educativo, il 
                                                 
127 KYMLICKA, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, cit., p. 190. 
128 KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Citizenship, cit., p. 190. Bisogna osservare come lo svantaggio subito dalle 
minoranze culturali dimostra l’impossibilità della neutralità dello Stato rispetto alle culture. Ogni decisione ha degli 
effetti sensibilmente diversi sui gruppi culturali. Per esempio, la decisione di utilizzare una determinata lingua come 
lingua ufficiale nelle scuole pubbliche sarà inevitabilmente vantaggiosa per un gruppo culturale, quello maggioritario, e 
svantaggiosa per un altro, che si vedrà privato di uno dei mezzi necessari alla sussistenza e alla trasmissione della 
propria cultura sociale. Dunque, l’idea della benigna noncuranza (benign neglect), per cui lo Stato non dovrebbe 
interferire nelle condizioni delle culture, non può essere accettata.  
129 Ivi, p. 199. 
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pubblico impiego (amministrazione ed esercito in primo luogo) e le politiche migratorie130. Nel 
caso degli immigrati, queste condizioni non si verificano. Anzi, secondo Kymlicka, essi vogliono 
integrarsi e non rappresentano una minaccia per l’unità statale131. Le loro richieste di diritti non 
vanno interpretare come pericolosi segnali di separatismo, ma come la ricerca di «termini equi di 
integrazione»132. In altri termini, quelli che prima abbiamo definito diritti polietnici hanno lo scopo 
di rinegoziare i termini dell’integrazione degli immigrati in modo da consentire loro di integrarsi 
nella cultura dello Stato in cui si trasferiscono nel rispetto della propria specificità (si pensi alla 
richiesta di poter indossare il velo islamico avanzata dalle minoranze islamiche in Europa). 
 
5. Liberalismo, diritti delle minoranze e autonomia. 
 Come abbiamo visto, per Kymlicka, i diritti delle minoranze possono essere accettati da una 
teoria liberale quando essi rispettano l’autonomia individuale. Il ruolo dell’autonomia per Kymlicka 
è talmente rilevante che egli la assume come valore fondante della propria teoria liberale133. 
Kymlicka intende l’autonomia come revisibilità razionale (rational revisibility) dei propri fini. Dal 
punto di vista di Kymlicka la scelta ha valore perchè ci consente di stabilire e valutare ciò che ha 
valore. In questo senso, la nozione di scelta e di autonomia che Kymlicka adotta è meno sostantiva 
di quella kantiana, secondo la quale scegliere ha valore intrinseco perchè riflette la natura razionale 
degli esseri umani, o milliana, la quale invece fa ricorso al valore intrinseco dell’individualità134. 
Eppure, anche in questa accezione che Kymlicka ritiene largamente accettata sia dalle minoranze 
nazionali che dagli immigrati presenti nelle liberaldemocrazie occidentali, l’idea di autonomia si 
mostra particolarmente problematica. 
                                                 
130 In un volume dedicato alle politiche etno-culturali in Canada, Kymlicka scrive: «l’esperienza storica del Quebec 
suggerisce che una minoranza può mantenere la propria cultura sociale solo se possiede poteri sostanziali a proposito di 
linguaggio, educazione, pubblico impiego e immigrazione». KYMLICKA, Will, Finding Our Way. Rethinking 
Ethnocultural Relations in Canada, Toronto-Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 33. 
131 Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, Social Unity in a Liberal State, in Social Philosophy & Policy, 1996, p. 119. 
132 KYMLICKA, Will, The Politics in the Vernacular, cit., p. 162. 
133 In un articolo del 1996 Kymlicka sostiene che «la più difendibile teoria liberale si basa sul valore dell’autonomia». 
Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance. In HEYD, David (a cura di), Toleration: An Elusive 
Virtue, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 61. 
134 Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 143. 
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 In primo luogo, la tesi per cui una vita buona deve essere una vita autonoma nell’accezione 
di Kymlicka non è auto-evidente, nè universalmente condivisa. Nel secondo paragrafo abbiamo 
esposto quelle che Kymlicka ritiene le due condizioni per la realizzazione di una vita buona, vale a 
dire che la vita deve essere vissuta dall’interno e che si deve avere la possibilità di rivedere i propri 
fini. Non si tratta di proposizioni che godono di unanime accettazione nelle moderne società 
liberali. Come ha scritto Parekh, «l’idea di vivere dall’interno è essenzialmente Protestante, e ha 
giocato solo un ruolo limitato nell’Atene e nella Roma classica, nell’Europa medievale, nella 
cristianità Cattolica, e nelle civiltà non-occidentali»135. Nemmeno la revisibilità dei propri fini 
sembra indiscutibile come condizione per la realizzazione della vita buona: si pensi a coloro che 
accettano come condizione per la riuscita della propria vita l’impegno rispetto a un determinato fine 
che assumono come indiscutibile, e poi valutano il proprio successo rispetto al conseguimento di 
questo fine. In altri termini, come ha scritto William Galston, «l’autonomia è solo uno dei modi 
possibili di esistenza nelle società liberali – uno tra gli altri»136. Per questa ragione, una teoria 
secondo la quale una vita non può dirsi riuscita sotto il punto di vista etico qualora non si diano le 
due condizioni di cui parla Kymlicka ci sembra incapace di cogliere e rispettare la profonda 
diversità che caratterizza il mondo contemporaneo. 
 Ugualmente discutibile ci sembra anche il modo in cui Kymlicka concepisce il valore 
dell’appartenenza culturale e il modo in cui il soggetto morale concepisce il rapporto con la propria 
cultura. Dal punto di vista di Kymlicka, come si è detto, l’individuo attribuisce valore al fatto di 
appartenere a una determinata cultura sia perchè essa costituisce il contesto in cui si danno opzioni 
di scelta autonome, sia perchè conferisce identità ai propri membri. Per gli appartenenti a gruppi 
minoritari tradizionali queste due condizioni potrebbero entrare in un conflitto difficilmente 
risolvibile. Essi potrebbero attribuire un ruolo centrale al fatto che, nel conferire identità ai suoi 
membri, una cultura limita le possibilità di scelta individuali e quindi la possibilità che essi si 
                                                 
135 PAREKH, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism, cit., p. 106. 
136 GALSTON, William A., Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, 
Cambridge – New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 24. 
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sviluppino come individui autonomi. Come ha scritto Monique Deveaux, «piuttosto che citare la 
“scelta individuale dotata di significato” come il beneficio più importante derivante dal fatto di far 
parte di una cultura, i membri dei gruppi culturali minoritari potrebbero sottolineare i modi in cui 
l’essere membro conferisce un senso di appartenenza – un contesto sicuro e stabile che fornisce 
stabilità emotiva e psicologica limitando in parte il caotico e disorientante insieme di scelte di vita 
possibili nel mondo moderno»137. In casi come questi, l’enfasi posta da Kymlicka sull’autonomia 
potrebbe rappresentare una mancanza di rispetto e comprensione per la specificità di alcune 
minoranze. 
Dunque, nelle moderne società liberaldemocratiche esistono diversi gruppi culturali, non 
necessariamente di natura religiosa, che attribuiscono grande valore al rispetto delle tradizioni e che 
concepiscono la realizzazione della propria vita buona all’interno del quadro delineato dalla propria 
appartenenza culturale. Un’accentuata enfasi sull’autonomia potrebbe condurre alla 
marginalizzazione di tali gruppi. Per esempio, Margaert Moore ha scritto che, poichè Kymlicka 
sostiene che «una cultura ha valore solo in quanto contribuisce all’esercizio dell’autonomia, i diritti 
alla protezione di una cultura sono giustificati solo nel caso di quei gruppi, o di quelle culture, che 
attribuiscono valore all’autonomia»138: dal punto di vista di un liberalismo basato sul valore 
dell’autonomia, le richieste per il riconoscimento di diritti per quelle minoranze culturali che invece 
non ne riconoscono il primato, ma che potrebbero ugualmente trovarsi in una situazione di 
svantaggio immeritato, non avrebbero alcuna legittimità. Questo però è in tensione con 
quell’argomento di Kymlicka che attribuisce diritti alle minoranze culturali basandosi sulle 
premesse ugualitarie della teoria liberale. 
                                                 
137 DEVEAUX, Monique, Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice, Ithaca and London, Cornell University 
Press, 2000, p. 132. 
138 MOORE, Margaret, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 55. A ciò bisogna 
aggiungere che, il far dipendere il riconoscimento dei diritti delle minoranze dalla promozione delle condizioni per 
l’esercizio dell’autonomia non consente a Kymlicka di distinguere «tra quei gruppi chiaramente illiberali che 
restringono la libertà dei loro membri in modi coerctivi e quelle comunità semplicemente non-liberali con stili di vita 
più eteronomi». I primi sono intollerabili in un regime liberaldemocratico, mentre gli altri, a determinate condizioni, 
potrebbero trovarvi spazio. Cfr. DEVEAUX, Monique, Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice, cit., p. 133, 
(corsivo mio). 
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Il liberalismo di Kymlicka aspira esplicitamente a liberalizzare139 le minoranze  nazionali 
non-liberali. Tale processo di trasformazione non deve però avvenire in maniera coercitiva. Infatti, 
Kymlicka distingue tra il processo di identificazione della teoria liberale più difendibile, ossia 
quella basata sull’autonomia, e il problema di chi possa esercitare l’autorità di imporla alle 
minoranze che non riconoscono il primato dei valori liberali140. Il divieto di imporre i principi della 
teoria liberale che, almeno in principio, vige nelle relazioni tra Stati nazione indipendenti, deve 
essere esteso anche ai rapporti tra i gruppi nazionali presenti all’interno del medesimo Stato 
multinazionale. Tranne che nel caso di gravi violazioni dei diritti umani degli individui coinvolti, un 
intervento coercitivo diretto non è ammissibile. Ciò che gli Stati liberali possono fare si limita 
all’azione indiretta e al fornire incentivi alla liberalizzazione.  
In un recente volume che per molti versi rappresenta un’alternativa libertaria al modo in cui 
Kymlicka affronta il problema delle minoranze culturali, Chandran Kukathas ha criticato la 
distinzione tra identificazione della teoria liberale più adeguata e imposizione della stessa a coloro 
che non ne condividono i valori. Nel distinguere tra la validità di una teoria e la sua imposizione, 
Kymlicka concederebbe alle minoranze nazionali di attuare molte di quelle restrizioni interne che, 
come abbiamo visto, non sono ammissibili da parte della sua teoria. In questo senso, la teoria di 
Kymlicka sarebbe incoerente: «egli propone di abbracciare un liberalismo ‘comprensivo’, e il suo 
impegno nei confronti dell’autonomia, ma non di imporre questo liberalismo»141. A nostro avviso, 
il rifiuto dell’imposizione del liberalismo basato sull’autonomia non è una dimostrazione di 
incoerenza da parte della teoria di Kymlicka. Si tratta piuttosto di un modo per tener fede alle 
premesse per la realizzazione della vita buona. Infatti, come si è visto nel  secondo paragrafo, tra le 
condizioni per vivere bene c’è che la vita stessa sia condotta dall’interno, in base a valori che 
l’individuo stesso sottoscrive. Dunque, se uno stile di vita autonoma fosse imposto coercitivamente, 
                                                 
139 KYMLICKA, Will, La cittadinanza multiculturale, cit., p. 165. 
140 Ivi, p. 287.  
141 KUKATHAS, Chandran, The Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p. 187.  
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i soggetti che subirebbero l’imposizione sarebbero costretti a vivere secondo valori che essi non 
approvano.     
Tuttavia, nonostante la presenza di queste considerazioni che mostrano la cautela di 
Kymlicka nel negare la legittimità dell’imposizione del liberalismo, crediamo che il suo approccio, 
nel porsi l’obiettivo della liberalizzazione delle culture non-liberali, si dimostri incapace di 
rispettare le minoranze nella loro specificità. La liberalizzazione delle minoranze, come ha 
opportunamente osservato Bhikuh Parekh, potrebbe «trasformarle in qualcosa che esse non 
sono»142. Sul fatto che le culture si trasformano non ci sarebbe niente da obiettare. Infatti, a meno 
che non si condivida l’implausibile tesi secondo la quale le culture sono entità immutabili, isolate e 
al di fuori del divenire storico, si deve ammettere che le circostanze storiche e le relazioni 
reciproche operano incessantemente a favore della loro evoluzione. I problemi per una teoria che 
intende tener fede ai principi del liberalismo egualitario sorgono se si considera che a trasformarsi è 
sempre la cultura minoritaria, e che tale trasformazione avviene secondo i criteri sottoscritti dalla 
cultura maggioritaria. Dunque, i rapporti di forza tra i gruppi culturali non vengono messi in 
discussione. Ciò entra in evidente tensione sia con uno dei principi che Kymlicka considera 
connessi con la diffusione del multiculturalismo liberale, vale a dire l’idea che lo Stato non 
appartiene al gruppo culturale maggioriario ma è proprietà di tutti i cittadini indipendentemente dal 
gruppo culturale di appartenenza, sia dell’ugualitarismo che in generale caratterizza l’approccio 
liberale di Kymlicka. 
In parziale risposta a un’obiezione di questo tipo, nel suo ultimo libro Kymlicka afferma che 
«la concezione liberale del multiculturalismo inevitabilmente, intenzionalmente e impenitentemente 
trasforma le tradizioni culturali dei popoli»143. Esso richiede che sia il gruppo dominante che quello 
subordinato entrino in relazioni e siano coinvolti in pratiche che esigono trasformazioni per 
entrambe le parti coinvolte. In questo senso, al gruppo maggioritario si richiede di «rinunciare alle 
fantasie di superiorità razziale, di abbandonare le pretese di esclusiva proprità dello Stato, e di 
                                                 
142 PAREKH, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism, cit., p. 108. 
143 KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Odysseys , cit, p. 99. 
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desistere dal tentativo di plasmare le istituzioni pubbliche esclusivamente secondo la propria 
immagine nazionale»144, mentre da parte delle minoranze si esige il rifiuto delle pratiche contrarie 
ai principi liberaldemocratici145. Non si può negare che queste considerazioni (per altro in linea con 
la considerazione dell’integrazione degli immigrati come una strada a doppio senso (two-way street) 
di cui parleremo più estesamente nel prossimo paragrafo) rappresentino un significativo passo in 
avanti rispetto a un approccio semplicemente assimilazionistico secondo il quale le minoranze 
devono adeguarsi ai principi e agli stili di vita della maggioranza. Tuttavia, al gruppo dominante 
viene richiesto di trasformarsi secondo principi che sono propri ma che, per accidente storico o 
negligenza, non vengono rispettati, mentre alle minoranze si richiede di conformarsi a principi che, 
in varia misura, sono loro estranei.  
 
6. La diversità degli immigrati tra assimilazione e integrazione. 
 Come si è visto nel terzo paragrafo, Kymlicka intende l’immigrazione come la seconda 
fonte della diversità culturale. L’immigrazione è vista come un fenomeno largamente volontario146 
e i migranti sono considerati come generalmente disponibili a integrarsi nella società che li 
accoglie. Essi non cercano, nè hanno la possibilità di ricreare, la cultura sociale del Paese di 
provenienza, ma, attraverso la richiesta di provvedimenti politici specifici, cercano di ottenere 
un’integrazione che sia il più equa possibile. Dunque, sia gli immigrati sia le politiche dello Stato 
liberale nei loro confronti non si propongono, tranne che nel caso di sparute minoranze 
conservatrici come gli Amish, il fine della segregazione o dell’auto-segregazione. Kymlicka 
sostiene che gli immigrati «vogliono che le istituzioni maggioritarie della loro società siano 
                                                 
144 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
145 Kymlicka cita pregiudizio razziale o etnico, anti-semitismo, trionfalismo religioso, esclusione basata sul genere o 
sull’appartenenza di classe, autoritarismo politico. Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, Multicultural Odysseys , cit, p. 100. 
146 L’idea che i fenomeni migratori siano di natura volontaria è stata spesso obiettata a Kymlicka dai suoi critici. Si veda 
per esempio: KUKATHAS, Chandran, Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship, «The 
Journal of Political Philosophy», 1997, pp. 412-416. In un recente volume, anche Tariq Modood ha sostenuto che «la 
dicotomia tra migranti volontari e popoli incorporati è troppo rigida». Egli si riferisce in particolare alla difficoltà di 
concepire come volontari i flussi migratori a partire dalla seconda metà del Novecento dalle ex-colonie verso la Gran 
Bretagna e le altre ex-potenze coloniali. Più che di migrazioni volontarie si tratterebbe di movimenti connessi all’eredità 
coloniale. Cfr. MODOOD, Tariq, Multiculturalism. A Civic Idea, Cambridge – Malden (MA), Polity, 2007, p. 33. 
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riformate in modo da accomodare le loro differenze culturali e da riconoscere il valore della loro 
eredità culturale»147. Gli immigrati cercano l’inclusione nella vita istituzionale e politica e ne 
sottoscrivono i valori fondamentali senza rappresentare minacce per la stabilità e per la pace 
sociale. 
 In The Politics in the Vernacular Kymlicka osserva con favore che, a partire dagli Anni ’60 
del secolo scorso, nei tre Paesi a maggiore immigrazione (USA, Canada e Australia) ci sia stato il 
passaggio da un modello assimilazionista detto ‘Anglo-conformity’148, secondo il quale gli 
immigrati devono adeguarsi sotto ogni aspetto alle pratiche culturali e all’identità del Paese in cui si 
trasferiscono fino a diventare indistinguibili dai nativi, ad un modello più tollerante secondo il quale 
l’integrazione degli immigrati esige che la loro inclusione consente la conservazione della propria 
specificità culturale. Gli immigrati chiedono di partecipare alla vita del Paese in cui si trasferiscono 
in qualità di cittadini degni di eguale considerazione e rispetto. Essi hanno il diritto, ma perfino il 
dovere149 di diventare membri a pieno titolo della loro nuova comunità politica. Tuttavia, 
l’integrazione, lungi dall’essere un processo che richiede sacrifici esclusivamente da parte degli 
immigrati è una ‘strada a doppio senso’150, in quanto la presenza di immigrati modifica anche la 
società che li accoglie. In particolare, la politica di uno Stato liberale nei confronti degli immigrati è 
una politica di integrazione pluralistica151: l’inclusione delle minoranze etniche pluralizza la cultura 
sociale maggioritaria in quanto vi immette gruppi diversi che sono portatori di identità culturali 
specifiche ma, allo stesso tempo, anche le abitudini e le pratiche degli immigrati si modificano in 
senso liberale a contatto con quelle della società in cui si trasferiscono. 
                                                 
147 KYMLICKA, Will, Social Unity in a Liberal State, cit., p. 119. 
148 KYMLICKA, Will, The Politics in the Vernacular, cit., p. 153. 
149 In un saggio dedicato alla discussione del problema dell’estensione della giustiza in un’ottica liberal-egualitaria, 
Kymlicka scrive: «le democrazie liberali non solo permettono agli immigrati di integrarsi, ma esercitano anche 
pressione affinchè ciò accada. Gli immigrati hanno non solo il diritto di diventare pienamente membri della nazione, ma 
anche il dovere di far parte della comunità nazionale». Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal 
Egalitarian Perspective. In MILLER, David, e HASHMI, Sohail H. (a cura di), Boundaries and Justice. Diverse Ethical 
Perspectives, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 263.  
150 KYMLICKA, Will, The Politics in the Vernacular, cit., p. 171. 
151 Ivi, p. 168. Kymlicka riprende questa espressione da SPINNER, Jeff, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, 
Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, Cap. IV. 
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 Il successo della teoria di Kymlicka è però reso difficile ancora una volta dal suo fondarsi 
sul valore dell’autonomia. A nostro avviso, contro questo pur generoso tentativo di discutere la 
reciprocità di trasformazioni implicate dai processi di inclusione delle minoranze di immigrati, 
valgono le medesime considerazioni fatte nel paragrafo precedente in relazione alla liberalizzazione 
delle minoranze nazionali. In ciò che segue discuteremo invece l’incapacità della teoria di Kymlicka 
nel trattare adeguatamente la diversità culturale rappresentata dagli immigrati.  
 Le difficoltà complessive cui va incontro il modello teorico di Kymlicka quando affronta il 
problema delle minoranze etniche si spiegano in parte con quello che Tariq Modood ha 
recentemente definito multinational bias152. Pur essendo, come abbiamo visto a proposito dell’idea 
di integrazione pluralistica, «pragmaticamente generoso nell’affrontare i bisogni politici e culturali 
e le insicurezze dei migranti», l’approccio di Kymlicka si presenta però come «teoricamente 
ingeneroso»153 nei confronti degli stessi componenti delle minoranze etniche. Infatti, l’argomento 
principale di Kymlicka in favore dei diritti per le minoranze culturali si basa, come abbiamo visto, 
sull’appartenenza degli individui a una cultura sociale. Gli immigrati ne sono privi e dunque, non 
esiste un argomento specifico che giustifichi i diritti polietnici con la stessa cogenza dei diritti 
concessi alle minoranze nazionali. Una ragione del multinational bias è, secondo Modood, l’origine 
canadese di Kymlicka e il suo interesse ricorrente per le questioni delle minoranze nazionali in 
Canada e negli Stati Uniti. Da ciò risulta, sempre secondo Modood, una scarsa applicabilità del 
modello di Kymlicka per l’analisi del fenomeno della diversità culturale in Gran Bretagna e 
nell’Europa occidentale, dove l’immigrazione rappresenta un problema di gran lunga più 
percepibile e urgente di quello delle minoranze nazionali. 
 A nostro avviso i limiti dell’approccio di Kymlicka nell’affrontare le minoranze etniche 
vanno ricondotti più in generale al fatto che la diversità culturale rappresentata dagli immigrati è 
ampiamente sottostimata rispetto alla diversità delle minoranze nazionali. Ad esempio, in un recente 
articolo in cui risponde alle preoccupazioni a proposito di un generale arretramento delle politiche 
                                                 
152 MODOOD, Tariq, Multiculturalism. A Civic Ideal, cit., p. 34.  
153 Ibid. 
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multiculturali nelle liberaldemocrazie occidentali, Kymlicka sostiene che «le rivendicazioni dei 
gruppi nazionali e dei popoli indigeni comportano generalmente una più sostanziale immissione di 
diversità etnoculturale nella sfera pubblica e un più sostanziale livello di cittadinanza differenziata  
di quello che è richiesto dai gruppi di immigrati»154. Dal momento che le minoranze nazionali e i 
popoli indigeni sono concentrati in un territorio differente rispetto a quello della maggioranza, e, 
vista l’indipendenza culturale che lo stesso modello di Kymlicka attribuisce sia alle une che agli 
altri, ci risulta dificile comprendere come la diversità che essi rappresentano sia presente all’interno 
della sfera pubblica di un Paese liberaldemocratico, se non in una forma molto indiretta e attenuata. 
Gli immigrati, al contrario, non sono territorialmente concentrati in un’area e, almeno 
tendenzialmente, non assumono un atteggiamento isolazionista. Dunque, la diversità che essi 
introducono nelle società in cui si trasferiscono è ben più percepibile, se non altro perchè le loro 
pratiche e i loro valori convivono, talvolta pacificamente ma spesso anche in modo conflittuale, con 
le pratiche e i valori del gruppo maggioritario. È questo tipo di diversità che una società 
liberaldemocratica deve assumere come prioritaria, ed è sulla necessità di accomodarla secondo 
equità che i classici principi liberali di libertà, eguaglianza e inclusione devono esercitarsi. 
Infatti, l’integrazione pluralista di cui parla Kymlicka non è stata ancora ottenuta; anzi, per 
sua stessa ammissione, negli ultimi anni si è diffuso un clima di sfiducia nei confronti delle 
politiche multiculturali, in particolare di quelle rivolte agli immigrati155. Se le riflessioni fatte nelle 
pagine che precedono hanno una qualche plausibilità, un modello teorico come quello di Kymlicka, 
basato sull’idea che l’autonomia è il valore fondamentale del liberalismo e sulla tesi per cui nel 
discorso sui diritti delle minoranze bisogna assumere come prioritaria la diversità delle minoranze 
nazionali, non è lo strumento più adeguato.  
                                                 
154 KYMLICKA, Will, The New Debate on Minority Rights (and Postscript). In LADEN, Anthony S., e OWEN, David 
(a cura di), Multiculturalism and Political Theory, cit., p. 51. 
155 Kymlicka ritiene che il crescente numero di immigrati clandestini, l’idea che gli immigrati (soprattutto quelli di 
religione islamica) siano portatori di culture illiberali e la percezione che la presenza di immigrati indebolisca il welfare 
state, sono le tre principali cause del calo di sostegno pubblico alle politiche polietniche. Si tratterebbe di problemi 
contingenti, una volta superati i quali, l’accettazione del multiculturalismo sarebbe restaurata. In altri termini, a detta di 
Kymlicka, «nei Paesi in cui gli immigrati sono visti come regolari, rispettosi delle norme liberali e contributori del 
sistema economico, l’adozione di politiche multiculturali non è considerata molto rischiosa e incontra minori ostacoli». 
Cfr. KYMLICKA, Will, The New Debate on Minority Rights (and Postscript), cit., p. 56. 
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 CHAPTER III 
 
Liberal Pluralism and Diversity. 
 
 
 
 
1. Accommodating diversity. 
Stephen Macedo’s Diversity and Distrust starts with the following statement: “Diversity is 
the great issue of our time: nationalism, religious sectarianism; a heightened consciousness of 
gender, race, and ethnicity; a greater assertiveness with respect to sexual orientation; and a 
reassertion of the religious voice in the public square are but a few of the forms of particularity that 
stubbornly refuse to yield to individualism and cosmopolitanism”156. As a matter of fact, our social 
world is crowded by moral, political, ethnical, religious, sexual, and social diversities157. An 
                                                 
156 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, Harvard University Press, 2000, 
p.1. Here and in the rest of the paper diversity is more or less synonym of pluralism. I prefer the use of the word 
‘diversity’ rather than ‘pluralism’ because I would like to make a distinction between value pluralism and pluralism as a 
fact (diversity). As we will see, value pluralism is one of the foundations of Galston’s diversity liberalism.  
157 That is not a completely new condition for liberalism. In fact, as K. A. Appiah writes, “the matter of diversity, far 
from being marginal to the origin of modern political philosophy, was central to it” (The Ethics of Identity, Princeton 
University Press, 2005, p. xv). If liberalism’s origins are to be traced back to the search for a peaceful coexistence after 
the XVI and XVII Centuries’ Wars of Religion, one cannot deny that liberalism had to do with diversity of religious, 
moral, and cultural beliefs since its beginning. What is new is the increased consciousness of that diversity. The reason 
for this circumstance should be searched out in the globalization, in migration, and in the claims for inclusion advanced 
by excluded minorities.  For some accounts of historical origins of liberalism according to which Wars of Religion are 
at the starting point of liberalism, see J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1994, and C. Larmore, 
The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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intriguing problem arises when one discusses how political institutions and political theory try to 
accommodate and deal with these diversities that could threaten the traditional notions of civic 
unity, stability, freedom, equality, and individualism with which Western liberal democracy is 
commonly associated. These considerations are particularly urgent in the debates about the 
regulation of the internal life of traditional (either religious or secular) communities that reject any 
simple assimilation to the practices and the lifestyles of mainstream society. 
Theorists praising diversity experience liberal democratic political institutions and liberal 
theories as unfairly sectarian and as blind to differences. Multiculturalists, feminists, post-
modernists, anti-liberal thinkers in general maintain that liberalism, with its classical aspirations to 
freedom and equality, is unduly homogenizing towards the variety of cultures, conceptions of the 
good, and forms of life spread in Western societies. 
In fact there is something that, following the observations of William A. Galston, we could 
label the paradox of diversity: “If we insist that each civil association mirror the principles of the 
overarching political community, then meaningful differences among associations all but disappear; 
constitutional uniformity crushes social pluralism”158. The tricky point is that since its origins, 
liberalism stands up for individual liberty and freedom of association, but if it insists that liberal 
principles are to rule the internal life of not properly liberal groups, the eventual outcome will be a 
coercive decrease of social complexity. Indeed, liberal aspiration to the coexistence of diverse 
moral, religious, and cultural options will be thwarted if groups and associations are required to 
comply with liberal norms. 
Liberalism is a complex and multiform tradition of political thought and it is in no way 
committed to the unrestricted inculcation of liberal norms in all the domains of social life. 
Individual rights, freedoms of association, public-private distinction, and toleration are resources at 
                                                 
158 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 20. Similar worries are expressed by Jeff Spinner-Halev in the following passage: “If all 
private groups are remade in the image of the liberal state, then everyone’s choices are reduced”. See J. Spinner-Halev, 
‘Autonomy, Association, and Pluralism’, in A. Eisenberg, and J. Spinner-Halev, Edited by, Minorities within 
Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 165. 
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liberalism’s disposal to counteract any immediate conformation of individual and collective life to 
the liberal general norms. Even Brian Barry, whose Culture and Equality is generally considered 
among the most strenuous challenger of accommodation claims, admits that (at least in principle) 
“it is no part of liberalism […] to insist that every group must conform to liberal principles in its 
internal structure”159. 
Liberalism is a political theory160 that is not required to rule all the dimensions of individual 
and collective life, but it is not easy to understand how wide should be the diversity that a liberal 
society can accommodate, if and in which ways liberalism should promote individualistic lifestyles, 
which are the constraints that bind the acceptability of claims for accommodation.  
William A. Galston’s recent work about liberalism is a noteworthy attempt to deal with all 
these matters. His diversity liberalism is one of the most stimulating although objectionable answers 
to the problem of accommodating diversity. In the next section I will present Galston’s theoretical 
proposal opposing it to autonomy liberalism. Then I will explore its theoretical foundations and its 
implications about educational policies. At the end I will formulate some critical remarks against it. 
 
1. Liberalism between autonomy and diversity. 
In a recent article Galston defines liberalism as a theory concerned with limits to public 
power: “From a philosophical and conceptual point of view, liberalism is a doctrine not of the 
structure of governmental decision making or of the substance of governmental decisions, but rather 
of the scope of governmental power”161. Every liberal theory is characterized by an account of the 
ways in which public power’s extension should be limited. For example, John Stuart Mill can be 
included among liberal thinkers not because of his ideas about human flourishing, but thanks to his 
                                                 
159 B. Barry, Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Polity, 2001, p. 147 
160 The fact that liberalism is a political theory and that it asks for a sort of division of moral labour between public and 
private does not exclude reciprocal influences between them. For the pervasivity of public values and the ways in which 
political principles shape also extra-political life see S. Macedo, Liberal Virtues. Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in 
Liberal Costitutionalism, Clarendon Press, 1990, Chapter 2, and W. A. Galston, Liberal Purposes. Goods, Virtues, and 
Diversity in the Liberal State, Cambridge University Press, 1991, Chapter 13. 
161 W. A. Galston, Why the New Liberalism isn’t All That New, and Why the Old Liberalism isn’t What We Thought It 
Was, in Social Philosophy and Policy, 2007, Vol. 1, p. 290. 
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harm principle. Similarly, Rawls is a liberal for his account of individual rights, not for his theory of 
distributive justice and his difference principle162. 
For Galston, liberalism is not a monolithic political and theoretical tradition. There are at 
least two concepts of liberalism, that is “two quite different strands of liberal thought based on two 
distinct principles”163 that can be summarized as autonomy and diversity164. 
Autonomy liberalism, can also be called Enlightenment liberalism. Galston argues that the 
historical and conceptual origins of that kind of liberal theory should be found in the 
Enlightenment’s faith in reason as the primary source of authority and as the necessary means for 
liberating individuals from arbitrary powers. According to this kind of liberal theory the state 
should promote and defend individual autonomy understood as the autonomy of rational, self-
examining, and self-directing individuals. Promoting autonomy could be obtained through 
educational policies that exhibit partiality towards autonomous, individualistic, and rationalistic 
theories of human flourishing. Defense of autonomy understood according to the guidelines of 
Enlightenment Liberalism is an aim that could be pursued through anti-accommodationist policies 
toward those groups that do not value autonomy as a fundamental condition for human thriving.  
The most representative spokesmen of Enlightenment liberalism, as Galston observes, are 
“John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and the Americans writing in an Emersonian 
vein”165. Among the contemporary autonomy liberals we find, according to Galston, Will Kymlicka 
who establishes a link between the promotion of individual autonomy and the protection of 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 W. A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 3. (Apr. 1995), p. 521.  
164 This distinction can be also used to interpret the whole liberal history. For example, J. T. Levy writes that the 
autonomy/toleration (or diversity) controversy is “not a new one, but one as old as liberalism itself. That is to say, the 
debate over autonomy and toleration is the latest episode in a very old argument”. The history of liberalism has been 
persistently characterized by a difference of judgement about the role of “intermediate institutions, associations and 
communities”. There is one strand (pro-toleration liberalism represented by Montesquieu, Burke, Tocqueville) that 
considers them as friends of liberal freedoms and as places where the individuals can live their lives free from the risks 
of state tyranny. The other strand (pro-autonomy liberalism represented by Voltaire, Kant, Mill) instead looks with 
suspicion at intermediate institutions because of the eventual risks of local tyrannies that should be under state central 
control. See J. T. Levy, Liberalism’s Divide, After Socialism and Before, in Social Philosophy and Policy, 2003, p. 281. 
165 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 21. 
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minority cultures, understood as the environment required for individual meaningful choices166. 
Other examples could be John Rawls who in A Theory of Justice167 relies upon a Kantian notion of 
moral subject, and Stephen Macedo who in Liberal Virtues168 works out a theory of liberal 
citizenship in which autonomy is highly emphasized as the distinctive feature of liberal persons’ 
character. 
Galston does not think of autonomy liberalism as an adequate conception. He objects to it on 
the basis of the idea that “autonomy is one possible mode of existence in liberal societies – one 
among others”169. If public institutions assume autonomy’s primacy, individuals and groups who 
deny that autonomy is always required for human thriving could feel to be jeopardised by and 
marginalized from a political power that does not adequately respect human diversity. These 
considerations support the rather common idea according to which liberalism could be no more than 
a sectarian doctrine notwithstanding its widespread and misconceived aspirations to impartiality, 
neutrality, and universality. Galston maintains that “autonomy based-arguments are bound to 
marginalize those individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment 
impulse”170: in our societies there are many individuals and groups whose ideal of human 
flourishing is in no way associated with autonomous choice, critical self-reflection, and all those 
attitudes generally related with a liberal-rationalistic idea of individual. 
It is actually since a long time that Galston criticizes autonomy liberalism. Already in 
Liberal Purposes he was arguing against those theorists according to which civic education should 
be aimed at the promotion of those rational attitudes needed for critically evaluating and choosing 
among different moral options. In that book he wrote that “liberalism is about the protection of 
                                                 
166 See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford University Press, 1989; Idem, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995. 
167 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971. 
168 In Two Concepts of Liberalism (cit., p. 523) Galston quotes the following passage from a book by Stephen Macedo 
as a typical example of autonomy liberalism: “liberal persons are distinguished by the possession of self-governing 
reflective capacities. Further developing these reflective capacities leads one toward the ideal of autonomy”. See S. 
Macedo, Liberal Virtues, cit., p. 269. 
169 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 24. 
170 Ivi, pp. 25-26. 
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diversity, not the valorization of choice”171. Indeed, the liberal model Galston prefers is diversity 
liberalism. He calls it also Reformation liberalism because its roots can be traced back to the post-
Reformation idea of toleration. It is the liberalism that “takes as its central value the toleration of 
religious and cultural diversity”172. Such liberalism understands ‘diversity’ as “legitimate 
differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of good life, sources of 
moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like”173. 
The assumption of the protection of diversity as the core value of a political theory allows 
diversity liberalism to pursue what Galston labels “a policy of maximum feasible 
accommodation”174 whose constraints are the requisites of civic unity and individual security. 
Moreover, it enables political institutions to take diversity seriously without imposing liberal values 
in the internal life of those groups that live in contemporary liberal societies and refusing to accept 
the idea that autonomy and individual choice understood along liberal lines are necessary conditions 
for humans to flourish.  
Given what I already said, it should be clear that Galston’s acceptance of diversity is not 
without limits. The constraints imposed on legitimate diversity are, in his view, rather demanding. 
Galston, far from any commitment to the idea of liberal neutrality175, sees liberal state as a political 
community that pursues public purposes such as the protection of human life, the advancement of 
basic human capabilities, the development of the abilities necessary for taking part to the public life, 
etc. These public purposes render the unity of a liberal society possible, give a shape to its 
institutions, arouse policies, settle public virtues. Thus, a community that adopted a practice 
denying some of these public purposes would be beyond the domain of the admissible diversity in a 
liberal state. 
                                                 
171 W. A. Galston, Liberal Purposes, cit., pag. 329. The main object of Galston’s critical remarks is A. Gutmann, 
Democratic Education, Princeton University Press, 1999².  
172 G. Crowder, Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism, in Political Theory, Vol. 35, N. 2, April 2007, p. 123. 
173 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, p. 21. 
174 Ivi, p. 20. 
175 For Galston’s objection to liberal neutrality see W. A. Galston, Liberal Purposes, cit., Part 2. 
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It should be pointed out that Galston’s preference for diversity liberalism is not so strong as 
“to deny a place for a more modest conception of autonomy as freedom of choice, secured by 
internal as well as external constraints”176. Galston’s intention, consistently with his pluralist 
account of value that will be discussed later, is to balance the two dimensions of liberalism he 
distinguishes. Notwithstanding this, as our further considerations will demonstrate and as a recent 
commentator argues, “Galston’s emphasis has always been on the toleration side”177 rather than on 
autonomy. 
 
3. The three sources of liberal theory and Galston’s liberal pluralism. 
 Galston’s diversity liberalism relies on three resources: expressive liberty, political 
pluralism, and value pluralism. Expressive liberty is “the normatively privileged and institutionally 
defended ability of individuals and groups to lead their lives as they see fit”178. Individuals179 want 
to live a life in which there is correspondence between inner beliefs and outer practices, that is to 
say they want to live according to their conceptions of what is valuable and meaningful. Then, they 
think that there is the loss of a fundamental human good when they are coercively deprived of the 
opportunity to lead their life consistently with their considered judgements. Obviously, Galston 
admits that expressive liberty has limits and that it does not consent everything is the outcome of a 
sincere belief. For example, it would object to human sacrifice for religious or conscientious 
reasons, but it would approve of some practices of conservative groups (such as “the male 
                                                 
176 W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 182. 
177 G. Crowder, Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 124. 
178 W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 45. From this quotation it is clear that expressive liberty 
concerns individuals as well as groups. In Liberal Pluralism Galston defines expressive liberty as “the absence of 
constraints, imposed by some individuals on others, that make it impossible (or significantly more difficult) for the 
affected individuals to live their lives in ways that express their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning or value to 
life” (p. 28). It would seem that in this definition, expressive liberty is more a property of individuals than of groups, but 
in the following page Galston’s usual emphasis on groups reappears: “Expressive liberty protects the ability of 
individuals and groups to live in ways that others would regard as unfree” (Liberal Pluralism, p. 29) 
179 If expressive liberty, as Galston thinks, is an individual as well as a group liberty here one should say that also 
groups want that their joint lives should be leaded consistently with the principles they value. From a liberal point of 
view arguing that groups have a collective life and follow some sort of principles is always problematic: which these 
principles are? Are they requested to rule only political life or they extend their domain in private life? How should 
such principles be identified? Galston never clearly addresses these questions and, as we will see later, his commitment 
both to individual and to group expressive liberty can create tensions that raise doubts on the overall liberal character of 
his theory.    
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circumcision and gender separation commanded by Orthodox Judaism”180) that an autonomy liberal 
would condemn as unsuited to a liberal society in which autonomy is considered the fundamental 
value. 
 Political pluralism is the second resource of Galston’s liberalism. It is the political theory 
worked out by J. N. Figgis, G. D. H. Cole, and H. Laski181 in the first decades of the twentieth 
Century. Political pluralism refuses the conception for which state power is plenipotentiary toward 
the plurality of associations and groups one can find in contemporary liberal democratic societies. 
State is just one among many legitimate authorities, and it is not the one that should always prevail. 
According to Galston, political pluralism is an effective tool for alerting us to the risks deriving 
from the totalistic temptations traceable in the thought of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau. The first 
maintained that all other activities and institutions should be subordinated to politics, as it is aiming 
at the highest and more comprehensive human good. The second argued in favour of an undivided 
sovereignty as the only guarantee for peace. Rousseau considered an unreserved devotion to 
common good as a necessary condition for civic health. The same totalistic temptation is still 
present in many contemporary theorists working within the liberal tradition, such as Stephen 
Macedo182, the transformative liberalism of which requires, according to Galston, correspondence 
between public political principles and the internal structure of associations, faith communities, and 
even families.  
Political pluralists’ core idea is that “our social life comprises multiple sources of authority 
and sovereignty – individuals, parents, associations, churches, and state institutions, among others – 
                                                 
180 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 29. 
181 See P. Q. Hirst, edited by, The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis, and H. 
J. Laski, Routledge, 1989. 
182 Galston refers to Macedo’s ideas about the pervasiveness of political principles in a well functioning liberal 
democracy. Liberal principles extensively shape the life of communities, associations, and even churches, transforming 
them in liberal sense. See S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., and S. Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Case of Religion. Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, in Political Theory, Vol. 26, No. 1, Feb. 1998. 
Other contemporary examples of liberal democratic theorists giving up to the totalistic temptation are, according to 
Galston, J. Habermas, J. Dewey, J. Rawls, A. Gutmann, I. Shapiro, D. Thompson. See W. A. Galston, The Practice of 
Liberal Pluralism, cit., pp. 26-40.  
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no one of which is dominant for all purposes and on all occasions”183. In a liberal society there are a 
lot of nonstate authorities whose existence is independent from state power, so a centralized state 
authority is not the only lawful authority exercising power. In The Practice of Liberal Pluralism 
Galston writes that “pluralist politics is a politics of recognition rather than of construction”184. 
Different spheres of human activity exist and are to be recognized and respected from the state even 
though they are not created by it. For example, even if one admits that public rules shape the 
families’ internal life, it does not mean that they are purposively constituted by the state. 
From the perspective of the political pluralism, the function of the state is quite constrained 
but it is not totally nullified. For Galston asserts that the state, the only authority that monopolizes 
the legitimate use of force, should coordinate the activities of the different communities, adjudicate 
when there are conflicts, and prevent likely group tyrannies. The prospect of group tyrannies is 
especially relevant for any liberal theory that accords some value to the right of association, and 
Galston deals with it quite optimistically claiming that “enforcement of basic rights of citizenship 
and of exit rights, suitably understood, will usually suffice”185 to avoid some groups becoming 
prisons for the individuals that are born and have been educated there, or even for those that join the 
group when they have already grown up. 
The third resource of Galston’s liberalism is value pluralism, that is a form of moral 
realism186 deriving from Isaiah Berlin187. It is different from emotivism, noncognitivism, or 
“Humean arguments against the rational status of moral propositions”188. Furthermore, value 
pluralism should not be confused with relativism because it does not deny the difference between 
good and evil and the objectivity of values. Value pluralists can claim that saving a human life is 
                                                 
183 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 36. 
184 W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 41. 
185 Ibid. 
186 For Galston both value pluralism and value monism are forms of moral realism because “both presuppose the 
existence of moral realm that is in some sense ‘there’, apart from our emotional projections and cultural constructions”. 
See W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 12. 
187 For Berlin’s political thought and the ways in which his value pluralism is linked to liberalism see at least G. 
Crowder, Isaiah Berlin. Liberty and Pluralism, Polity, 2004, and G. Crowder, and H. Hardy, Edited by, The One and 
the Many. Reading Isaiah Berlin, Prometheus Books, 2007 
188 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 30. 
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different from killing innocent people and that this difference is “part of the objective structure of 
the valuational universe”189. There is a domain of values that set what constitutes a decent life for 
individuals and societies190. Galston, following Stuart Hampshire, argues that the limits are fixed 
“by common human needs”191 and that in many historical circumstances these limits have been 
overcome. Anyway, what is characteristic of value pluralism (and that seems more relevant for 
political theory) is the idea that there are many and heterogeneous goods irreducible to a single 
value. Value pluralism rules out the possibility of fully rank-ordering the distinct and conflicting 
values that we encounter in our moral life. From the point of view of value pluralism there is also 
no value or good (no summum bonum) always having priority when there is a conflict with other 
values and goods. 
The philosophical challenger of value pluralism is moral monism. It claims that all moral 
values can be reduced to a single measure and that all moral decision have, at least in principle, a 
clear and well identifiable solution. Utilitarianism is the classical expression of monism. Whereas 
Rawls and other theorists of the rights have objected to utilitarianism on the basis that it does not 
respect adequately the separateness of persons, value pluralists’ objection concerns the fact that 
“utilitarianism fails to take seriously the heterogeneity of values”192. According to Galston it is 
utilitarianism (and all other variants of monist theories) that should demonstrate how the 
heterogeneity of goods is reducible to homogeneity without improperly reducing the complexity of 
our ordinary moral world. In fact, Galston never justifies value pluralism. He presents it as “an 
account of the actual structure of the normative universe”193, advances descriptive claims in its 
favour, and declares that “it is concrete experience that provides the most compelling reasons for 
                                                 
189 Ibid. 
190 Here Galston is explicitly influenced by Hart’s minimum content of natural law (See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, Clarendon, 1961, p. 189-195). As he states in a recent interview, “there are certain goods that no human being 
would willingly do without, and political authority behaves wrongly when it disregards or contradicts this fact, which is 
[...] at the heart of international human rights standards”. Galston does not want to introduce natural law elements in his 
theory. Rather his aim is pointing out that there are some ‘great evils’ of human condition with which politics should be 
concerned. See À propos de ‘The Practice of Liberal Pluralism’ de William Galston. Un Dialogue avec l’Auteur, in Les 
Ateliers de l’Éthique, 2006, p. 9. 
191 S. Hampshire, Morality and Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 155.  
192 W. A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 33. 
193 Ivi, p. 30. 
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accepting some form of value pluralism”194. What Galston gives us is no more than a description 
and a defence195 of value pluralism in response to some objections raised by critics, but never a 
proper philosophical justification. 
The political implications of value pluralism are not immediately clear. Among the theorists 
accepting value pluralism the compatibility between this account of moral world and liberalism is a 
matter of dispute. Theorists like I. Berlin, B. Williams, and G. Crowder, claim that pluralism is 
attuned with liberalism, whereas others like J. Gray believe that the acceptance of value pluralism 
and the consequent refusal of autonomy (and even negative liberty) as the trump value leads to 
conceiving of liberalism as a theory of only local authority196. Galston explicitly follows Berlin’s 
route in trying to elaborate a liberal theory that assumes value pluralism and negative liberty as 
fundamental ideas. For Galston and Berlin negative liberty should be understood as “the capacity of 
individuals unimpeded by external coercion or constraints, to choose for themselves among 
competing conceptions of good or valuable lives”197. A minimal conception of liberty such as this 
can have a privileged status in value pluralism and can function as the starting point for the 
elaboration of a liberalism compatible with the acceptance of value pluralism. 
Assuming this idea of negative liberty does not commit to some controversial philosophical 
or psychological systems. What does matter is only “the absence of force”198 when one wants to 
leave a community that risks becoming a prison. Galston claims that “the rejection of human 
imprisonment is the core of what Berlin means by negative liberty, and it is a principle with moral 
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force across political boundaries”199. Pluralism can accept traditional practices such as arranged 
marriage but it cannot accept that communities could impose the same practices on individuals that 
refuse to identify in them and that would leave the community. That is the main meaning of the 
negative liberty that Galston strives to defend. 
It is quite commonly agreed that value pluralism can object to those theories arguing that 
autonomous life is the necessary condition for human flourishing on the basis that there are many 
goods other than autonomy itself and that one can lead a good life without being autonomous. 
Galston argues that this objection does not represent a threat for the centrality of negative liberty in 
his (and Berlin’s) account of value pluralism. Rather it is “the fact of value pluralism itself that 
gives special status to individual liberty”200. It is value pluralism’s emphasis on the plurality of 
valuable and ultimate ends that confers particular importance to negative liberty and to the freedom 
to choose among many options. Galston, consistently with the acceptance of value pluralism, 
concedes that there are good human lives that do not ascribe to choice any particular value, but at 
the same time he recognizes that value pluralism itself suggests that “there is a range of 
indeterminacy within which various choice are rationally defensible”, and that “because there is no 
single uniquely rational ordering or combination of such values”201, any imposition of an ordering 
of value would be unjustified. 
Then the centrality of negative liberty in Galston’s (and Berlin’s) value pluralism is rooted 
not in the belief that rational and conscious choice is a feature that in any case distinguishes the 
good lives, but in the idea that coercion, not being a natural fact, should be always justified because 
of the “pervasive human desire to go our own way in accordance with our own desire and 
beliefs”202. This desire should not be interpreted as an equivalent to the idea of liberal autonomy 
and as an endorsement of the view that autonomy is always the trumping value. In fact, this move is 
unavailable to value pluralists given their commitment to the view that there is no such value. 
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Galston insists that the desire to live in accordance with her own conception of life is not a desire of 
an autonomous life: “a life lived with the requisite symmetry between the inner and the outer is a 
life of integrity”203, and, when this symmetry occurs unimpeded by external force, also not-
autonomous lives can have a significant level of integrity. 
Galston’s argument about negative liberty has been criticised by Robert Talisse because it 
seems to rely without enough reasons on the idea that negative liberty should be considered as the 
“default position”204 and that any deviation from it should be justified. Galston attempts to reply to 
this critique by pointing out that his account of negative liberty should not be read as the 
identification of an arbitrary default position, but should be related to the problem of justification 
for authority. Western political theory starts with a question about who can legitimately exercise 
power, and different theories have furnished divergent answers: “If value pluralism is the 
philosophically preferred account of the structure of the moral universe”205 then it rules out many 
answers to the question of what is a legitimate exercise of power. For example, it forbids that 
illiberal associations impose on their members some practice that they overtly refuse. 
 To give a more complete presentation of Galston’s liberal pluralism I conclude this section 
with some remarks about the comprehensive character of Galston’s theory in comparison with 
Rawlsian political liberalism206. The comprehensive207 character of Galston’s liberal pluralisms 
descends in quite obvious ways from its reliance on value pluralism. As Charles Larmore writes, 
political liberalism’s ambition is to “find principles of political associations expressing certain 
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fundamental moral values that, to as great an extent as possible, reasonable people may accept 
despite the different views about the good and about religious truth that divide them”208. Value 
pluralism is a complex view about the nature of value in plain opposition to those metaphysical and 
religious doctrines according to which there is only a single source of value. From the political 
liberalism’s standpoint it appears to be such a controversial doctrine that its claims can reasonably 
be rejected. 
Galston’s divergence from political liberalism seems to be clear and explicit. Rawls 
elaborated a liberal theory whose scope is limited to the basic structure of the society, is 
independent (or freestanding) of comprehensive doctrines, and is worked out from values, ideas, 
and principles implicit in the culture of a liberal democratic society. Political Rawlsian liberalism 
demands that the public justification of fundamental institutions and policies must avoid any appeal 
to contested and controversial comprehensive doctrines. Instead Galston claims that it is impossible 
to submit political discourse to the extremely demanding constraints required from Rawlsian public 
reason209. Public discussion about policies and constitutional matters cannot avoid references to 
contested notions deriving from comprehensive doctrines210. The alternative “is stubborn silence, a 
kind of democratic dogmatism that ill serves both theory and practice”211. 
 
4. Educating for diversity.  
  A short discussion about educational policies will be valuable to illustrate how Galston’s 
diversity liberalism actually works in practical cases. In fact, education is a field in which the 
significance of accommodating the demands of individuals and groups who do not perceive their 
flourishing in autonomy terms appears particularly troubling. For instance, think about traditional 
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communities that refuse to assimilate in liberal democracy for religious reasons and try to shield 
themselves from scientific progress and the ideals of civic participation, self-criticism, and 
individuality that mark modernity. Such communities represent a thorny challenge for liberal 
aspirations to inclusiveness and fairness. 
The Amish are the classic (and most debated) example in a similar discussion because they 
are involved in one of the most well known judicial US cases concerning education, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder212. The Amish constitute small and conservative religious communities living in North 
America, mainly in Pennsylvania, the Midwest, and Ontario. They completely reject modern world 
and try to live according to their religious norms that command isolation from secular world, 
rejection of technology, and a severe educational system that is designed to prepare young Amish to 
perpetuate their community without questioning either its structure or criticizing its practices. As 
Shapiro and Arneson observe, the Amish are “particularly opposed to high school education, which 
they see as threatening to their entire way of life”213. In Wisconsin v. Yoder three Amish parents 
requested and obtained two years of exemption of their children from a Wisconsin law prescribing 
school attendance until the age of sixteen. Amish parents claimed that an excess of their children’s 
exposure to diversity would have been obnoxious to the preservation of their lifestyle. They also 
alleged that particularly in the last two years of compulsory education Amish children would have 
been likely to develop critical attitudes that facilitate their leaving the community. Moreover, 
Amish parents maintained that compulsory high school, being contrary to their religious beliefs, 
would have been an unjust curtailment of their religious freedom. 
Galston claims that “Yoder was correctly decided”214. Taking this stance, Galston 
differentiates himself both from those conservatives fearing that admitting exemptions for religious 
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groups from general laws could weaken state central power, and from those liberals arguing that 
exemption like those allowed by Yoder could translate into hindrances for children’s autonomy 
development. Galston’s endorsement of Yoder can be understood in the light of a consideration of 
expressive liberty, political pluralism, and value pluralism that, as we observed in the previous 
pages, are the three sources of his liberal pluralism.  
The expressive liberty we are dealing with when we are discussing children’s education is 
parent’s expressive liberty215. Galston argues that “the ability of parents to raise their children in a 
manner consistent with their deepest commitments is an essential element of expressive liberty”216. 
Galston partially accepts the fiduciary model217 according to which parents should promote the 
future interests of their children. He maintains that children’s “vulnerability, dependency, and 
developmental needs”218 are the main reason in favour of this model. Still Galston thinks that the 
parental role in raising children cannot be reduced to that of a mere care-taker, teacher, or state 
delegate for instructing children about how to become a good citizen. Relying on some of Eamonn 
Callan’s reflections on children-parents relation, Galston writes that “parenting is typically 
undertaken as one of the central meaning-giving tasks of our lives”219. In fact, being a good parent 
is a fundamental part of what constitutes a good life for people deciding to have children, and 
parenthood generally implies that everyone shapes one’s daughters’ and sons’ values in agreement 
with what she deems valuable. Galston maintains that “the child is in part (though only in part) an 
extension of ourselves” and that any attempt to hinder parents’ educational efforts in raising their 
children represents a hateful form of disrespect for parents’ expressive liberty. Liberal states, 
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differently from illiberal regimes that subordinate parental role in education to the fulfilment of a 
unitary and undifferentiated culture, should respect (obviously without certain limits220) expressive 
liberty and then should agree with the Yoder decision. 
If we consider political pluralism we could have additional reasons in favour of the 
exemption from the last two years of high school education granted to Amish children by the Yoder 
decision. As we saw in the previous section, political pluralism guarantees that there are more then 
one legitimate authority in liberal democracies and that state power should not be considered as the 
supreme power that subordinates all the others. Yoder, with its recognition that parental authority 
could be granted qualified autonomy against state’s educational general aspirations, could be 
considered as a substantial acceptance of political pluralism. As Ian MacMuellen writes, “Galston’s 
distinctive claim is that civic goals are not to be privileged over other competing values”221. 
In a recent essay Amy Gutmann interprets Galston’s theory as a form of civic minimalism 
which “accepts a minimal set of common educational standards but no more. Its aim is to maximize 
parental authority consistently with keeping a democratic society unified”222. The Yoder decision 
seems acceptable because Amish people, thanks to their peaceful nature and their isolated and 
agrarian existence, do not constitute a serious threat against civic peace. In addition, Amish can 
leave their community, so they enjoy substantive exit rights. According to Galston, “the Amish 
community is not a prison. For young adults must explicitly choose to become full members”, and 
“there is no evidence that many former members find themselves unable to cope with the demands 
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of a modern economy and society”223. All these considerations should work in favour of the 
acceptance of the legitimacy of (a qualified) parental authority in Yoder. 
Galston’s agreement with the Yoder decision seems to be resistant also to a partial receipt of 
those liberal objections asserting that Amish people are not good liberal citizens because their 
“society is patriarchal – women are regarded as unequal helpers of men – and Amish children are 
not prepared for being critically receptive citizens”224.  Liberalism, and it is here that value 
pluralism comes in, cannot ask for a never questioned primacy of those political virtues associated 
with autonomy, rationality, and self-examination. Amish can score very high in respect to other 
virtues such as law abidingness, responsibility, tolerance of diversity, that are nonetheless 
fundamental for a well functioning liberal democratic society225. It is just the acceptance of value 
pluralism as the most adequate theoretical tool for describing our moral world that leads us to the 
claim that a compulsory education aimed at instructing children for living an autonomous and self-
examining life would take for granted that individual autonomy is the sommum bonum to which 
everything should be subordinated. If value pluralism holds we can question the Socratic thought 
(assumed more or less tacitly by the dominant part of the liberal democratic tradition) according to 
which “the unexamined life is an unworthy life, that individual freedom is incompatible with ways 
of life guided by unquestioned authority or unswerving faith”226. For Galston there is still moral 
goodness outside the narrow domain of autonomy, and Yoder adequately recognizes that. 
 
5. Questioning Galston’s liberalism. 
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After having presented Galston’s liberal theory in many of its relevant aspects we can 
proceed to a critical evaluation of his proposal. Firstly, we will argue that Galston misrepresents 
both conceptually and historically the theories he dubs autonomy liberalism and diversity 
liberalism. Then we will proceed to a critical evaluation of Galston’s diversity liberalism. Our 
critical remarks will focus on the assumption that the protection of diversity is enquiry’s starting 
point for diversity liberalism; the possibility that value pluralism (that is a view about goods) could 
glide into a view about plurality of cultures; the lack of conceptual clarity of a theory that aspires 
both to comprehensiveness (with its relying on value pluralism) and to minimal commitments (with 
its emphasis on the minimal character of negative liberty). Galston’s liberalism will be submitted to 
a series of objections raising doubts on its theoretical consistency and on its aspiration to be an 
adequate tool for dealing with diversity. 
Firstly, Galston’s presentation of autonomy (or Enlightenment) liberalism as a theory 
committed to promoting autonomy understood as an individual capacity for rational self-direction is 
far from accurate both theoretically and historically. In Emily Gill’s Becoming Free, one can read 
that “for Galston a liberal society or government that values and tries to inculcate the capacity for 
autonomy in all citizens does not promote diversity but undermines it”227. What does promoting 
“Socratic or Millian ideals as valid for all citizens”228 mean? Is it true that the advocates of this 
form of liberalism want to actively encourage the value of autonomy? How is it possible to uphold 
autonomy without betraying other fundamental liberal premises? Take for example J. S. Mill, 
considered by Galston as one of the most pre-eminent autonomy liberals. Mill, notwithstanding the 
perfectionist character of his utilitarian liberalism229 and his though that “it was good for people to 
reflect on their beliefs and to exercise some kind of self-conscious choices about their way of 
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life”230, never argued in favour of public coercive measures for shaping individual characters. It is 
evident in his claim that the state should not be directly concerned with the education of children. 
As Brian Barry observed, the role of institutions in Mill (and also in other autonomy liberals) is to 
“provide the conditions under which autonomy can flourish but they do not do anything directly to 
bring about the ideal of autonomy”231. Even Will Kymlicka, which explicitly endorses autonomy 
liberalism, distinguish between the identification of the more adequate liberal theory and the 
imposition of the theory itself to illiberal and non-liberal minorities: accepting a liberal theory for 
which autonomy is the main value does not directly commit to the imposition of autonomous 
lifestyles to traditional communities and their individuals232. 
No liberal society can require that everyone should be engaged in Socratic self-examination, 
for this imposition would result in hateful violations of fundamental and traditional liberal 
guarantees such as the respect for privacy and individuality. Liberal institutional commitments stop 
at the point in which everyone disposes of the required means for thriving both in an autonomous 
and in a non-autonomous way.  
Moreover, and with these remarks we point out the historical inaccuracy we mentioned 
before, Galston gives us a too narrow characterization of Enlightenment liberalism. It is equated 
with only one Enlightenment strand, that is the Rationalist, according to which “individual 
autonomy is identified with the individual exercise of reason, so principles of justice must be 
constructed which are acceptable to all on the basis of reason alone”233. There is another (although 
not dominant in contemporary liberal debate) tradition in Enlightenment that is not considered by 
Galston: it is the Sentimentalism represented principally by David Hume and Adam Smith, which 
gave a complex and sophisticated account of ethics and politics in which political principles must 
be endorsed not in terms of reason alone but also in terms of sentiments and emotions.  
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Then Galston’s representation of autonomy liberalism is both conceptually and historically 
flawed. If we pass to consider diversity liberalism we will find other weaknesses from the historical 
point of view. First of all there is some difficulty in asserting that the sources of a liberalism 
founded on toleration and on acceptance of diversity must be founded in the Protestant 
Reformation. As Brian Barry outlines, it was already John Stuart Mill that in On Liberty warned 
against any uncritical enthusiasm about the Reformation legacy for liberal theory. Mill wrote that 
“those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little 
willing to permit differences of religious opinion as that church itself”234. The break-up of the 
Universal Church was seen with regret by all the involved parts, and the Peace of Augsburg (1555) 
was perceived at maximum as the realization of a modus vivendi coexistence alterable according to 
evolving power relations. 
For what concerns diversity liberalism we would like to argue that is not clear if it conceives 
of diversity as “its point of departure”235 or as the value that should be protected or pursued through 
public policies (as has been shown through the example of the Amish). Diversity, from a liberal 
point of view, is a fact of social life having as such no particular value. It is simply a sociological 
fact that our societies are diverse for what concerns morality, religion, and politics. Diversity as 
such is not a value and we can have circumstances in which homogeneity could be preferable to 
diversity. Think for instance of the degree of convergence required by the good functioning of some 
religious or political associations. As Chandran Kukathas clearly writes, “diversity is not the value 
liberalism pursues but the source of the problem to which it offers a solution”236. Liberalism is 
required to give an answer to the problem of elaborating agreeable principles for making possible 
the peaceful coexistence in a society extensively pervaded by the conflict about how one should 
live. Posing from the starting point that diversity is the value that liberalism should protect could 
mean puzzling the priorities and the finalities of liberal inquiry. 
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Another objection that can be formulated against Galston’s theory relates to the ways in 
which he employs value pluralism. It is a view about plurality and incommensurability of 
conflicting goods, not cultures, so it should emphasize a state of affairs in which many values 
compete without an always valid rule of priority. Galston himself recognize this feature of value 
pluralism when he refers to it as a resource to ground a liberal theory. For he claims that “while 
liberal pluralists celebrate legitimate diversity among cultures, they suspect that diversity will exist 
within culture as well and that a culture’s smoothly homogeneous public face reflects the covert 
operation of power”237. This statement results in patent tension with the acceptance of Amish’s 
restrictions on children education, because the homogeneity and the social immobility of Amish 
society could be a signal of an unjustified and oppressing power exercised from the strongest 
against the weakest members of the group.  
At this point we agree with George Crowder’s when he notices that “Galston does not go as 
far as Gray in identifying the incommensurability of values with the incommensurability of political 
regimes, but he tends similarly to equate diversity of goods with diversity of cultures”238. If the 
identification of the incommensurability of values with the incommensurability of political regimes 
easily translates into a relativistic view according to which there is no prospect for criticizing 
political institutions from outside, even the more moderate equation of diversity of goods with 
diversity of cultures is a dangerous move toward a relativistic position that is both unavailable to 
Galston given his often stated idea that “pluralism is not the same as relativism”239 and potentially 
illiberal. In fact, the emphasis on the diversity of cultures might hide the presence of oppression and 
coerced homogeneity within the groups themselves. In all likelihood there will be conflicts between 
diversity among cultures and within cultures, and Galston’s theory does not give us clear advises to 
deal with them. 
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Our last critical remark concerns the comprehensive character of Galston’s diversity 
liberalism. At the end of the third section we observed that Galston wants to point out his distance 
from political liberalism. His commitment to value pluralism and his objections to the constraints 
imposed by the norms of public reason on public life and discussion would seem enough to firmly 
place Galston into the comprehensive camp. But the issue is not as simple as it could appear at the 
first sight. For some commentators like Will Kymlicka and Robert Talisse consider Galston as a 
political liberal. In a book published in 1995, so before the publication of Galston’s works we are 
mainly considering here, Kymlicka includes Galston among political (or pro-toleration, or pro-
diversity) liberals such as John Rawls, Charles Larmore, and Donald Moon240: their theories share a 
common opposition to the commitment to autonomy as the fundamental liberal value241 for 
accommodating the claims of not properly liberal groups and individuals. An account of Galston as 
a political liberal is profoundly misconceived because Kymlicka, as it is more extensively argued in 
the first chapter, conflates the political/comprehensive distinction, which is about the justification of 
a liberal theory, with the pro-autonomy/pro-diversity toleration, which instead is about the value a 
liberal theory might assume as fundamental.  
Talisse instead challenges the view that diversity liberalism is a comprehensive theory242. 
Galston’s appeal to the relevance of the presumption against coercion and in favour of negative 
liberty would render Galston’s liberal pluralism dangerously243 akin to the Rawlsian political 
liberalism. Given that the presumption against coercion and the primacy of negative liberty 
understood along value pluralist’s lines are widespread view in a liberal society, it would seem that 
Galston agrees with one of the three features we ascribed to political liberalism (political principles 
are to be worked out starting from what John Rawls names “implicitly recognized basic ideas and 
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D. Moon, Constructing Community. Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts, Princeton University Press, 1993.  
241 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, cit., p. 158. Kymlicka continues to consider Galston as a political liberal 
also in his most recent Contemporary Political Philosophy. An introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002². 
242 R. B. Talisse, Can Value Pluralists be Comprehensive Liberals? Galston’s Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 136. 
243 We say dangerously because that proximity is against the Author’s declared purposes. 
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principles”244 of a liberal democratic society). We already discussed this objection and we saw that 
Galston’s reliance on negative liberty and on the idea that coercion should be always justified is not 
an arbitrary assumption of a default position but rather a consequence of the acceptance of value 
pluralism as the most adequate view about ethics. There is still another consideration that would 
fade the distinction between Galston’s theory and political liberalism, that is Galston’s 
understanding of negative liberty as a very minimal notion that is independent from disputable 
philosophical and metaphysical assumptions. It would work as the basis of a liberal theory thought 
as a minimal moral conception245 undistinguishable from political liberalism with its search for a 
consensus on some shared basic values as a guarantee of a just and stable political society. 
 It would seem that Galston’s search of a minimally committed notion of negative liberty 
politicizes his diversity liberalism. And yet Galston’s reliance on value pluralism is too fundamental 
to be disregarded as the main factor that renders his theory a comprehensive liberalism. It is so 
relevant that Galston himself does not disrespect it even when it leads to endorsing conclusion in 
some respects not compatible with some central tenets of liberal political morality. For instance, in 
the discussion of Yoder we observed that the employment of value pluralism as one of the resources 
of diversity liberalism works not as a device for defining “a more modest conception of autonomy 
as freedom of choice”246 and for balancing autonomy and diversity liberalism, but as an instrument 
for giving priority to diversity and undermining what Galston himself considered (and still 
considers) as necessary virtues for every liberal citizen, that is the “capacity to evaluate the talents, 
character, and performance of public officials” and “critical reflection needed to understand, to 
accept, and to apply liberal principles of justice”247. Differently from what Galston maintains, we 
think that arguing for a not-principled concession of exemption for Amish due to their peaceful 
nature, scarce numerical relevance, and relative isolation from the rest of society, would have been 
                                                 
244 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 8. 
245 That is political liberalism in Charles Larmore’s understanding. See C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, cit., p. 
133. 
246 W. A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism, cit., p. 182. 
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 73
more consistent with Galston’s general approach and in general with any theory aspiring to 
generosity toward diversity but not willing to give up when core liberal values are at stake248. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
248 See S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism, cit., and J. Spinner, The Boundaries of 
Citizenship. Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, Ch. 5. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Political Liberalism and Diversity: Political Transformations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 In this chapter I will discuss the way in which what I labelled in the first Chapter of the 
Dissertation ‘political pro-autonomy liberalism’ deals with diversity. Stephen Macedo’s approach 
will be assumed as an example of this kind of theory. In Macedo’s view the politicization of 
liberalism coexists with a commitment to the value of autonomy, although the autonomy that 
political liberalism refers to is, as it will be more clear in the following pages, a political notion. 
 In the next section I will give an account of Macedo’s politicization of liberal theory as a 
progress beyond the weakness of comprehensive liberalisms’ attempts to accommodate diversity 
that have already been analyzed in Chapter II and Chapter III. Political liberalism is mainly a 
Rawlsian idea, and Macedo’s position is overtly relying on Rawlsian thoughts249. Nevertheless, his 
theory has some noteworthy peculiarities that make it independent from the original inspiration. 
Above all, Macedo is more candid than Rawls about liberal partisanship and about the impossibility 
                                                 
249 See especially J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, 2005. When suitable, in 
this chapter I will use also Rawlsian texts and thoughts. 
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of achieving a completely neutral justification for a liberal theory. To be more precise, he is less 
reticent than the Author of Political Liberalism in “spelling out the controversial implications of 
liberalism” and “the deep and broad implications of liberal politics”250. However, it should be 
pointed out that Macedo does not completely reject neutrality but, as the fourth section will show, 
he argues for a very constrained notion of liberal neutrality that is consistent with the ambitions and 
the structure of political liberalism. 
Macedo’s theory is also characterized by a pronounced civic dimension. The idea is that, in 
order to flourish, liberal societies need a civic life of a certain kind. Citizens must be educated so 
that they can give their contribution to the thriving of liberal order. In the third section I will stress 
to explain that this means, among other things, that a liberalism such as Macedo’s cannot accept 
diversity in itself, as something having value as such. It will distinguish between healthy and 
unhealthy forms of diversity and will argue in favour of transforming collective and individual 
identities so that they can actively support the liberal society in which they live. 
It is this view of transformation that will be found problematic. As I have argued in the 
Second Chapter of the Dissertation, the concept of transformation of groups’ identities is not tricky 
as such. In that Chapter, Will Kimlicka’s view has been objected on the basis of the narrowness of 
the notion of comprehensive autonomy according to which the transformations are conducted. In 
the case of Macedo the notion of autonomy that is assumed as relevant is less substantive and 
divisive yet still problematic: in fact, it is the emphasis on the political notion of autonomy that does 
not allow to see that when a liberal society decides to include new and presumably different 
minorities the transformations concern both majorities and minorities. 
 
2. The politicization of liberalism. 
                                                 
250 S. Macedo, The Politics of Justification, in Political Theory, Vol. 18, No 2, May 1990, p. 281. 
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Stephen Macedo’s work is a clear expression of political liberalism’s principles. In a 1995 
article in which he discusses the problems posed to liberal civic education by moral and religious 
pluralism, he objected to comprehensive liberalisms on the basis that their ideals are “deeply 
partisan and not easily defended”, and that they “claim too much”251. Given the persistence of 
disagreement among reasonable individuals about the ultimate matters of ethics, religion, and 
philosophy, that is the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’252, and given that homogeneity about these 
controversial matters is either unfeasible or achievable only trough an intolerably intrusive use of 
state coercion that inevitably would restrict individual freedoms and rights, political authority 
should not be premised on the validity of divisive comprehensive doctrines such as the view that 
critical thinking is a necessary feature of a good life, or that religious truths are to be achieved in 
some specific ways. 
Macedo’s politicization of liberalism closely follows Rawls’ approach in Political 
Liberalism253. For Macedo proposes “to put aside such matters such as religious truth and the 
ultimate ideals of human perfection” and stress “to justify at least the most basic matters of justice 
on ground widely acceptable to reasonable people – and not only to those who share our particular 
view of the whole truth”254. In the Rawlsian jargon, reasonable people are those who “are prepared 
to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation” and “agree to act on those terms, even at the 
cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms”255. 
The notion of reasonableness is so central in Macedo’s work that he maintains that political 
liberalism’s core motive is “the desire to respect reasonable people”256. 
                                                 
251 S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, in Ethics, Vol. 
105, 1995, p. 473. 
252 As John Rawls argues, “political liberalism assumes that a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime”. See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. xvi. 
253 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit. 
254 S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism, cit., p. 473.  
255 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. xlii.  
256 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, Harvard University Press, 2000, 
p. 170. 
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According to Macedo, and also to Rawls, political liberalism asks to ‘bracket’ our deepest 
convictions and to focus upon what reasonable people can share notwithstanding their deep 
disagreements. One could say that, contrarily to comprehensive liberals pursuing what could be 
called “a strategy of engagement” (in the sense that “they would invite our deepest disagreements 
on to the political stage to be grappled with directly”257), political liberals practice a more modest 
“strategy of avoidance” aimed at getting a fair agreement. The underlying idea is that “citizens who 
disagree about their highest ideals and their conceptions of the whole truth can nevertheless agree 
on public aims such as securing the equal enjoyment of a broad array of freedoms, establishing 
democratic institutions, and providing a basic social safety net”258. This agreement, political liberals 
contend, is reachable without sharing a specific comprehensive account of ethics, religion, and 
metaphysics.  
At this point it should be pointed out that the theory Macedo is advancing is not sceptical.  It 
is not led by the idea that human reason is unfit to know moral, religious, or other metaphysical 
truths. Macedo is extremely clear in maintaining that even if “political liberalism does not assert a 
particular view of the truth”, that does not mean “that there is no truth about these larger 
matters”259. What is relevant from a political liberal perspective is “to acknowledge the difficulty of 
publicly establishing any single account of truth for the whole of life”260. 
Political liberalism does not demand that, even in their private lives, individuals have to be 
indifferent toward their religions or whatever be their ultimate ethical commitments: it assumes that 
each individual has her own comprehensive doctrine and that she can relate it to the political 
domain, which is defined by what reasonable people can share, according to her own lights261. As it 
                                                 
257 S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, cit., p. 491. 
258 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, cit., p. 170. 
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261 In Diversity and Distrust Macedo writes: “comprehensive religious and moral conceptions are regarded as 
inappropriate grounds for determining the shape of basic political institutions (because these conceptions are sources of 
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will be better understood in the following discussion of the idea of public reason, the primacy of the 
political domain only holds when matters of particular relevance are at stake. In fact, political 
liberals argue that the appeal to comprehensive doctrines is suspicious only when a society is 
fashioning “basic principles of justice”262, that is those fundamental rights and political principles 
that direct the coercive powers of the state. In other less significant circumstances, every individual 
can lead her life according to what her comprehensive doctrine demands. 
The politicization of liberalism can be understood as a tool for amending comprehensive 
liberalism’s narrowness in accommodating and accounting for the problem of diversity. In fact, as 
Macedo maintains in a 1998 article, political liberalism is to be preferred to its opponent because 
the former, almost as a definitional matter, “accommodates a greater philosophical diversity at the 
foundational level than comprehensive versions of liberalism”263. If political liberalism’s 
justification of the political order does not rely on the validity of one among many conflicting 
conceptions of the good, it can more fairly accommodate and acknowledge the so called ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’. Whereas one could say that a comprehensive liberalism assuming autonomy 
as its core value “does not show very much respect for the choices citizens may make to live 
nonautonomously, as members of hierarchical societies or corporate bodies”264, political liberalism 
does not take a position about ultimate matters that are not directly relevant in the political domain. 
So it does not privilege those who, for instance, are committed to an autonomy inspired conception 
of the good life, but at the same time it does not marginalize those who conceive of their flourishing 
within conservative religious communities. 
It has to be remarked that political liberalism’s openness towards diversity operates at the 
philosophical level. As the quotation from Macedo’s 1998 article shows, political liberalism, given 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reasonable disagreements). But that does not mean that what has been put aside is valueless or irrelevant to individual 
citizens. Quite the contrary, much of value is outside of the shared grounds of a liberal public morality” (p. 190). 
262 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, cit., p. 177.  
263 S. Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion. Defending the Moderate Hegemony of 
Liberalism, in Political Theory, 1998, p. 79, my emphasis.  
264 M. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in S. M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton University Press, 
1999, p. 110. 
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its freestandingness, scores higher than comprehensive liberalism in accommodating a more 
elevated degree of (reasonable) philosophical diversity. The diversity that is actually 
accommodated is a further matter, and Macedo’s political liberalism is quite far from a simple 
laissez faire approach toward diversity. In fact, as the following sections will show, his theory does 
not stand neither for an unconstrained neutrality among different conceptions of the good nor for an 
undifferentiated acceptance of diversity. 
 
3. The civic and transformative dimensions of political liberalism. 
Stephen Macedo’s political liberalism disagrees with any attitude of celebration for plurality 
and difference as such. He is critical of those theorists who romantically265 celebrate diversity as 
such and think that a more diverse society is always good in itself or a suitable end for public 
policies. Macedo thinks that “diversity needs to be kept in its place: diversity is not always a value 
and it should not be accepted uncritically”266. Even for political liberalism there are ‘healthy’ and 
‘unhealthy’ forms of diversity and the principles of a sound political theory are to distinguish 
among which should be accommodated and which should be rejected or restrained.  
Macedo’s liberalism is pretty demanding. According to him, liberal societies do not rest on 
diversity, but on “shared political commitments”. Keeping alive a thriving liberal society requires 
“a shared public morality”267 and specific citizens’ virtues that do not naturally produce themselves, 
but call for public intervention, primarily trough the public educational system but also trough other 
less direct means. Very simply, given that a liberal society is possible only if its individuals become 
good citizens and given that “there is no reason to think that the dispositions that characterize good 
                                                 
265 S. Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, cit., p. 189. 
Here Macedo mainly refers to William Galston’s discussion of educational policies for children from conservative 
religious minorities such as the Amish. See W. A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, in Ethics, Vol. 105, 1995.  
266 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, cit. p. 3.  
267 Ibidem, p. 146. 
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liberal citizens come about naturally”268, the state is in charge of creating the conditions of its own 
perpetuation. 
These short remarks are enough to indicate that Macedo objects to what he labels ‘liberal 
legalism’269, the view according to which law is simply a system of impartial rules constituting the 
framework within which individuals and groups pursue their ends. In this rather simple picture law 
is purposeless and the main function of the government consists in enforcing law and regulating the 
eventual conflicts of interests arising among individual and groups. ‘Liberal legalism’ is valuable 
insofar as it helps to account for the fact that law assures ordered liberty and allows individual and 
groups to pursue in peaceful ways their aims but, according to Macedo, it should be rejected given 
that it misses “some of the deepest ambitions of a liberal constitutional order”270.  
Liberalism has a transformative dimension that one cannot grasp if one stops at ‘liberal 
legalism’ tenets.  As I mentioned, liberal societies’ flourishing is not a natural fact but depends on 
certain citizens’ attitudes that are neither spontaneous nor self-sustaining. Liberal state needs to 
transform individuals’ and groups’ commitments so that they can actively support liberal order. 
Active support is more than mere acquiescence to the coercive power of liberal institutions. Already 
in a book published in 1990 Macedo distinguished two ways of living in a liberal regime. Firstly, 
there is what we can label the situation of liberal coexistence. In this case we have an outward 
conformity to liberal institutions that can be compatible also with reciprocal indifference or hostility 
joined with common fear of punishment for the violations of liberal rules. Liberal coexistence is the 
primitive way of affirming liberalism and of living according to liberal norms and institutions. It is 
characteristic of the period in which liberal tolerance emerged as a pragmatic tool for 
accommodating religious pluralism after religious wars in 17th Century. However, liberal 
coexistence is not the only and “the best way of affirming liberal justice”271. Liberalism can be 
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270 Ivi. 
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more than a modus vivendi and citizens can actively support liberal justice for moral reasons. This 
second way of living according to the principles of liberalism is possible when individuals affirm 
liberal justice critically and reflectively. 
Macedo points out that the interest for individuals’ and communities’ support for political 
order is not alien to liberalism and to liberalism understood as a tradition of political thought. 
Rather it is an old concern, pace those who think that liberalism is an atomistic theory concerned 
only with the respect of individual rights272. For instance, a classical liberal such as Adam Smith 
was aware that “local communities and other intermediate associations are important indirect 
instruments of civic education”273 which the state can shape and manage trough public policies so 
that they can become supportive of liberal democracy. 
Thus, from the perspective of Macedo’s political liberalism healthy forms of diversity are 
those “supportive of basic principles of justice”274. To flourish in suitable ways, liberal state has to 
constitute normative diversity for its own ends. Collective and individual identities need to be 
transformed in ways that render them able to support a liberal democratic society. The process 
through which in the 1960’s American Catholic Church was liberalized and, after a long period of 
distrust and suspicion, became an active supporter of democracy around the world is assumed as an 
illustration of the “transformative potential” liberalism. Macedo remarks that this transformation 
“did not occur accidentally”275, but was the deliberate outcome of, among other political acts, the 
principle of separation between political and religious power.  
Macedo’s liberalism, with its accent on the state role in shaping normative diversity and on 
the fact that the civil society it envisages is a shared moral space in which citizens respect one 
another as equal participants in the collective enterprise of self-government, seems to go well 
beyond political liberalism concerns with fundamental constitutional principles. According to what 
                                                 
272 These objections to liberal theory have been formulated for instance by Charles Taylor in Atomism, in Idem, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 187-210.  
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Macedo himself asserts, his theory is a kind of civic liberalism that emphasizes “the importance of 
the wider civic life of liberal democracy in practice, as well as liberalism’s educative ambitions”276. 
In another paper Macedo writes that “liberalism has an important civic dimension: it proposes not 
simply a set of negative mechanisms for limiting and controlling political power, but also includes 
positive means for fostering a politics worthy of esteem”277. So, one could ask, what is the 
difference between this sort of political liberalism and other comprehensive liberalisms stressing the 
relevance of civic virtues or other more explicitly republican approaches? Is Macedo’s political 
liberalism nothing more than a disguised form of comprehensive liberalism as some of his critics 
claim?278    
What distinguishes political from comprehensive liberalism is the fact that in the first case 
the justification of the constraints imposed to the acceptable diversity does not go beyond what is 
shared by different comprehensive positions. For instance, political liberals cannot claim that a 
community that does not promote or in same ways favours the autonomy (understood as a 
comprehensive ideal) of its members is, just for this reason, beyond the realm of what can be 
tolerated. The main difference between the two versions of liberal theory resides in the way in 
which any of them defends the constraints to the admissible diversity: “political liberalism stands 
for a measure of restraint that would be unnatural for one committed to a vision of the good life as a 
whole informed by autonomy or individuality”279.   
Macedo’s liberalism is unapologetically transformative up to the point that it does not even 
despise assimilation, provided that it operated in nonoppressive ways, and is directed toward 
justifiable values, which are those that can be defended without an appeal to comprehensive 
doctrines. In fact, as Macedo argues, “the point of the transformative mechanisms is political. They 
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are deployed in liberal politics, and their effects are welcomed insofar as they secure a system of 
political liberty and other basic political goods”280. Liberal transformations stress the need to 
enhance our civil interests, the common interests of citizens who decide to peacefully live together 
in a free and diverse society, not to advance a religion over another religion or atheism over 
religious faith in general. In this sense, Macedo’s view is less demanding and more open to 
diversity than, for instance, John Dewey’s civic totalism with his idea that civic engagement is 
overwhelmingly relevant and that democratic public morality should be concerned with what is 
ultimately true. Moreover political liberalism is not grounded in a pro-science comprehensive view 
opposed to religious beliefs as such. Thus it neither does have a negative attitude towards religious 
beliefs as such (or towards other different particular loyalties) nor does want, in a Deweyan spirit, 
“to dissolve traditional religions in order to transfer religious energies to the common political 
project of progressive reform and the advancement of science and culture”281. It only asks that 
religious and other groups transform in a civic direction to support liberal order. 
 
4. Political liberalism, neutrality, and public reason: promoting political autonomy. 
Considering what I have written up to now, it seems that neutrality does not have a relevant 
place in Macedo’s political liberalism. If, as Will Kymlicka has argued in an article published 
almost twenty years ago, neutrality is the view that “the state should not reward or penalize 
particular conceptions of the good life but, rather, should provide a neutral framework within which 
different and potentially conflicting conceptions of the good can be pursued”282, one could say that 
arguing in favour of transforming individual and collective identities so that they can support liberal 
order is far from neutral. In fact some conceptions of the good, those suffering more changes, will 
be penalized and and other will not be at ease in a social environment like that envisaged by 
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political liberal principles. These considerations are not particularly relevant for Macedo’s views 
and for political liberalism in general. They would be crucial if the neutrality Macedo’s theory is 
looking for were consequential neutrality283, which is neutrality related to the outcomes of public 
policies. However, Macedo’s political liberalism does not demand that laws, institutions, and 
collective decisions must have the same consequences for all the conceptions of the good present in 
a liberal democratic society. It is unavoidable that different conceptions will be differently affected 
by the framework constituted by liberal rights and freedoms284. For instance, in a society in which 
rights are universally enforced and protected, those groups who do not recognize women rights will 
suffer much more limitations to their conduct than those ones for which equality between sexes is a 
condition that cannot be renounced. 
Political liberalism aims at justificatory neutrality. Macedo is extremely candid about liberal 
partisanship and on the fact that political liberalism is not an exception to the observation that any 
justification is controversial. He claims that neutrality has to be understood only in the limited sense 
that “liberal political values (at least those that undergird the constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice) should not depend upon particular religious and (what John Rawls called) 
comprehensive philosophical worldviews”285.  That is for sure a very constrained notion of 
neutrality whose operation one can better understand if one considers the idea of public reason. 
According to Macedo liberalism is not only a theory focused on individual rights, 
guarantees, and liberties but on public justification. In fact he approvingly quotes Jeremy Waldron’s 
view that “liberals demand that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at 
the tribunal of each person’s understanding”286. The essential premise of Macedo’s Rawlsian 
justificatory strategy is that “public power belongs to us all as fellow citizens, and we should 
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exercise it together based in reasons and arguments we can share in spite of our differences”287. The 
process trough which persons give and receive reasons is fundamental for legitimizing the coercive 
power exercised from the state on all citizens. Given the deep disagreements about different but still 
reasonable worldviews these reasons have to be public, in the sense of being independent from what 
each person thinks true according to her comprehensive doctrine. It is publicity that guarantees that 
no particular comprehensive view subordinates those persons who, notwithstanding their 
reasonableness, are committed to other comprehensive views. It is still publicity that assures the 
possibility of achieving the “core aspiration of civic or political liberalism”, that is “a political 
community of principle in which citizens share not only a common effective authority, but also 
public moral principles and a mutually acceptable and convincing rationale for those principles”288. 
The constraints imposed by public reason have been largely objected from non-liberal as 
well as from other liberal thinkers.  Critics have focused on many arguments: some of them claim 
that, at the end of the day, public reason silences some groups, especially religious ones, or that it 
hides biases towards conservative moral arguments; others raise doubts on the difficulty of clearly 
detaching public from non-public reasons; some others observe that public reason conceived 
according political liberalism’s tenets can result in the weakening of the vitality of a healthy public 
sphere and in the incapacity of publicly pursuing truth. 
In a recent paper Macedo has attempted to reply to such objections289. He has stressed that 
the main criticisms are misplaced or exaggerated, in so far as even conservative and religious 
fundamentalists today try to fashion their arguments in terms of public reasons: it would be quite 
weird if in a political debate someone used God revelation to strengthen her arguments. Moreover 
the acceptance of the Rawlsian wide view of public reason, according to which “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion 
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at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons are presented”290 appears to be 
enough inclusive even for those fearing the exclusionary effects due to public reason: it does not put 
particular restrictions on public discussion as such, but only ask that “there should be a common, 
public rationale for laws that will be binding on all (and this is especially urgent where fundamental 
considerations of justice are at stake)” 291. However in this chapter I will not deal with these 
complex matters in so far as my analysis will briefly focus on the so called spillover effects of this 
form of liberalism of public reason. I will consider public educational policies as a domain in which 
these spillover effects are particularly noticeable and in which normative diversity is more 
perceptibly transformed for civic purposes. 
In the previous pages I showed both that Macedo’s political liberalism does not defend 
neutrality of effects and that it needs to transform individual and collective identities so that they 
can support liberal order. The transformative potential of political liberalism is particularly relevant 
for public education: in fact it deals with children and for this reason it is concerned with less then 
full citizens who can be shaped according to the plans of the educational system. Civic spirited 
public school would promote the rationality and autonomy of their students: they could be shaped to 
acquire the capabilities to be fully able to critically choose their lifestyles, independently from what 
their families auspicate. Moreover, public schools (contrarily to what happens in the case of private 
religious or secular schools) in general expose their pupils to an extended diversity of religious, 
political, and moral beliefs that is not easily consistent with the homogeneity required by some 
conservative groups as a necessary condition for individual and collective thriving. 
Macedo claims that “all children should have an education that provides them with the 
ability to make informed and independent decisions about how they want to lead their lives in our 
modern world. Liberal freedoms to choose is the birthright of every child”292. In other words, 
                                                 
290 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 462. This idea is presented for the first time in J. Rawls, The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1997, pp. 765-807. This article has been included in the 
Political Liberalism’s expanded edition, from which I am quoting. 
291 S. Macedo, Public Reason, Democracy, and Political Community: The Critics Revisited, cit. 
292 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 207. 
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children have to receive an education that makes easy their becoming good liberal citizens who are 
able to support liberal order. However Macedo admits that if the state promotes trough public 
school some liberal virtues such as critical attitude toward competing political or religious claims or 
the respect for moral and religious pluralism it will encourage critical thinking in general. In sum, 
considering that it is difficult to insulate what one learns in the classroom with how one behaves in 
her extra-school life, it is easily foreseeable that “liberal civic virtues and attitudes will spill over 
into other sphere of life”293.  
 At this point the intriguing theoretical problem for Macedo, who as I have said defends a 
political liberalism that has also a thick civic dimension, is how to combine the rejection of 
founding liberal theory in comprehensive worldviews with the its civic orientation. It would seem 
that the more one looks at the way in which public schools shape children’s character so that they 
become good liberal citizens (in the sense of self-directing and critical individuals) the more the 
state betrays its commitment to a comprehensive idea of human flourishing294. In this case the 
comprehensive ideal could be a Millian theory of individuality or a Kantian view of autonomy, in 
any case, some comprehensive account that could possibly rejected by traditional groups. 
Some considerations on Macedo’s position about Wisconsin Vs. Yoder, which I have more 
extensively discussed in Chapter III, can help in better understanding the way in which his 
political/civic liberalism deals with diversity in educational matters. The starting point of Macedo’s 
treatment of Amish is that, notwithstanding they are good working and peaceful people, in other 
respects they are very far from being good liberal citizens295. Their society is patriarchal and can 
hardly be considered a place in which the equality between sexes is in force. Moreover Amish 
tradition does not permit that their children be educated for being ‘critically reflective citizens’ so, 
                                                 
293 Ibidem, p. 179. The spillover problem of political liberalism has been broadly discussed in J. Tomasi, Liberalism 
Beyond Justice. Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory, Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
294 For similar considerations see C. Wolfe, Natural Law Liberalism, cit., p. 116. 
295 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 207. This opinion draws on what J. Spinner writes in The Boundaries of 
Citizenship. Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State, Johns Hokpins University Press, 1994, pp. 87-108. 
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allowing that Amish parents directly care for the education of their children is not the best way to 
enhancing their capacities to score high as liberal citizens. 
According to Macedo, “that the children are prepared for the life in the Amish community is 
not enough: it is for the children to say whether that is what they wish”296. Thus Amisch children, 
like other pupils from whatever group, must be free to choose if they want to remain in their native 
communities or if they want leave for joining other groups. That is possible only when the 
education they receive makes them able to do so. Thus, granting an exemption from public schools 
like the one demanded from Amish parents in Wisconsin Vs. Yoder could mean a severe impairment 
in children’s capabilities to have an open future and, for this reason, in principle should not be 
granted. Macedo hopes that “Yoder remains a ‘dead end’ in American constitutional law”, and 
claims that it “should at some point be overruled”297. 
Now one can again wonder whether education shows that the distinction between Macedo’s 
political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism disappears. Even Rawls admits that, although 
there is a great difference in scope and generality between the two forms of liberal theory, 
“certainly there is some resemblance between the values of political liberalism and the values of the 
comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill”298. Macedo however specifies that his aim “is not to 
promote a comprehensive philosophical doctrine of autonomy or individuality, but to make sure that 
no authority imposes an intellectual tyranny on children”299. In other words, the notion of autonomy 
employed by his approach is limited to the political domain, although it easily spills over in other 
spheres of life. It is as if Macedo’s theory demanded that all individuals become politically 
autonomous, and this transformation is going to end up in their becoming also morally autonomous. 
Political autonomy is, as Rawls has pointed out, “the legal independence and assured political 
integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citizens equally in the exercise of political 
                                                 
296 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 208. 
297 Ibidem, p. 208. This considerations do not rule out that even justified laws and policies can admit exemptions. When 
these measures impose ‘special burdens’ on particular groups and individuals, some exceptions can be granted for 
reasons of fairness. See S. Macedo, Public Reason, Democracy, and Political Community, cit. 
298 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 200. 
299 S. Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, cit., p. 238. 
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power”300, whereas moral autonomy expresses itself in a life of reflection and critical examination 
of commitments, ideas, attitudes, and values. 
At this point one could object that both political and comprehensive liberalism, 
notwithstanding their philosophical differences, aim at the promotion of the same value of 
individual autonomy. In the next pages however I will not criticize Macedo’s theory on the basis of 
the fact that political liberalism is nothing more than a masked comprehensive liberalism given that 
their effects are not distinguishable. After all, the difference between a theory that justifies social 
order starting from substantive ethical commitments and a theory that starts instead from what 
different and yet reasonable comprehensive worldviews share remains. It remains also if one 
considers that they have quite similar effects301. After having said that, one can still object to the 
‘practical implications’302 of political liberalism, that is for example to the kind of society it fosters 
or to the virtues it promotes in direct or indirect ways. 
In the last section of this chapter however I will focus on the general idea of Macedo’s 
transformative liberalism. I will argue that although he grasps a fundamental aspect of liberalism 
(individual and collective identities must be shaped in specific ways to be supportive of liberal 
order) that is often neglected in contemporary literature, the aim of transformative mechanisms (a 
society in which individuals become politically autonomous) is excessively narrow and does not 
adequately address the diversity asking for accommodation in our liberal democratic societies. 
 
5. The narrowness of political transformations. 
Up to now, the reconstruction of Macedo’s thought has been eloquent in showing that the 
politicization of liberalism represents an interesting theoretical move for accommodating diversity. I 
                                                 
300 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, cit., p. xlii. 
301 One could say that, analogously, the difference between utilitarianism and right-based theories still holds even if 
both can, starting from their own philosophical premises, justify a right to, say, active euthanasia.  
302 J. Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice. Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory, cit., p. 9. In this 
book Tomasi argues that political liberalism can be objected for its ‘sociological effects’ even if “the form of 
justification sought by political liberals succeeds” (p. 10). Tomasi’s leading idea is that a theory can be correctly 
justified and yet its effects can be objectionable. In the case of political liberalism, the reasons for objections concern 
the fact that in a society ruled by its principles not all the conceptions of the good will be equally affected.    
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remarked in a previous page that political liberalism scores higher than comprehensive liberalism 
for what concerns the accommodation of “philosophical diversity at the foundational level”. 
Eschewing any appeal to ultimate truths and focusing on the political domain (although it is not 
seen as isolated from other extra-political concerns), political liberalism can claim the allegiance of 
many who do not feel comfortable in a society ruled by a comprehensive liberalism.  
Will Kymlicka has aimed at denying both that there is any substantive difference between 
the two ways in which liberalism can be justified and that political liberalism can be more 
successful than comprehensive liberalism in accommodating diversity. The Author of Multicultural 
Citizenship in fact maintains that the strategy of “endorsing autonomy only in political contexts, 
rather than as a general value, does not succeed. Accepting the value of autonomy for political 
purposes enables its exercise in private life, an implication that will only be favoured by those who 
endorse autonomy as a general value”303. Thus for Kymlicka the politicization of the value of 
autonomy cannot accommodate the claims of those individuals who reject an autonomous private 
lifestyle.  
However I think that it is possible to answer to such considerations. For example, as it has 
been showed in recent works by some scholars concerned with the compatibility of Islam with 
liberal democratic values, political liberalism, with its focus on the need to avoid questions 
connected with the ultimate truth of a set of religious beliefs, tends to be less sectarian than “deeply 
secular” and “truth seeking” 304 comprehensive liberalism. In a recent article Andrew F. March has 
showed that in the case of Muslim minorities, political liberalism can vindicate its aspiration “to 
win the support of otherwise nonliberal social groups”305. In fact, Islam would prefer a situation in 
                                                 
303 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 162. 
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which its religious and metaphysical beliefs are politically expressed but, given that in the public 
arena the political power is shared with non-Muslims, it is desirable to ground political power in 
what different comprehensive doctrines share, as it is recommended by political liberalism’s tenets. 
In fact, “were non-Muslim states to make wider claims to metaphysical truth, then it might be more 
difficult for Muslim to affirm citizenship within them” 306. 
In addition, Macedo’s approach, with its emphasis on the civic dimension of political 
liberalism, enables us to grasp the fundamental dimension of individual and collective identities’ 
transformations involved in the accommodation process. Nonetheless, as I contend in the remaining 
part of the present section Macedo’s understanding of the transformative dimension of liberalism is 
incomplete.  
In a passage addressing the problem of which groups are worthy of being accommodated, 
Macedo writes that “the important point is that we must decide which communities are to be 
accommodated, and that there is nothing wrong with deciding on the basis of the best reasons that 
are available, and with due confidence in the worth of preserving liberal institutions”307. Remarking 
that we have the duty to decide whom and according to which principles is to be included in our 
liberal society does not allow to see some relevant issues involved in a fair integration of 
individuals and groups understood as free and equal participants in a framework constituted by 
liberal rights and freedom. 
Firstly, given the complexity and the diversification of every liberal society it is difficult to 
identify the we in which the ultimate authority resides when it has to be decided if a group has to be 
accommodated and, after it has been accommodated, which are to be the most fair terms of 
inclusion. Unless one assumes an unrealistic monolithic image of liberal society, there will be more 
then one we competing for having the last word about such complex issues. Moreover, one has to 
have in mind that all these opposite we will have different interpretations of core liberal principles, 
and so, different and conflicting views about the best answer to diversity. Should the majority 
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 92
principle be applied? Sure, it could be applied, but if it is applied without further considerations, 
there is the risk that the accommodation becomes more a matter of power than of justifiable 
principles. In other words, if the majority decides on the basis of its own principles which groups 
claims are to be accommodated in liberal society and which are the ways in which minority groups 
should transform to be included, it seems that the hegemony liberalism is assumed to exercise is 
more then moderate308, notwithstanding Macedo’s intentions. In this case, one would have a 
majority imposing its values on majority asking for accommodation trough fair and equitable terms 
of integration. 
Secondly, it is difficult to imagine an accommodation that does not involve changes in the 
majority that receives new and presumably different groups. I argue that Macedo’s approach is well 
equipped to see only one side of the coin, that is the transformations demanded to minorities, 
whereas it is easily predictable that, at least descriptively, the inclusion of new minorities in a 
liberal state will alter its character. Imagine a homogeneous society that includes minorities having 
different religious, moral, or political beliefs: even leaving aside for the moment considerations 
about the fairest forms of inclusion, one can claim that the presence of these new minorities will 
have the effect of creating, in certain senses, a new society. 
The process of integration of immigrants shows clearly that the inclusion of new groups 
involves transformations both in majority and in minorities. In this case I will not take a stand in the 
complex debate between those who argue in favour of open borders and those who support 
restriction to migration309. For the sake of the example, suppose that the migrants have been 
lawfully admitted in the new country without serious dangers for its economics, stability, and social 
                                                 
308 The hegemony of liberalism is, according to Macedo, moderate. See the title of the article cited in the footnote 13. 
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peace. In this chapter I will follow Joseph Carens’ description of the process of integration of 
immigrants as a three stages process310. In the first, one has the recognition of formal legal equality 
of immigrants trough the grant of legal rights. A liberal state should grant these rights (except from 
political rights) even to individuals who are not yet citizens but reside within its territory. In fact, 
“liberal democratic principles may be interpreted in various ways but, however interpreted, they 
entail a deep commitment to treat those subject to the state authority fairly and equally”311. Liberal 
state must justify differential treatment for citizens and non-citizens, and it seems that there are no 
moral reason for not granting some fundamental legal rights to people who are under state authority 
although they are not included as full members of the democratic community, in the sense that they 
are not citizens.  
The second stage of the process of integration of immigrants is the acquisition of citizenship 
for long established residents and for their children. It is only with citizenship that immigrants 
achieve that “status that establishes one’s position as a full member of a political community (even 
though many of the rights of membership cannot be exercised until the children mature)”312 and can 
fully participate in the democratic process of self-determination. At this point one can wonder if 
there could be something beyond legal rights and citizenship, considering that they can coexist with 
gross inequalities among individual and groups. 
According to Carens there could be a further stage beyond the first two I briefly have 
exposed. It is difficult to specify what it would look like in an a-contextual way, but one could 
reasonably expect that there will be “some sort of mutual adaptation between immigrants and those 
in the receiving society”313. In the chapter about Will Kymlicka’s314 liberal multiculturalism the 
notion of integration of immigrants as a “two-way street” has been mentioned to mean a process of 
integration in which both immigrants and receiving society are reciprocally involved in 
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transformative processes. In that chapter the comprehensive idea of autonomy used by Kymlicka 
has been found defective for accounting for what, following Kymlicka himself and Jeff Spinner, has 
been called “pluralistic integration”. Now one could ask if Macedo’s theory works better. I already 
have observed that his politicization of liberalism represents a move toward a more stressed 
philosophical generosity towards diversity. And yet, as the following example will show, his 
emphasis on the transformative dimension of liberalism is too unilateral, in so far as it allows to 
grasp only the transformations demanded to minorities. 
Imagine that a liberal society in which Catholicism is the most common religion receives a 
significant number of Muslim migrants. Even though the society temporarily rejects full political 
integration for newcomers, it will be affected by many changes. Let us assume that Muslim children 
go to public schools with Catholic children. It is easy to foresee that, even without multicultural 
provisions aimed at accommodating newcomers, classrooms will become at least de facto 
multicultural.  
As David Miller has argued, migrants’ contribution to the reshaping of the culture of the 
nation to which they move is “a process that happens in any case”315, even only as a direct 
consequence of the factual presence of the newcomers. However, the relevant normative 
considerations arise when one considers which the more adequate way of accounting for this 
process is. Such an account has to recognize the value of migrants’ contribution in a non-residual 
way in so far as, once they have lawfully been admitted, their status as less than equal citizen is 
unjustifiable in a liberal perspective.   
In fact later, when the Muslim presence is recognized and accommodated, the changes will 
be more extended: there will be new study programs, particular provisions for holidays, etc. In a 
subsequent stage, if migrants are fully included in the democratic process and obtain citizenship, 
one can imagine that “the acceptance of difference in the public sphere easily leads to a number of 
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changes […] so as to accommodate the newly included groups”316. The public space of the 
receiving society will lodge new individuals with their previously excluded different religions, 
beliefs, moralities, histories. The earlier Catholic and homogeneous society is going to not exist 
anymore. It will have been replaced by a new society in which both old residents and newcomers 
went trough a process of reciprocal transformations.  
Once a liberal society decides, for loyalty to its own principles of freedom and equality, to 
accommodate new groups, even the we that in Macedo’s model must rule on matters of inclusion 
becomes subject to changes. In other words, as Bhikhu Parekh has argued, “We cannot integrate 
them so long as we remain we”317. Thus, a theory such as Macedo’s undervalues majority’s 
transformations and in this way cannot grasp this other fundamental dimension involved in the 
accommodation of diversity. 
At this point, one can state that Macedo’s understanding of liberalism’s transformative 
practices is incomplete. The stress on the political nature of the transformations in which 
newcomers groups are involved ends up to be misleading and too demanding: misleading because, 
as I tried to show, it blocks us from seeing that majorities too transform, and too demanding 
because asking minorities to become politically autonomous could be too much.  
To be more precise, one could say that Macedo’s approach is misleading because it is too 
demanding. Here I could, mutatis mutandis, restate the objection I moved in Chapter II of this 
Dissertation against Kymlicka’s attempt to liberalize non-liberal minorities (or the critiques William 
Galston318 raises against what he calls Enlightenment Liberalism). In the case of the author of 
Multicultural Citizenship there is a comprehensive idea of individual autonomy that is ruling the 
process of accommodation for new groups and individuals. That idea was found highly tricky, but, 
even if in a more nuanced form, the same problems appear when the idea of political autonomy is 
assumed as fundamental. Transforming all individuals in politically autonomous subjects can be 
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tantamount to transforming them in something different from what they are. In addition, this 
process becomes still more problematic if one adds that are majorities who fix the terms of 
inclusion according to their own principles and traditions. 
The justificatory difference between comprehensive and political autonomy is not removed. 
However, even in its political form, autonomy is still too controversial to be the leading value of a 
liberal theory, especially if, as the previous pages have illustrated, it does not allow a complete 
understanding of the transformative process of individual and groups identities involved in 
accommodating diversity.  
Thus autonomy as the main liberal value must be rejected both in its comprehensive and 
political form. In the next chapter I will try to sketch a political form of liberalism that, eschewing 
any reliance on whatever form of autonomy, aims to be the most adequate theory for dealing with 
diversity. As it will be showed, it is the rejection of autonomy that allows to bring to a completion 
the Rawlsian political turn that, in conjunction with the reliance on the value of autonomy, is unable 
to give diversity its due. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapters I have been discussing three liberal approaches to the problem of 
diversity. Comprehensive forms of liberalism were rejected both in Kymlicka’s pro-autonomy and 
Galston’s pro-toleration version. Kymlicka’ liberal multiculturalism appears to be unable to 
accommodate diversity. The emphasis on the value of autonomy excessively constraints the 
accommodation of diversity: the liberalization of minorities, considering that they could reject the 
primacy of autonomy without being dangerous for the maintenance of a liberal order, does not take 
seriously their difference. Galston’s theory, discarding the view that autonomy is the liberal 
sommum bonum, appears to go one step further. The recognition that in a liberal society there are 
many legitimate authorities and that liberalism demands respect for “expressive liberty” would 
seem a much more adequate tool for dealing with diversity, at least in practical terms. And yet, the 
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notion of value pluralism on which Galston’s liberalism relies is not a safe ground: it is a view 
according to which there are many goods, but Galston seems to translate it in the view that there are 
many cultures. A similar shift could, contrarily to Galston’s premises, condone illiberal outcomes 
and oppression. 
 The political turn represents a remarkable theoretical opening to the problem of diversity. 
After the process of politicization, liberalism becomes independent of comprehensive accounts of 
good, truth, religion. Political liberalism, relying on what individuals can share despite their 
comprehensive loyalties, is more philosophically generous than comprehensive liberalism insofar as 
he accepts more diversity at foundational level. In the fourth Chapter I discussed Macedo’s theory 
as an example of what I labelled ‘political pro-autonomy liberalism’. The analysis of Macedo’s 
view has showed that his approach is rather demanding. He subordinates the acceptance of diversity 
to the political transformation of the minorities looking for accommodation. The notion of political 
transformation has been found highly problematic: it prevents us from seeing that the integration of 
minorities involves reciprocal transformations both in majority and in minorities. 
I argue that the most adequate liberal theory for dealing with diversity has to be political and 
pro-toleration. The political turn must be brought to completion: political liberalism has to leave 
behind its commitment to autonomy, even to a political notion of autonomy. Demanding that 
individuals become politically autonomous could be too demanding and, as I observed examining 
Macedo’s theory, could hide important dimensions one has to consider about the integration of the 
minorities. Political liberalism is accomplished and does not betray its philosophical premises when 
it is coupled with a commitment to toleration. Only in this way one can have a theory that combines 
political liberalism’s virtue (its philosophical openness towards diversity) with the merits of pro-
toleration views (their practical receptivity). 
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If one considers recent liberal literature one can find that Chandran Kukathas’ Liberal 
Archipelago319 represents (in the sense in which I will specify in the next pages) a form of political 
liberalism according to which toleration, and not autonomy, is the core value. In this chapter I will 
analyze in some details Kukathas’ position using it as a significant illustration of the theory I want 
to argue for. Next section will explain the sense in which Kukathas’ liberalism has to be understood 
as both political and pro-toleration. In the third section I will deal with the way in which Kukathas 
faces the problem of minority rights320 and their relation with the mainstream society. It will be 
clear that the kind of society Kukathas envisages and recommends is “an archipelago of different 
communities operating in a sea of mutual toleration”321. These communities enjoy an extended 
degree of autonomy and independence in so far as they can be governed by different and not 
necessarily liberal principles. In other words, Kukathas’ liberal archipelago does not recognize the 
relevance that has been traditionally ascribed both by liberalism and communitarianism322 to the 
unity of the state. For Kukathas admits that his “sympathies with (some form of anarchism) are 
quite evident”323, and it is just on this point that I will move my more substantial objections against 
the Author of Liberal Archipelago because the absence of a unitary state could condone those same 
illiberal outcomes that Kukathas himself aims to avoid. I will rely on the theory of political 
obligations as associative obligations324 to show that the value of the unity of the state should be 
safeguarded even in a liberal theory that refuses comprehensive commitments and assumes 
toleration as its main commitment. 
 
2. A different political liberalism. 
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 In Two Concepts of Liberalism Kukathas maintains that “liberalism is a response to the fact 
of human diversity, and to the problems it generates”325, and that there are two possible answers 
one can give to these question. The first considers liberalism as a theory that “describes a set of 
standards or principles by which a community or a society should live”. From this perspective “a 
community is a liberal society if its institutions uphold or honour the values which make it 
liberal”326. According to the first conception Kukathas lists, the value liberalism fosters are 
autonomy (in Kantian sense) or individuality (in Millian sense). Further, this version of liberalism 
assumes that, beyond deep disagreements in many domains, individuals can reach an agreement on 
some fundamental principles of justice that must rule collective life. An instance of this liberalism is 
represented by Ralws’ A Theory of Justice327: in this work, Rawls “offers a comprehensive 
justification for a liberal social order, explaining that those who share a recognition of the 
fundamental importance of certain values would, in a suitably constrained setting, agree to a set of 
controlling moral principles (justice as fairness), and attendant institutional arrangements 
(constitutional democracy)”328.  
Kukathas finds highly problematic this variant of liberalism understood as an answer to the 
problem of diversity and disagreement. He argues that “people may disagree not only about, say, 
religious matters but also about principles of justice. […] If this is the case, the problem with a 
solution which recommends agreement to abide by a particular set of rules or principles of justice is 
that it risks begging the question”329. Aiming at a convergence on a theory of justice is too 
demanding if one adequately considers the disagreements that characterize modern societies. 
Liberalism, according to Kukathas, should not be primarily concerned with principles of justice or 
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with which principles individuals should assume as relevant in their private conducts, but with 
setting umpires who peacefully resolve disagreements. This way of conceiving of liberalism is, 
among other things, consistent with liberalism’s historical origins. In fact, as Kukathas writes, 
“liberalism’s original concerns were not with justice, or social unity, but with securing a regime of 
mutual toleration”330. It is important to observe that for Kukathas there is more than one umpire, 
that is more than one legitimate authority. Whereas theorists such as Macedo and Galston “defend 
liberalism by insisting on the compatibility of respect for diversity and the unity of liberal state”331, 
Kukathas does not recognize particular value to the unity of the state as such and does not think that 
liberal enquiry has to start from the assumption of a close society.  
These considerations will be relevant in the following pages, when the metaphor of the 
liberal archipelago will be more extensively discussed. For the moment it is enough to signal the 
politicity of Kukathas’ liberalism. He wants to establish liberalism as a “minimal moral 
conception”332. His liberal theory, like any political theory that wants to be normative in some sense 
is not devoid of moral content and, for this reason, is a moral conception like any comprehensive 
liberalism. But whereas comprehensive liberalisms are characterized by substantive commitments, 
political liberalism looks for the minimal conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful coexistence of 
different moral positions. 
Kukathas is quite explicit in claiming that toleration is the main value of liberalism. Further 
he also writes that “a society or community is a liberal one if, or to the extent that, it is tolerant”. In 
Kukathas view, toleration is not a demanding virtue according to which what is to be tolerated 
should be respected or admired. In Liberal Archipelago, “toleration requires little more than 
indifference to those who are, or that which is, tolerated”333. This account of toleration is deeply 
                                                 
330 C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 39. Kukathas cites John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration and Pierre 
Bayle’s Philosophical Commentaries as ‘critical works’ in the liberal tradition emerging after European Religious Wars 
XVII Century as a theoretical and political attempt to assert the value of liberty of conscience. 
331 Ibidem, p. 20. 
332 Ibidem, p. 17. Kukathas admits that his understanding of political liberalism is influenced by Charles Larmore, 
Political Liberalism, in Idem, The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 1996, Chapter 6. 
333 Ibidem, p. 23. 
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different from other popular accounts that are present in liberal recent literature. Liberal theorists 
such as John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Deborah Fitzmaurice334, notwithstanding momentous 
differences among their views, defend the value of toleration in indirect way: they share a 
commitment to autonomy, and it is just this commitment that defines the boundaries of what must 
be tolerated. In other words, all these approaches “presuppose the existence of a liberal order: that 
is, an order in which the value of autonomy, embodied in principles of justice, is authoritatively 
upheld in public sphere”335. Thus, there is a common moral standpoint that establishes what 
practices must be tolerated. If one thinks for a moment to minority practices from this perspective, 
toleration can be extended only to those practices that respect the core value of the mainstream 
society, that is autonomy, otherwise minorities are transformed so that their structure and values 
mirrors the structure and the values of the majority336. Underlying this conception of the toleration 
there is the idea that “when groups cease to respect the freedom or autonomy of individuals in their 
midst, toleration is no longer warranted”337. Kukathas rejects this view for two main reasons: 
firstly, because it assumes, without good enough justification, that in a liberal society there is an 
already established moral order that can set what has to be tolerated and what has to be considered 
intolerable. Secondly, such an approach is too concerned with the perpetuation of liberal order than 
with the respect for dissenters, and, as Kukathas argues, there is the “risk of intolerance and moral 
dogmatism”338. 
Kukathas proposes an alternative conception. In particular, he wants to defend a view 
according to which toleration has independent value. From this perspective toleration does count, in 
                                                 
334 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, cit.: J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Extended Edition, Columbia University Press, 
2005; D. Fitzmaurice, Autonomy as a Good: Liberalism, Autonomy, and Toleration, in The Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1), 
1993.  
335 C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 125. 
336 Ivi. The process of liberalization of minorities recommended by Kymlicka (see Chapter II of this Dissertation) can be 
considered an instance of what Kukathas means by restructuration of minorities practices. According to Kukathas, the 
liberalization of minorities assumes an excessively narrow concept of toleration. In fact,   
337 C. Kukathas, Rights of Culture, Rights of Conscience, in R. Tinnevelt, and G. Verschraegen, Edited by, Between 
Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty, Palgrave, 2006, p. 110. 
338 C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 126. 
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part, “because it checks or counters moral certitude”339: people are fallible and so, tolerating 
different and dissenting beliefs can be an answer to the awareness of the limits of human ability to 
know. These considerations do not seem to go beyond an instrumental defence of toleration: it 
would seem that toleration is valuable because it allows the prevalence of true beliefs over false 
ones. To go beyond instrumental arguments for toleration Kukathas adds that it “is also valuable 
because it is the condition which gives judgments worth”340. Here Kukathas is relying on the 
Kantian argument according to which reason depends upon a public realm of freedom. A full 
exposition of the argument is beyond the scope of this Chapter, but it is enough to say that reason 
becomes authoritative only in a public arena in which it is continuously subject to criticism and 
scrutiny. So, to avoid that reason authority is compromised, “toleration is vitally important”341.  
At this point one can wonder whether there is a relation between this reflections on reason 
and beliefs and the relevance of toleration in a liberal theory focused on the accommodation of 
diversity (for instance in the relations between majorities and minorities). Kukathas’ answers 
arguing that “relations among communities, including relations with non-liberal minorities, involve 
disputes in the realm of public reason”342: it is as if different communities represented different 
options in a dispute taking place in the public sphere of a liberal society in which disagreements 
cannot be denied. It is important to observe that this dialogue does not involve actual dialogical 
practices. In fact, Kukathas claims that there is a dispute among majority and minorities even when 
one thinks to those some small conservative groups (such as the Hutterites) who do not aims at 
participating in modern society but want to withdraw from it. Awareness of the existence of other 
possibility of life is enough to state that different positions are present and dispute in the public 
sphere. 
                                                 
339 Ivi. 
340 Ivi. 
341 Ibidem, p. 127. To explain Kant’s position about the public use of reason, Kukathas quotes I. Kant, The Critique  of 
Pure Reason, St. Martin’s, 1970, and O. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations in Kant’s Practical 
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
342 Ibidem, p. 128. 
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In this section I have showed in which sense Kukathas’ liberalism has to be understood as 
both political (for what concerns the justification) and pro-toleration (for what concerns the core 
value). Thus, according to the taxonomy I have elaborated in the first Chapter of the Dissertation, 
Kukathas’ thoery is an illustration of PT liberalism. In the next section I will discuss the model of 
society recommended by Kukathas and the way he thinks diversity should be dealt with.   
    
3. The archipelago society and the politics of indifference towards diversity. 
 In The Liberal Archipelago Kukathas writes that “the free society described by liberalism is 
not a stable social unity created or upheld by a shared doctrine. It is, rather, a collection of 
communities associated under laws which recognizes the freedom of individuals to associate as, and 
with whom, they wish”343. Thus, the archipelago society is composed by many communities which, 
like islands composing an archipelago, float in a sea of reciprocal toleration. Individuals are free to 
join groups of whatever character, even illiberal ones. It is important to observe that membership in 
a group is not exclusive, in the sense that an individual can join different groups and these groups 
can contribute to the shaping of their lives in different ways. Here there is a deep disagreement 
between Kukathas and communitarians and many liberals. In particular, Kukathas maintains that 
communitarians344 must be criticized because, with their emphasis on social unity, can suppress 
social diversity and undervalue the fundamental attachments every individual has towards her own 
partial community. Moreover, communitarians, with their accent on the centrality of political 
community, tend to “neglect the character of community as something changeable and fluid”345. 
Liberals, even though they start from opposed philosophical premises, also tend to assume that 
                                                 
343 Ibidem, p. 19. 
344 See, among the many works one could consider, M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
345 C. Kukathas, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community, cit., p. 92. 
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political community is the preeminent community and that “its interests or values take priority 
whenever there is a conflict over differing values”346. 
 Shortly, Kukathas argues that both communitarianism and contemporary liberal because 
they overstate the significance of political community. The latter is, according to Kukathas, “an 
association of individuals who share an understanding of what is public and what is private within 
that polity”347. In a liberal order, the political community should be only one among many 
communities to which individuals are freely committed. Kukathas contends further that in case of 
conflicts among different communities, there is no fix law establishing the priority of political 
community. In The Liberal Archipelago there is a list of some reasons for conferring less value to 
political community. Firstly, there is the risk that, if political community enjoys the role of 
dominant community, it could be oppressive: “this form of oppression has not been difficult to find 
in modern states, which have – to various degrees – established national standards for all kind of 
practices, ranging from education to medicine to law”348. Another reason for undervaluing political 
community concerns the observation that, when political community is understood as a nation, there 
could be an extremely strong concentration of power in a central state apparatus. The main problem 
is that the existence of a strong central state represents a menace to individual liberty in so far as the 
conformity required from the existence of a centralized state can imply significant suppressions of 
individual and groups diversity. Moreover, history is rich of examples of the fact that the state has 
been “the most powerful instrument of oppression and domination we have known”349. 
 Having in mind these considerations, one can understand that in Kukathas’ model the role of 
the state is sensibly less extended than the one recognized by other liberal writers. For instance, 
Will Kymlicka, who is considered by Kukathas as the main adversary of his Liberal Archipelago, 
                                                 
346 Ibidem, p. 94. The liberal theorists to which Kukathas polemically refers are mainly John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, 
and Will Kymlicka. 
347 C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 172, emphasis in the text. It should be pointed out that, for Kukathas, 
political community is not equivalent to state: the latter is mainly characterized in an institutional sense, in so far as it is 
composed by those institutional mechanisms concerned with policing, lawmaking, warmaking, and so on (See Liberal 
Archipelago, cit., p. 209).  
348 Ibidem, p. 192. 
349 Ibidem, p. 159. 
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claims that the role of the state is “to uphold and promote justice; and since the conception of justice 
in question is a liberal conception of justice, its task is to liberalize society”350. According to 
Kukathas, neither the liberalization of the society nor the liberalization of groups should be among 
the legitimate aims of state: it should not be concerned with the promotion of whatever conception 
of justice, but should only care about the preservation of order in a context in which different 
groups can be in conflict. Thus the state should work as an umpire with no specific aims apart from 
the peaceful and free coexistence of potentially conflictual individuals and groups who should 
safely pursue their own ends. However Kukathas specifies that the state “is only an umpire – not the 
umpire”351, but it is still an important umpire in reason of its power. 
 After having explained the liberal archipelago metaphor and after having sketched the 
function acknowledged for the state in Kukathas theory, I can proceed in analyzing how the 
problem of diversity is faced in this pro-toleration political liberalism. The starting point for the 
analysis of this matter is a passage from the first chapter of Liberal Archipelago in which Kukathas, 
in polemics with William Galston and other pro-diversity liberals, writes: “diversity is not the value 
liberalism pursues but the source of the problem to which it offers a solution”352. It is simply a fact 
of social life that there is a plurality of cultures, religions, languages, and liberalism goes in the 
wrong direction if it aims at protecting or celebrating this diversity. Kukathas argues that diversity 
has no intrinsic value, in the sense that it is no valuable as such. Rather, it is easy to observe that “in 
some contexts, uniformity is preferable”353: think for example to the degree of homogeneity 
required in a church or in some kind of political associations. 
 At this point one could ask: what is the right liberal attitude toward diversity? Should liberal 
state recognize in some ways the diversity of groups, communities, and associations354? What is the 
                                                 
350 Ibidem, p. 212. 
351 Ibidem, p. 213. 
352 Ibidem, p. 29. 
353 Ibidem, p. 32. 
354 Liberal theorists have often been criticized for their being inhospitable to difference. In particular, liberals have been 
objected because their aspirations to universality reflect the standards of the dominant cultures and disrespect the 
identities of minorities asking for some form of recognition. See C. Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in A. Gutmann, 
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right course of action for a liberalism that wants to face the demands of recognition advanced by 
groups? Kukathas’ answer is very simple in so far as he claims that “liberalism is indifferent to the 
groups of which individuals may be members, it recognizes the freedom of individuals to join or 
form groups or to continue to belong to groups into which they may have been born – but it takes 
no interest in the interests or attachments which people might have”355. Thus, given that the only 
interest of the liberal state resides in the preservation of an ordered peace in which individuals and 
groups must be free to pursue their ends, any move pointing toward whatever form of recognition 
for groups has to be considered illegitimate. This holds whether when the recognition remains 
within liberalism (consider for instance Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism) and when the 
recognition goes beyond liberalism and it is more an acknowledgement of liberalism incapacity in 
accommodating diversity than an integration of liberal theory with other considerations (consider 
for instance Charles Taylor’s multiculturalism356). 
 The reasons for denying the desirability of the politics of recognition (trough differentiated 
rights and policies) are related to the fear of conflicts. As it has been observed in a previous page, 
groups are far from being natural entities. They are “mutable social formations that change size, 
shape, and character as society and circumstances vary”357, so the definition itself of groups could 
generate conflicts or actualize latent conflicts. Even when the nature and the composition of groups 
is relatively stable “recognition is troubling because it signals an elevation of the conflict between 
groups over material gains into conflicts over the identity of the society”358. Moreover, not all 
groups want the same thing: if one considers some religious conservative communities such as the 
Amish or the Hutterites who want in some senses be left alone, one can see that recognition is not 
an universal aim in liberal societies. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Edited by, Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, 1994. Kukathas dealt 
with these objections in his Liberalism and Multiculturalism. The Politics of Indifference, in Political Theory, 1998. 
355 C. Kukathas, Liberalism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, in A. Vincent, Edited by, Political Theory. Tradition and 
Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 135. For similar considerations see C. Kukathas, Liberalism and 
Multiculturalism, cit., p. 691. 
356 See C. Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, cit. 
357 C. Kukathas, Liberalism and Multiculturalism. The Politics of Indifference, cit., p. 693. 
358 Ivi. 
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 In Kukathas’ liberalism freedom of association is extremely relevant. Individuals are free to 
join whatever groups or community if they like so. Their freedom to associate is so extended that 
they can join even illiberal communities. In fact, according to Kukathas, a liberal society is not 
necessarily composed of liberal communities359. As it has been previously observed, for Kukathas 
liberalism is not a theory of justice, but a theory aiming at the peaceful coexistence of different (and 
potentially conflicting) communities. Thus, an illiberal society can be tolerated if it does not 
represent a risk for the security of the whole society and if does not impose its authority on people 
who want to leave. In fact, freedom of association is not without limits. In Kukathas’ theory 
individuals are free to associate, but they must also enjoy “a substantive freedom to exit”360 in the 
sense that they should be free to leave their community and that there should be a wider society 
open to them. In Kukathas’ perspective, the right of exit can be understood as nothing more than a 
right to the repudiation of authority. A community can exercise authority over its members only 
when they acquiesce361. 
Freedom of exit is not an ultimate value in so far as it is grounded in liberty of conscience. 
As Kukathas has written in a paper on human rights, freedom of conscience “is the basis for a very 
important freedom: to dissociate from people or communities or traditions or standards one cannot 
abide”362. Freedom of conscience is understandable as ‘inner freedom’, but in a minimal sense. It 
captures three important ideas: firstly it accounts for the importance of the fact that individuals act 
rightly and that they should not be coerced to act in ways they consider wrong. Secondly, “freedom 
of conscience recognizes that people’s ideas of right and wrong differ”363. Finally, the idea of 
freedom of conscience accommodates the old liberal conviction that authentic beliefs should not be 
imposed. From these remarks one can realize that, for Kukathas, freedom of conscience is neither 
                                                 
359 See C. Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, cit., p. 249. 
360 Ibidem, p. 252. 
361 Kukathas maintains that “the basis of any association’s or community’s authority is not any right of the group to 
perpetuation, or even existence, but the acquiescence of its members”. See C. Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, cit., p. 96. 
362 C. . Kukathas, Rights of Culture, Rights of Conscience, cit., p. 115. 
363 Ibidem, p. 115. 
 109
autonomy nor self-direction: in fact, even non-autonomous persons can have free conscience 
provided that they are not required to conform to what they don’t endorse. 
 
4. The archipelago view of society and its limits. 
 The archipelago view of society defended by Kukathas has been at length criticized. Many 
theorist have objected to it both on the basis of the fact that it misrepresents the character of liberal 
societies and on the basis of its normative outcomes. In other words, critics pointed their attention 
both on its descriptive aspects (does liberal society is actually as Kukathas represents it?) and on its 
normative dimension (does the supremacy of toleration recommended by Kukathas’ model is an 
adequate theoretical tool for dealing with diversity?). In this section I will account for some of these 
objections and I will expose my own critical remarks aiming at weakening the anarchical character 
of Kukathas’ liberalism. 
 In Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and the Problem of Internal Minorities364 Daniel 
Weinstock claims that the archipelago view of society is a sociological assumption shared by many 
theorist who discuss the problem of minority rights. In fact, although Kukathas is the most extreme 
philosopher who defends such a view, there are some other contemporary writers such as Jseph 
Raz, Jeff Spinner-Halev, and John Gray who assume a similar view of the society365: “political 
society is thought of as formed by discrete, insular communities that happen to share space, and that 
willy-nilly must come to an understanding of how to govern the commons”366. 
 Weinstock aims at contesting the two assumptions on which the archipelago view relies: the 
independence assumption and the completeness assumption. According to the first, individuals form 
their identities independently from the political environment in which they are embedded. The 
completeness assumption claims that each group completely accounts for the identity of its 
                                                 
364 D. M. Weinstock, Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Internal Minorities, in A. S. Laden, and D. Owen, Edited by, 
Multiculturalism and Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
365 See J. Raz, Multiculturalism, in Idem, Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford University Press, 1994; J. Gray, Two 
Faces of Liberalism, New Press, 2000; J. Spinner-Halev, Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression and the State, in 
Ethics, Vol. 112, 2001. 
366 D. M. Weinstock, Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Internal Minorities, cit., p. 257. 
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members. Weinstock argues that “both of these assumptions are entailed by the archipelago view. 
People are thought of as relating to the public sphere and to other communities exclusively as 
members of a particular community (the completeness assumption), and as forming their identities 
within those communities (the independence assumption)”367. The problem for the archipelago 
view is that both these assumption are implausible. 
 The independence assumption mistakenly takes for granted that groups are generally insular 
and isolated, whereas it is a matter of fact that groups and their cultures interact and dialectically 
evolve. With the exception of few conservative religious groups such as the Amish and the 
Hutterites, the groups spread in liberal society cannot be depicted in the way required by the 
independence assumption. In fact, “orthodoxy and insularity are not the natural states of 
cultures”368. The completeness assumption is flawed as well: it does not recognize that “typically, 
individuals belong to a plurality of groups”369 (such as churches, political parties, professional or 
recreational associations) none of which can completely account for the character of a person. Both 
the independence and the completeness assumption take exceptional and extreme cases as 
paradigmatic of the social life in contemporary liberal societies. The insularity required by the 
archipelago view can be only the outcome of a decision, and any decision asks for a context that 
offers different options among which the choice can be exercised. 
 These considerations point to state that the archipelago view is descriptively inadequate. 
The problem is that it misrepresents the real nature of liberal society and the actual relations 
between mainstream society and minorities. Weinstock’s further observations concern the 
normative inadequacy of the archipelago view. The two inadequacies are connected. In fact, even 
the groups one can think more insular have relations with the mainstream society and receive many 
benefits from it: “their proximity and participation in society means that they are not to be thought 
of solely as formulating claims against the state and the broader society within which they live. 
                                                 
367 Ibidem, p. 258. 
368 Ibidem, p. 262. 
369 Ivi.. 
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They must also be thought of as having obligations toward the state and the broader society”370. 
Differently stated, all the groups receive some benefits from the organization of the mainstream 
society, and are just those benefits that ground the obligations of particular groups toward the rest of 
the society. To be consistent with the archipelago image, Weinstock writes: “since citizens of 
modern societies actually spend quite a bit of time in the waters separating groups from one 
another, they all have a responsibility to make sure that they are suitable to the needs of all”371. 
Thus, apart from quite rare cases of complete isolation, even the members of conservative 
communities must be considered citizens of the mainstream society independently of their likes.  
To be fair to Kukathas, I would say that the objections according to which the archipelago 
view is descriptively inadequate are exaggerated. In fact, in Liberal Archipelago Kukathas argues 
that “groups are themselves not in any way natural or fixed entities but mutable social formations 
which change shape, size, and character as society and circumstances vary”372. So, it is difficult to 
find a statement according to which the insularity of some small conservative groups is the normal 
condition of groups. Even in Are There any Cultural Rights? one can find a full acknowledgment of 
the fact that cultural communities are not isolated from the rest of the society and so that, although 
each group should have the right to rule its collective existence according to its principles, “no 
community within a wider society can remain entirely untouched by the political institutions and the 
legal and moral norms of the whole”373. It is enough to consider for a moment the way in which the 
existence of the exit rights, that are fundamental in the overall economy of Kukathas’ approach, 
transforms the nature of particular communities. When an individual is free to leave, her community 
is inevitably transformed, “particularly if the formal right comes with substantive opportunities”374. 
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